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a. The Thesis to be advanced: Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism 
 
This Thesis recommends a way of  thinking about the knowledge we have of  our own 
intentional actions or, as I will call it, practical knowledge. On this view, one’s knowledge of  
what one intentionally does is constituted by the intention involved in doing it, on the 
condition that the intention is executed. Intentions are understood as differing from 
beliefs both normatively and semantically. They differ normatively in that they set 
standards on how things are to go or to be going, whereas beliefs have standards set for 
them by how things are, were or will be. And they differ semantically because whereas 
beliefs are propositional attitudes, intentions are not, or at least are not fundamentally so.  
 
I call this view Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism about Practical Knowledge, or Non-
Propositionalist Intentionalism – NPI – for short. The ‘Intentionalism’ part of  the name 
indicates a view on which practical knowledge is constituted by intention, and the Non-
Propositionalist part indicates that intentions are here understood as – unlike beliefs – not 
propositional attitudes. NPI is a response to the problems I find in various attempts to 
understand how practical knowledge could be constituted by a true belief  held in 
epistemically favourable circumstances, and is a development of  the view I find in 
Anscombe’s Intention. 
 
In addition to its key claim - that practical knowledge is constituted by intentions, on the 
condition that they are executed - NPI involves two other commitments, one 
epistemological and one action-theoretic. The first is a commitment to understanding 
knowledge per se as neutral between its practical and theoretical manifestations, as a 
certain kind of  mental engagement with a fact; a kind apt to underwrite certain specifically 
epistemic capacities, such as the capacity to express and to make inferences from what 
one knows. Possessing these capacities can be a matter of  having a belief  which is true 
and held in epistemically favourable circumstances, but it can also be a matter of  having 
an intention which is being or will be executed. Knowledge manifested in the first way is 
‘theoretical’ and knowledge manifested in the second way is ‘practical’. 
 
The second commitment is to a non-reductive conception of  the relationship between 
the phenomena (concepts) of  practical knowledge, intentional action and intention-execution. 
These three phenomena are understood as three distinct yet essentially related facets of  a 
single underlying phenomenon. The concepts which pick out each of  these three facets 
are to be conceptually elucidated in terms of  one another. Thinking of  someone as φ-ing 
intentionally, as executing their intention to φ, or as having practical knowledge that they 
are φ-ing is thinking of  them as instantiating a single phenomenon under three different 
aspects.  
 
I argue that NPI is the best way to jointly meet several constraints on a good account of  






b. The structure of the discussion 
  
The Thesis falls into three parts; NPI is introduced and defended in Part Three. Let me 
sketch the argumentative route which will take us there.  
 
Part One introduces our target phenomenon - practical knowledge - and motivates accepting 
some version of  Intentionalism; the view that practical knowledge is somehow constituted 
by the agent’s intention. In Chapter One practical knowledge is described first in terms 
of  its content and then in terms of  three philosophically interesting features which 
appear to characterise knowledge with this content. An initial constraint - the Apparent 
Features constraint - requires an account of  practical knowledge either to accommodate or to 
explain away each of  these apparent features. Practical knowledge and intentional action 
are shown to be particularly tightly related, and in light of  this a second constraint is 
added: the Special Relationship constraint requires an account of  practical knowledge to 
contain a plausible conception of  this relationship. 
  
Chapter Two aims to dismiss two general approaches to thinking about practical 
knowledge by dismissing representative examples. Lucy O’Brien sees practical knowledge 
as somehow grounded in the agent’s conscious awareness of  acting, whereas Sarah Paul 
thinks of  practical knowledge as inferred from the agent’s knowledge of  her intention. I 
suggest that both O’Brien’s consciousness-based account and Paul’s inferentialist account flout 
the Special Relationship constraint, albeit in different ways. Paul’s account, additionally, 
flouts the Apparent Features constraint and a new constraint we are led to by the 
discussion: the Why Knowledge? constraint requires an account of  practical knowledge to 
make it clear why the phenomenon it describes achieves the status of  knowledge. I try to 
show that it is the core respective ideas in O’Brien’s and Paul’s pictures which cause 
problems for their views; O’Brien’s problems stem from thinking of  practical knowledge 
as consciousness-based, and Paul’s from thinking of  it as inferentially grounded. These 
two broad approaches are the key alternatives to Intentionalism, so rejecting them 
motivates considering the latter. 
  
Part Two considers and rejects a version of  Intentionalism I call Cognitivist Intentionalism - 
CI. The ‘Cognitivism’ included in CI is the view that intentions are a kind of  belief. If  we 
think of  ‘ordinary’ knowledge as constituted by true beliefs held in epistemically 
favourable circumstances, then we can think of  ‘practical’ knowledge as a special case, 
one in which the true belief  is an intention. This basic structure is consistent with 
different accounts of  what the ‘epistemically favourable circumstances’ are, in which a 
true intention-belief  gets elevated to knowledge-status. I consider an internalist and an 
externalist version of  CI in Chapter Three. The internalist version comes from David 
Velleman and is found lacking in similar ways to Sarah Paul’s inferentialist view. I explain 
that this should come as no surprise because despite very different accounts of  practical 
knowledge’s psychology, Paul’s and Velleman’s epistemologies of  practical knowledge are 
very similar. The externalist version - due to Kieran Setiya - overcomes these problems, 
but does not obviously meet the Why Knowledge? constraint, and seems to rely on a 
suspect claim; that we can form beliefs at will.  
 
Chapter Four argues for a fourth constraint on a good account of  practical knowledge. 
The Intention-Content constraint rules out any account of  practical knowledge which 
requires seeing intentions as in all cases propositional attitudes. I assume that some 
intentions are propositional attitudes, and argue that these can be executed only by 
executing a non-propositional intention; specifically one whose content does not contain 
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reference to the intender, an intention simply to φ. No version of  CI can meet the 
Intention-Content constraint: if  intentions are a kind of  belief  then they must be 
propositional attitudes in all cases. We thus have a reason to reject CI which is 
independent of  problems with the details of  any particular version of  it. If  practical 
knowledge is somehow constituted by intention, it cannot be because those intentions are 
a kind of  belief.  
 
Part Three introduces, develops and defends a better Intentionalism. Chapter Five 
considers a view which I find in Anscombe’s Intention and label Non-Cognitivist 
Intentionalism – NCI. NCI holds that practical knowledge is constituted by intentions rather 
than beliefs. Intentions and beliefs differ normatively: intentions set standards on how 
things are to go whereas beliefs have standards set for them by the facts. Because 
practical and theoretical knowledge are constituted by attitudes of  different normative 
shapes, they themselves differ formally in two important ways: practical knowledge is 
undermined by a mistaken performance; theoretical knowledge by a mistaken judgment, 
and practical knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’, whereas theoretical 
knowledge is ‘derived from the objects known’. Because it sees practical knowledge as 
having these formal properties, NCI happily meets the Apparent Features and Special 
Relationship constraints, and does so in a unified way. Our discussion also leads us to 
introduce a new constraint. The Structure-Sensitivity constraint requires a good account of  
practical knowledge to be sensitive to intentional action’s internal structure, which I 
explain. NCI is shown to meet this constraint very easily too. 
 
But NCI faces two serious problems. First, it is unclear whether it meets the Why 
Knowledge? constraint. For NCI holds that practical knowledge is constituted by intention, 
which is not a kind of  belief, just in case the intention is executed. But it is hard to see 
how an attitude other than belief  could constitute knowledge, and hard to see in 
particular how executing an intention could be an epistemic-phenomenon rather than an 
agential one. Second, it is hard to see how NCI could meet the Intention-Content constraint 
consistently with a new and final constraint. This – the Knowledge-Content constraint - 
requires an account not to leave it mysterious why practical knowledge is a kind of  
propositional knowledge. Indeed, it might seem that any Intentionalism will flout either the 
Intention-Content or the Knowledge-Content constraint, depending on whether it sees 
intentions as propositional or as non-propositional attitudes: how could a non-
propositional attitude constitute a kind of  propositional knowledge?  
 
In Chapter Six I consider a version of  Intentionalism which contains a conception of  
intention as a non-propositional attitude. Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism - NPI - trivially 
meets the Intention-Content constraint, and since it entails NCI, also takes over NCI’s 
capacity to meet the Apparent Features, Special Relationship and Structure-Sensitivity 
constraints, as argued in Chapter Five. I explain how NPI can be developed in such a way 
that it meets the Why Knowledge? and Knowledge-Content constraints too. It meets the latter 
because its core claim is that intentions constitute practical knowledge on the condition 
that they are executed, and because the execution of  the intention brings into being 
something with propositional shape, viz. the fact that one is φ-ing. This fact, according to 
NPI, is the object of  the agent’s practical knowledge. And it meets the former because 
someone who is executing their intention possesses a set of  capacities which 
commonsense epistemology links to knowing that p, and because we need not think of  
them as believing that they are acting in order to explain how they have these capacities; 
we need only think of  them as executing their intention. The upshot is that executing an 
intention can be thought of  as an epistemic phenomenon as well as an agential one: it 
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bears all the marks of  knowing. Thus I will have made the case for NPI as an account of  
practical knowledge able to meet all six of  our constraints, and so an account to take 
seriously. 
 
c. Our Commonsense-Human methodology 
 
My approach to thinking about practical knowledge is guided by commonsense 
psychological, epistemological and action-theoretic reflections, and not by discoveries in 
empirical science or hypotheses from empirically-minded philosophy of  mind or 
theoretical epistemology. My starting assumption is that our commonsense-
psychological, -epistemological and -action-theoretic concepts are generally in good 
working order. Because I think these commonsense concept-types (epistemological, 
psychological etc.) are inextricably linked with one another, it is useful to have a term for 
the whole web of  them, and I will refer to them collectively as our commonsense-human 
concepts. I will refer to the methodology whose starting-point is a respect for the good 
working order of  these concepts as a commonsense-human methodology.   
 
The methodology does not assume that we cannot make or discover mistakes within our 
commonsense-human modes of  thought, but it does mean that mistakes can be exposed 
as mistakes only by exposing the ways in which they fail to mesh with other parts of  our 
commonsense-human understanding. One upshot of  this is that most of  the concepts, 
platitudes and assumptions of  commonsense must be held fixed as the background 
against which to consider any given part of  it. Another is that any account of  a 
commonsense-human phenomenon which entails that our commonsense-human 
understanding of  it is systematically mistaken, must provide an error-theory for these 
mistakes, itself  given in commonsense-human terms. 
 
My adherence to this commonsense-human methodology is motivated by the thought 
that our understanding of  the kind of  creatures we are is essentially bound up with our 
being the kind of  creatures we are. From this perspective, eliminativist or revisionist 
conceptions of  commonsense-human concepts are incoherent, since they presuppose 
that our characteristically human modes of  understanding, behaving and communicating 
could be abandoned, whilst tacitly assuming that we – i.e. this kind of  creature – would 
survive the abandonment. So I think that taking our commonsense-human concepts 
seriously is unavoidable, not only psychologically, but logically too. But I won’t argue for 
these points; I mention them by way of  explaining why I commit myself  to the 
commonsense-human methodology I am describing.  
 
But I think the methodology can be justified more prosaically too. For our quarry – 
practical knowledge - is itself  a commonsense-human phenomenon. My aim in this 
Thesis is to understand something which we all recognise from our experience as 
humans, specifically as agents and as knowers, although most of  us may not have a name 
for it. Because our target phenomenon is a commonsense-human one, we should not 








d. Why care about practical knowledge? 
 
Understanding practical knowledge is important for various reasons. I will consider just a 
few.  
 
First, some have thought that understanding our knowledge of  our own intentional 
actions might provide the basis for an understanding of  how we know about our own 
intentional mental states. The can be developed in various ways, but the common thread 
is to see our relation to these states as implicating our rational agency in some way.1 The 
prospects for a view like this aren’t my focus here, but clearly understanding practical 
knowledge is a prerequisite for such a view. 
 
Second, there is the thought that the actions which are the objects of  practical 
knowledge form a morally and legally relevant class. Denying that one knew that one was 
acting is a way of  denying one kind of  moral and/or legal responsibility. (I am careful not 
to make the (false) claim that there is no sense in which we can be responsible for those 
things we do unknowingly.) If  I poisoned the well unknowingly, because the fertilisers I 
used leached into the groundwater, then I am in a very different moral and legal situation 
to someone who did so intentionally and knowingly, in order to kill off  the villagers. 
Again, understanding practical knowledge enables more to be said about this special kind 
of  moral and legal responsibility. These issues are not my focus, but they will come up 
here and there during my discussions.  
 
Third, as we shall see in Chapter One, some have thought that practical knowledge’s 
philosophically interesting features follow from the fact that acting intentionally is in 
some important sense dependent on having practical knowledge. But ordinarily, the facts 
we know are independent of  our knowing them. The pangolin would still be endangered 
even if  I didn’t know that it was. If  practical knowledge does not fit this model, then a 
rather fundamental feature of  our conception of  knowledge will have to be re-thought. 
This is a central thought in Anscombe’s Intention and I will argue for it and develop it in 
Chapters Five and Six.  
 
Finally, the idea that acting intentionally is somehow dependent on one’s knowledge has 
action-theoretic implications. For if  the idea is right, then in order to understand either 
of  these phenomena – intentional action and practical knowledge - we need to 
understand them both, and to understand their interrelations. This idea too is central to 
Anscombe’s discussion, and is another which I will develop in Chapters Five and Six.  
                                                          
1 See e.g. Moran, “Making Up Your Mind”; Authority and Estrangement and “Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, 
and the Forms of  Activity”; O’Brien, “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force” and Self-Knowing Agents; 
Peacocke, “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)” and “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II)” and 







Part One introduces the phenomenon of  practical knowledge, develops three initial 
constraints on an adequate account of  it, and motivates taking some version of  
Intentionalism seriously. Chapter One provides an initial sketch of  practical knowledge, 










I am currently typing, typing a sentence, and writing a PhD Thesis. I know that I am 
doing all these things, but how? What is involved in having this knowledge? 
 
Many philosophers have thought that one’s knowledge of  one’s own intentional action is 
knowledge of  a special kind. Practical knowledge, as I will call it, appears to have certain 
philosophically interesting features, features which do not attach to one’s knowledge of  
one’s own non-intentional actions, or to one’s knowledge of  the intentional actions of  
others. This Thesis considers how best to understand practical knowledge, in order to do 
justice to its apparent possession of  these features.  
 
In this introductory Chapter I define a starting-point for this investigation by providing a 
sketch of  the phenomenon of  practical knowledge. The sketch must be sparse enough to 
be more or less neutral between the various accounts of  practical knowledge I will 
consider later on. But it must be full enough for it to be clear which phenomenon the 
expression ‘practical knowledge’ picks out, and to give an initial sense of  what a good 
account of  the phenomenon must explain.  
 
I start in §1 by describing practical knowledge in terms of  its content; as knowledge of  
one’s own current or ongoing intentional actions. But there is more to practical 
knowledge than this; practical knowledge appears to be first-person authoritative, epistemically 
ungrounded and psychologically immediate, features which I explain in §2. An initial constraint 
on an account of  practical knowledge – the Apparent Features constraint - requires an 
account to either accommodate, or explain away these features.  
 
That knowledge with a certain content should display unusual epistemological and 
psychological features ought to strike us as curious, as I explain in §3. So a second 
constraint on an account of  practical knowledge - the Special Relationship constraint - 
requires it to explain why the special features described in §2 should attach to knowledge 
with the content described in §1, and to contain a plausible conception of  the 
relationship between intentionally doing something and having practical knowledge that 
one is doing it. I give some reasons for and against considering that relationship a 
conceptual one, without drawing any conclusions; I will return to this issue in later 
chapters.  
 
In §4 I introduce some further possibilities for thinking about practical knowledge, 
possibilities we will consider more decisively in later chapters. We will see that some have 
been attracted to the idea that practical knowledge can take in future as well as present 
intentional actions, and that some have thought that practical knowledge is knowledge 
not only of  one’s intentional actions themselves, but also of  the reasons for which one 
acts. Again, I make no decisions on these issues, but will come back to them; in particular 
in Chapter Five. I conclude in §5 by re-capping our two initial constraints on an account 
of  practical knowledge. 
 4
1. Practical Knowledge’s Content 
 
A preliminary but nevertheless helpful characterisation of  our target phenomenon is as 
follows: 
  
Practical knowledge is the knowledge we have of  our own actions when those actions are 
intentional. 
 
This slogan will form the basis of  our sketch of  practical knowledge. Drawing out some 
of  the slogan’s implications will help us distinguish our target phenomenon from other 
phenomena which are sometimes given the label ‘practical knowledge’.  
 
‘Practical knowledge’ is sometimes used to refer to knowledge how to do something, 
understood as a certain kind of  capacity or ability for acting in a certain way, and often 
distinguished, following Ryle, from ‘knowledge-that’, or propositional knowledge.1 
Practical knowledge in our sense is not Rylean know-how, but a kind of  propositional 
knowledge. I have practical knowledge that I am typing, and although it is very plausible 
that I could not know that I am typing unless I knew how (in Ryle’s sense) to type, my 
practical knowledge is not itself  knowledge-how, but knowledge-that.2 
 
The distinction between practical knowledge and knowledge-how survives even when 
Ryle’s distinction between know-how and know-that is collapsed. Some have thought 
that my knowing how to type is my knowing that, of  some way of  acting w, w is a way of  
typing (or a way for me to type).3 But my practical knowledge (in our sense) is different 
from my knowledge how to type, even if construed as a kind of  knowledge-that. For my 
current practical knowledge that I am typing is existential in a way that propositionally 
construed knowledge-how is not; it entails the current existence of  an act of  typing, whereas my 
knowing how to type, however understood, does not.  
 
Finally, sometimes moral and prudential knowledge are referred to as ‘practical’ 
knowledge. But this knowledge is not existential either. My knowing that it is wrong to 
go about murdering people (moral knowledge) doesn’t entail that I’m doing any 
murdering, nor does my knowing that poisoning is a good (i.e. relatively covert) method 
of  murder.  
 
Our slogan characterises the object of  practical knowledge as the agent’s own intentional 
actions. That is not to say we can’t know about others’ actions, or about our own non-
intentional ones. Obviously we can. What it means is that these kinds of  knowledge are 
not examples of  the phenomenon this Thesis seeks to understand. And although 
practical knowledge is always knowledge of  intentional action, this does not mean that it 
must have contents of  the form “I am φ-ing intentionally”. What it means is that when 
someone’s knowledge that they are φ-ing is practical knowledge, they are φ-ing intentionally. 
We will begin to see why this is in §3, when we start to consider the special relationship 
                                                          
1 Ryle, The Concept of  Mind. Ch. 2. 
2 Throughout I will talk of  knowing that one is φ-ing interchangeably with knowing what one is doing. 
Identifying knowing what with a kind of  knowing that is controversial, but my choice of  usage does not 
commit me to this identification, it serves only to simplify discussion. The phenomenon I am interested 
in is knowledge of  the kind I express in saying “I am φ-ing”, and which is properly referred to as my 
knowledge that I am φ-ing. I will also sometimes refer to this phenomenon as ‘φ-ing knowingly.’ In all 
cases, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of  first-person propositional knowledge that one is φ–ing. 
3 See e.g. Stanley and Williamson, “Knowing How.”  
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which seems to exist between practical knowledge and intentional action. For now, I will 
speak as if  practical knowledge is always knowledge of  current or ongoing intentional 
action; as if  its content is always of  the form “I am φ-ing”, but I will come back to the 
question of  practical knowledge and tense in §4(a). 
 
Before moving on I want to make two further comments about the idea that practical 
knowledge is knowledge of  specifically intentional action. First, actions are not intentional 
per se, but relative to a description. I am currently typing, but I am also making tapping 
noises as I hit the keys, and whilst I am typing intentionally, my making tapping noises is not 
intentional. It is plausible to think that I am performing one action here which can be 
described in two different ways; this is the standard view and I will assume it here.4 As we 
might expect given that practical knowledge is particular to intentional action, practical 
knowledge is also description-relative: whilst I have practical knowledge that I am typing, I 
don’t have practical knowledge that I am making tapping noises, although I may well have 
some knowledge of  this (the difference between practical knowledge and non-practical 
knowledge of  action will be explored in §2).  
 
Second, I should be clear that in thinking of  practical knowledge as knowledge of  
specifically intentional action, I am glossing over a complexity within the literature. For 
although many have sought to understand the special kind of  knowledge we have of  a 
privileged class of  our own actions, not everyone has identified this privileged class with 
our intentional actions. Others have thought that we have a special kind of  knowledge of  
our voluntary,5 or our full-blooded,6 or our autonomous7, or our deliberate8 actions. Plausibly, 
these are all slightly different notions, each picking out a class of  action which is 
privileged in its own characteristic way.9 But they do seem to have something in common; 
they all seem to pick out actions which are related in a privileged way to their agents’ 
mind, rationality or personhood.10 
 
Why choose to identify the privileged class as that of  our intentional actions? There are 
two reasons. First, my study is located within a tradition – begun in Anscombe’s Intention 
- in which the privileged class is most commonly identified with intentional action. And 
second, my focus in this Thesis is on a certain kind of  account of  practical knowledge; an 
account on which practical knowledge is in some sense constituted by the agent’s 
intention. So it is natural to settle on the class of  intentional actions as those which are taken 
in by practical knowledge.11  
 
 
                                                          
4 See e.g. Anscombe, Intention, 11–12; and “Under a Description”; Davidson, “Agency,” 59; and “Problems 
in the Explanation of  Action,” 104. Ursula Coope suggests this view goes back at least to Aristotle 
(Coope, “Aristotle on Action,” 109.). Cf. Goldman, A Theory of  Human Action, 1–10. There is philosophy 
to be done in explaining when two descriptions attach to the same action, and when they pick out 
distinct actions, as they sometimes do, but I won’t be doing it here. 
5 Hampshire, Freedom of  the Individual, 54. 
6 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 5. 
7 Velleman, “Preçis of  The Possibility of  Practical Reason,” 4. 
8 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 161. 
9 For a discussion of  how these kind of  adverb might be distinguished, see Hyman, Action, Knowledge and 
Will. Ch. 1. 
10 Velleman, The Possibility of  Practical Reason, 4. 
11 Not everyone agrees on this. Velleman and Hampshire, for example, think that practical knowledge is 
constituted by intention, but is knowledge of  full-blooded or autonomous action (Velleman) or voluntary 
action (Hampshire).  
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2. Practical Knowledge’s Apparent Features 
 
We have just identified our target phenomenon in terms of  its content. But why should 
knowledge with a certain content be worthy of  philosophical investigation? We don’t care 
about the distinction between meteorological and non-meteorological knowledge, or 
about people’s knowledge about their own shoes as compared to their knowledge of  the 
shoes of  others. So why is knowledge about our own intentional actions interesting in a way 
that knowledge about our own non-intentional actions, or about the intentional actions 
of  others, is not? The answer is that this knowledge seems to have some curious features. 
I will distinguish three, explaining each in turn.  
 
a. First-Person Authority 
 
First person authority is a property usually associated with psychological self-knowledge; 
knowledge of  one’s own intentional and sensory states. In this connection, the 
expression ‘first person authority’ – henceforth ‘FPA’ - has various connotations; of  a 
person’s having privileged epistemic access to her mental states, of  her being the best person to 
ask about her own mental goings-on, of  her statements about her own mind being 
presumed true, if  presumed sincere, and so on. And there is disagreement over exactly how to 
understand FPA; over which of  these and other factors are relevant. To separate out the 
various properties associated with FPA would take us too far afield, but luckily we need 
not do this in order to make use of  the notion in our understanding of  practical 
knowledge.  
 
Instead we can start by understanding practical knowledge’s apparent FPA rather loosely; 
as involving some kind of  first-/third-person asymmetry. There is some kind of  difference 
between a person’s capacity to know what she is intentionally doing and anyone else’s 
capacity to know it. This does not mean that we are infallible about our own intentional 
actions. I can go wrong at least in the sense that I might think I am intentionally doing 
something which I am not – as when I think I’m kicking Rory under the table but I am in 
fact kicking Jen. What it means is that when I do have practical knowledge that I am φ-
ing, my epistemic relation to the fact that I am φ-ing is in some sense of  a different order 
than yours could be. 
 
I leave open here exactly what this sense is. All of  those whose accounts of  practical 
knowledge we will consider in the coming chapters – our protagonists, as I will call them 
– agree that practical knowledge displays FPA. A good account of  practical knowledge 
will contain a plausible explanation of  what this amounts to. I will come back to this in 
(d). 
 
b. Epistemic Ungroundedness 
 
Practical knowledge also appears not to be epistemically grounded in any of  the usual 
ways in which knowledge of  contingent facts is grounded. The ‘usual ways’ are memory, 
testimony, perception and inference, including inference from general knowledge and 
from any of  the other three kinds of  ground.  
 
We can rule out memory and testimony as grounding practical knowledge very easily. 
Memory can furnish us only with knowledge of  the past, or function to maintain 
knowledge previously learned. But practical knowledge is never knowledge of  past 
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intentional action. Testimony often grounds our knowledge of  others’ intentional 
actions, as when Henry tells me on the phone that he’s starting a new painting; or our 
knowledge of  our own non-intentional ones, as when later, whilst visiting his studio, 
Henry tells me that I’m standing on a tube of  paint. But Henry doesn’t appear able to 
inform me that I am – intentionally – wiping the paint off  my shoe. If  I am wiping off  
the paint intentionally, I don’t seem to need someone else to tell me I am. And my 
practical knowledge can’t be based on my own testimony, on pain of  circularity. 
 
Sometimes we know about others’ intentional actions and our own non-intentional ones 
by perception or observation.12 (I will use these expressions interchangeably throughout 
the discussion of  this Thesis.13) But I don’t seem to know about my own intentional 
actions in this way either.14 Consider my knowledge that I am typing these words. Yes, I 
can see and feel my fingers moving, hear and feel them hitting the keys and see these 
words appearing on the screen, but my knowledge that I am typing these words doesn’t 
seem based on these observations. After all, if  I didn’t know what I was typing until I saw 
the words appear on the screen, it would come as a surprise to me that I ended up 
writing just these words. And not only is it not a surprise, but it’s hard to see how I could be 
intentionally writing a sentence if  I had to rely on perception to tell me what I was 
writing. Having written “Not only is it not a surprise,” for example, I would not yet know 
which sentence these words were the beginning of. In such a scenario it is hard to see 
how writing a sentence could be any less than a miracle. 
 
A further reason to doubt that perception grounds practical knowledge is illustrated 
nicely by Kevin Falvey:  
 
Suppose […] that I have a nosy neighbor who spies on me using a telescope trained on 
my apartment. If  I am sitting on the couch one afternoon reading a book, she would be 
in a position to see that I am doing so, but she would not be in a position to see, what 
might be perfectly true […], that I am making bread.15 
 
Whilst sitting on the couch, Falvey knows that he is making bread in the absence of  any 
current relevant perceptible clues. Nor does his knowledge seem to be based on earlier 
clues which his neighbour wasn’t party to. To see this, assume that his nosy neighbour 
has been watching him all day, has seen him kneading the dough and putting it on the 
radiator to rise. It is still possible for Falvey to have knowledge which his neighbour 
lacks; for adjust the example so that Falvey is not making bread at all, not really; instead 
he’s experimenting with a new low-yeast recipe he’s found (he doubts it will yield a dough 
that rises properly). Things look just as they did in the previous case, and the neighbour 
judges as before, that Falvey is making bread. But he’s not – he’s doing an experiment. 
And Falvey knows this despite the fact that the same (or: relevantly similar) perceptual 
information is available to him as to his neighbour.  
                                                          
12 A piece of  knowledge might be grounded in perception without being inferred from perceptual beliefs (see 
Roessler, “Intentional Action and Self-Awareness”; Grünbaum, “Perception and Non-Inferential 
Knowledge of  Action.”). I consider an inferential conception of  practical knowledge below.  
13 This is standard in the literature, although not ubiquitous; John Schwenkler and Johannes Roessler both 
think that although practical knowledge is perceptually based without being observationally based 
(Schwenkler, “Perception and Practical Knowledge”; Roessler, “Intentional Action and Self-
Awareness.”). Both Schwenkler and Roessler make a strong case for practical and perceptual knowledge 
being intertwined in interesting ways, but I don’t think either makes a convincing case for the claim that 
practical knowledge is epistemically grounded on perception of  what one is doing, as that claim is 
understood here. I won’t have time to consider their discussions. 
14 Cf. Proust, “Perceiving Intentions.” 
15 Falvey, “Knowledge in Intention,” 25. 
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It might be pointed out here that actually Falvey has access to perceptual clues which his 
neighbour lacks, viz. the deliverances of  proprioception.16 But it is implausible that 
Falvey’s practical knowledge is based on proprioception. For in the initial example he 
knows that he is making bread (and not doing an experiment) and in the re-jigged version 
he knows that he is doing an experiment (and not making bread). Yet we can stipulate that 
his bodily movements, and so his proprioceptive information, up to and including his 
sitting on the couch, are just the same. Sure, his bodily movements will differ between 
the cases later on (in one case he takes the dough to the oven, in the other he takes it to 
the bin), but this is irrelevant to the knowledge he has whilst sitting on the couch of  what he 
is doing.  
 
It is important to be clear about what is being denied when we say that practical 
knowledge is not perceptually grounded. The idea is that it is not justified by reference to 
the agent’s perception of  her action. This does not rule out that perception is a 
precondition for having practical knowledge. It seems very plausible that certain intentional 
actions cannot be performed in the absence of  any sensory feedback. Even rather simple 
things like pointing to the right seem hard to imagine being able to do in complete sensory 
(including proprioceptive) deprivation,17 and more complex and world-involving actions 
like cycling to a friend’s house, playing darts or building a tree-house would be out of  the 
question.  
 
But that the capacity for perception is presupposed by the capacity for practical 
knowledge does not mean that practical knowledge is epistemically grounded in or 
justified by perception. Our judgments about what we are intentionally doing do not 
seem to be based on perceptual information, in the way that our judgments about what 
others are doing might be so based. Asked how I know that Jess is cycling, I might say 
that I can see that she is. Asked how I know that I am cycling, I won’t say that I can see 
that I am – or that I can feel that I am, for that matter, either.  
 
Finally, we sometimes come to know about others’ intentional actions on the basis of  
inferences from various bits of  general knowledge about their tendencies or capacities, or 
else on the basis of  inferences from perceptual clues, testimony or both of  these 
combined with general knowledge. I can hear a tapping coming from Henry’s room, and 
I know that he meant to get on with some work today, which would involve typing and 
so tapping. I infer that he’s typing, and my judgment might constitute knowledge in 
virtue (inter alia) of  being so grounded. But although in my own case I can hear a tapping 
noise, and I know that I too meant to get on with some work today, which would involve 
typing, so tapping, it isn’t prima facie plausible that my knowledge that I am typing is based 
on these kinds of  consideration.  
 
It might be agreed that my knowledge that I am typing is not based on the same kind of  
premises as my knowledge that Henry is, yet be maintained that my knowledge is 
nonetheless inferentially grounded. Some have thought that my knowledge that I am 
typing is inferred from (inter alia) my knowledge of  my own mind, specifically, my 
knowledge of  my own intention. I will consider a view like this (from Sarah Paul) in more 
detail in Chapter Two. The important point here is that this isn’t how things appear. For in 
general when someone has inferentially grounded knowledge, she will be able to answer a 
                                                          
16 For a proprioceptive conception of  practical knowledge see Dokic, “The Sense of  Ownership: An 
Analogy between Sensation and Action.” 
17 Cf. Peacocke, “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I),” 359. 
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“How do you know?” question by citing one or more of  the inference’s premises, yet 
asked “How do you know you’re typing?” I would not naturally respond by saying that I 
intend to be doing so.  
 
Practical knowledge seems unable to be epistemically grounded in memory or testimony. 
And it does not appear to be grounded in perception or in inference. And this is so 
despite the fact that what is known in practical knowledge – facts about a person’s 
ongoing intentional actions – are knowable in the usual ways. For someone else can know that 
I am typing only on the basis of  testimony (mine or someone else’s), perception or 
inference. And I am just another she from her perspective.18  
 
c. Psychological Immediacy 
 
Practical knowledge seems to have a further philosophically interesting feature. We are 
often said to be able to say straight-off what we are intentionally doing, where ‘straight-off ’ 
means something like ‘without having to think about what one is doing’.19 I will refer to 
this feature as ‘psychological immediacy’.  
 
Initially this might not seem to distinguish practical knowledge from knowledge of  
others’ intentional actions, or of  one’s own non-intentional ones, for often one does not 
need to do any thinking prior to saying what someone else is doing intentionally, or what 
one is non-intentionally doing. If  asked what you are doing I might be able to reply 
straight-off  “She’s putting salt on her chips”, and whilst accidentally knocking a stack of  
plates out of  the cupboard I might be asked “Who’s making that racket?”, responding 
‘straight-off ’ “I am!” But practical knowledge does differ from these kinds of  case in two 
important ways.  
 
First, whereas there are examples in which I can say ‘straight-off ’ – without consideration 
– what someone else is intentionally doing, or what I am non-intentionally doing, I 
needn’t be able to. If  I am not wearing my contact lenses and am asked at lunch what you 
are doing I might have to peer right in at you in order to be able to say that you are 
putting salt on your chips. And if  asked, whilst recounting the amusing tale of  the time 
Dan forgot his passport and missed his plane to Oslo, “Do you think you might be 
upsetting Dan?” I may have to consider things a little before coming out with “Oh dear, 
I think I am.”  
  
To see the second difference we need to say more about psychological immediacy. Compare 
my being able to say straight-off  that you are (intentionally) putting salt on your chips 
and my being able to say straight-off  that I am (intentionally) putting salt on my chips. My 
capacity to say straight-off  what you are doing depends on my having previously noticed 
or otherwise discovered that you are salting your chips. But my being able to say straight-
off  that I am salting my chips doesn’t seem to require any prior noticing or discovery.  
The same difference holds between my capacity to say straight-off  what I am doing 
intentionally and what I am doing non-intentionally. Say I am non-intentionally writing 
the words ‘casual relationship’ (I meant to be writing ‘causal relationship’). I might be 
able to say straight-off  that I am doing so once I notice my mistake, but if  I am writing 
                                                          
18 See also O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 156. 
19 See e.g. Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 10; Falvey, “Knowledge in Intention,” 22; O’Brien, 
Self-Knowing Agents, 168–171. 
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‘casual relationship’ intentionally, I can say that I am doing so straight-off  without having 
to notice or discover that I am.20  
 
‘Noticing’ and ‘discovering’ are not the only relevant concepts here. Sometimes my 
knowledge of  what you are intentionally doing or of  what I am doing non-intentionally 
will follow on from finding, working or figuring out what’s being done. Part of  the idea 
behind the seeming psychological immediacy of  practical knowledge is that having 
practical knowledge of  what one is doing seems inconsistent with finding, working or 
figuring out what one is doing.  
 
Practical knowledge’s apparent psychological immediacy may seem to go hand-in-hand 
with its apparent epistemic ungroundedness.21 Discovering (etc.) that something is the 
case seems to require discovering via some epistemic route or other, but we said above that 
practical knowledge does not seem to be epistemically grounded in any of  the usual 
ways. But psychological immediacy and epistemic ungroundedness do seem able to come 
apart. To bring this out consider my (non-practical) knowledge that my eyes are open. It 
is at least arguable that the basis on which I know this is perceptual, that it is in some 
sense based either on the perceptions which I have given that they are open, or on 
proprioceptive awareness, or a combination of  the two. So it is at least arguable that my 
knowledge that my eyes are open is epistemically grounded, in part on perception. But it 
doesn’t look like something I have discovered or noticed (etc.) to be the case.  
 
The example might be controversial. One complaint I can imagine is on Wittgensteinian 
grounds; that one’s eyes are open doesn’t look like knowledge in the same way that (e.g.) that 
there’s a chaffinch in the sycamore can be knowledge. But I don’t need this example to do very 
much work. The only point is that it is not obvious that practical knowledge’s apparent 
psychological immediacy go hand-in-hand, so that it is worth thinking of  these as two distinct 
apparent properties of  practical knowledge. That these properties are distinct will be 
important in our discussions of  Sarah Paul’s and in particular of  David Velleman’s 
conceptions of  practical knowledge in Chapters Two and Three.  
 
d. The Apparent Features constraint 
 
We have seen that practical knowledge at least appears to be first-person authoritative, 
epistemically ungrounded and psychologically immediate. Having made these observations, we can 
state an initial constraint on an adequate account of  practical knowledge: 
 
The Apparent Features Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge will either accommodate, or explain away, 
all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features.  
 
Before moving on, a few comments about the Apparent Features constraint are in order.  
 
First, the Apparent Features constraint does not require a given account to either 
accommodate (treat as veridical) all of  practical knowledge’s apparent features or to 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Velleman, Practical Reflection, 47; Anscombe, Intention, 51; O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents. 
21 The idea that we can say ‘straight-off ’ what we are intentionally doing is often treated as interchangeable 
with the idea that the knowledge doesn’t seem to rely on observation or evidence (e.g. Falvey, 
“Knowledge in Intention,” 22–23.). I have no complaint with using ‘straight-off ’ in this way, but it is not 
the way I will be using it.  
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explain them all away. It requires that for each feature, a given account must either 
accommodate it, or explain it away. Most of  the accounts we will consider seek to 
accommodate some of  the features and explain others away.  
 
Second, not all of  practical knowledge’s apparent features are disputed by our 
protagonists. All of  our protagonists seek to accommodate the appearance that practical 
knowledge displays FPA, although they understand this feature differently, and not all as 
plausibly as each other. Accommodating practical knowledge’s apparent FPA will involve 
giving a plausible characterisation of  what it involves. Our protagonists also all agree that 
practical knowledge is psychologically immediate, although again, they give different accounts 
of  why this is.  
 
It is practical knowledge’s apparent epistemic ungroundedness which attracts the most 
argument, although even here there is a lot of  agreement. All of  our protagonists accept 
that practical knowledge is not based on memory, testimony or perception. The 
disagreements are as follows: O’Brien, Velleman and Setiya think that practical 
knowledge is epistemically grounded, but not in any of  the ways discussed in (b). Sarah 
Paul, as I have already mentioned, thinks that practical knowledge is inferentially 
grounded, despite appearing not to be. And Anscombe thinks that practical knowledge is 
not epistemically grounded at all, an approach I develop myself  in Chapter Six.  
 
Finally, opting to explain away any of  practical knowledge’s apparent features brings with 
it an explanatory demand, stemming from our commonsense-human methodology as 
explained in my introduction (p. iv). If  an account suggests that we are systematically 
subject to misleading appearances about practical knowledge, it also must say something 
– in commonsense-human terms - about why this should be; about why this particular 
region of  our commonsense-human understanding should lead us astray. In the end I 
will try to describe a conception of  practical knowledge (heavily influenced by what I 
take to be Anscombe’s) which accepts all of  its apparent features at face value. 
 
 
3. The Special Relationship between Practical Knowledge 
and Intentional Action 
 
We started to describe practical knowledge in §1 as knowledge with a certain content, 
and in §2 we saw why knowledge with this content seems worthy of  philosophical 
enquiry – it seems to display certain philosophically interesting features. Here we will 
consider the relationship between practical knowledge and its object; intentional action. 
We will see that this relationship looks different to the relationship we usually expect 
between a piece of  knowledge and its object. In (a) I will explain how the relationship 
between doing something intentionally and having practical knowledge (understood as in 
§1 and §2) seems an especially tight one, for doing something intentionally at least 
typically or centrally goes hand-in-hand with having practical knowledge. In (b) I will 
consider some options for thinking about the nature of  this especially tight relationship, 
without aiming to settle on one. A good account of  practical knowledge should settle on 
one, though, and in (c) this demand will be recorded in a second constraint on an account 





a. The Special Relationship 
 
Consider two cases in which I express knowledge that I am chasing the dog. In Case 1 I am 
playing with my dog Mutton in the garden. Unable to see Mutton (who’s hiding behind a 
bush), Mum shouts out of  the window, “What are you doing?” and I shout back “I’m 
chasing the dog!” In Case 2, the dog and its temperament are unknown to me. Whilst 
walking in the park I am ambushed. Terrified, I flee; running in circles trying to shake it 
off. At some point a shift in aspect takes place; the dog’s barks, I realise, are not fearsome 
at all, but playful; I am, and have been for a while, closer to the dog’s tail than it is to 
mine (despite its doubtless being capable of  running much faster than me). And I notice 
an observer - who I take to be the dog’s owner - standing nearby, unflapped and 
smirking. At the same time, I realise my true situation and exclaim, “I’m chasing the 
dog!”  
 
Ex hypothesi, at the moment of  exclamation in Case 1, I am chasing the dog intentionally 
whereas at the moment of  exclamation in Case 2 I am not. In Case 2 there are, of  
course, other things I am intentionally doing, running being one, but I am not intentionally 
chasing the dog. After my realisation I may decide to continue chasing the dog, in which case I 
will come to be chasing it intentionally, but I was not chasing it intentionally at the 
moment of  realisation. Whilst the realisation was dawning on me, I was trying to get away 
from the dog and chasing something is precisely not a kind of  trying-to-get-away-from.  
 
Compare my knowledge in the two cases. Plausibly in Case 1 my knowledge has all three of  
practical knowledge’s apparent features, whereas in Case 2 it has none. But notice further 
that it’s hard to imagine me intentionally chasing the dog in Case 1 without having 
knowledge with these apparent features. It doesn’t seem possible to change Case 1 to one 
in which my knowledge does not appear to display FPA, epistemic ungroundedness or 
psychological immediacy whilst holding fixed that I am chasing the dog intentionally: not only 
is it the case that the knowledge I have of  what I am doing intentionally has all the 
apparent features attaching to practical knowledge, but also my action’s being intentional 
seems somehow bound up with its being an object of  knowledge of  this special kind. The 
relationship between intentional action and practical knowledge seems especially tight.  
 
Further considerations support the idea that the relationship between acting intentionally 
and knowing what one is doing is not only especially tight, but perhaps has a conceptual 
aspect. It is familiar that denying knowledge of  an action is a way of  denying responsibility: 
“How dare you upset Dan like that?” - - - “But I didn’t know I was!” Denying knowledge 
that I was upsetting Dan may not absolve myself  of  all responsibility; Dan’s defender 
may legitimately chastise me for being careless (“Come on, you know he’s sensitive about 
the whole Oslo thing”), but that doesn’t mean that my lack of  knowledge is irrelevant to 
the level or kind of  responsibility I bear for upsetting him. The responsibility in question 
seems to be of  a kind which attaches to specifically intentional actions. That denying 
knowledge of  one’s action is absolving oneself  of  responsibility of  this particular kind 
suggests some conceptual connection between knowing what one is doing and acting 
intentionally.  
 
And I also seem able to absolve myself  of  the special kind of  responsibility which goes 
along with acting intentionally by admitting knowledge but characterising it as lacking 
practical knowledge’s (apparent) special features. For say I respond to “How dare you 
upset Dan like that?” with “I know, I feel awful - I realised I was upsetting him when I 
saw that look on his face, but I couldn’t stop telling the story without everyone guessing 
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how he felt - and that would have made things even worse.” Here I characterise myself  as 
having noticed that I am upsetting Dan, and my knowledge as at least in part perceptually 
grounded. That is, I characterise my knowledge as not practical in our sense. I might be in 
a worse moral position than had I not come to know I was upsetting him, but I am 
clearly in a better one than had I said “Yeah I know, I love winding him up with that 
story”, implicating myself  in having known what I was doing all along, not on the basis 
of  perceptual clues and not in a way that constituted a discovery.  
 
b. Thinking about the Special Relationship 
 
What is the correct way of  understanding the special relationship between intentional 
action and practical knowledge? Are all intentional actions objects of  practical 
knowledge? Ought we think of  the relationship as a conceptual one? If  not then how are 
we to make sense of  the observations in the previous two paragraphs? These are 
questions which are answered differently by different accounts of  practical knowledge 
and I don’t want to pre-judge things here. I do, however, want to make a few comments 
about the options available for thinking about these issues.  
 
First, quite apart from the considerations in (a), it is attractive to think of  practical 
knowledge as essential to intentional action because this would underwrite a unified 
(accommodating) explanation of  all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features. On 
such a view, the fact that I am intentionally (say) typing would be dependent on the fact 
that I know that I am. My knowledge will display FPA because the fact that I am 
intentionally typing is dependent on my knowledge but not on anyone else’s, thus 
grounding a first-/third-person asymmetry. My knowledge that I am typing could not be 
epistemically grounded in any way, for the reason that the existence of  an intentional 
action to be known about on any epistemic basis would presuppose my already knowing 
about it. And such a view leaves no room for me to figure out or notice that I am 
intentionally typing because these concepts represent my knowledge as latching on to a 
fact independent of  it, but it is just this kind of  independence between the intentional 
action and the practical knowledge which is denied by someone who thinks that practical 
knowledge is essential to intentional action. 
 
Not only would such a view meet the Apparent Features constraint, but it would seem to 
do so in the best way possible, by giving one explanation of  all three apparent features. An 
account which accommodates the features in a unified way seems preferable to one which 
does not, since it doesn’t leave us wondering why the three philosophically interesting 
features from §2 coalesce together in the phenomenon of  practical knowledge.  
 
But the idea that practical knowledge is essential to intentional action is thought by many 
to admit of  counterexamples, and so to be untenable. The classic counterexample comes 
from Davidson: 
 
[I]n writing heavily on this page I may be intending to produce ten legible carbon copies. 
I do not know, or believe with any confidence, that I am succeeding. But if  I am 
producing ten legible carbon copies, I am certainly doing so intentionally.22 
 
Davidson’s example and ones like it have convinced many that practical knowledge cannot 
be essential to intentional action.23 We will consider this kind of  putative counterexample 
                                                          
22 Davidson, “Intending,” 92. 
23 See e.g. Hornsby and Stanley, “Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge,” 121; Alvarez, “Acting 
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in detail when we consider Lucy O’Brien’s views in Chapter Two, and again at the end of  
Chapter Five. I will suggest in those places that it is not clear that examples such as this 
are as damaging as they have been supposed to be, to the view that an agent’s practical 
knowledge is essential to her action’s being intentional.  
 
But even if  we do take examples like Davidson’s to show that not all intentional actions 
are objects of  practical knowledge, this need not entail that the relationship between the 
phenomena of  intentional action and practical knowledge is a merely empirical one. 
Drawing this conclusion assumes that if  the relationship between two types of  
phenomenon is a conceptual one, then any instantiation of  the one type entails an 
instantiation of  the other. But this ignores the possibility of  the conceptual relationship 
being a normative one. By way of  analogy, we might think there is a conceptual 
relationship between something’s being a car and its being able to get one from A to B. But that 
doesn’t mean that any car will in fact be able to get one A to B. Counter-examples can be 
found piled up on scrap-heaps. It is not plausible to conclude from these counter-
examples that being a car is only contingently related to being able to get from A to B; it is not 
plausible that being a method of  transportation is merely accidental to what it is to be a 
car. The correct conclusion is instead that some cars are defunct or deficient. The objects 
on the scrap-heap count as cars in having many of  the major features of  cars, but they 
are duds in lacking this one. And the possibility of  thinking of  them as dud cars rather 
than as non-dud non-cars seems parasitic on thinking of  cars as essentially (inter alia) such 
that they ought to get one from A to B. Equally, even if  Davidson’s example and ones like 
it show that some intentional actions are not objects of  practical knowledge, this needn’t 
mean that practical knowledge is only accidentally related to intentional action. It might 
instead show that ideal or paradigm cases of  intentional action are objects of  practical 
knowledge; that only if  it is an object of  practical knowledge will an action be 
paradigmatically intentional. 
 
It is important to be clear about the implications of  saying that intentional action is 
somehow dependent on practical knowledge, for if  practical knowledge is like this, then 
it appears radically different to knowledge as ordinarily understood. Knowledge, we are 
inclined to think, seems essentially to involve some kind of  successful mental ‘latching 
on’ to facts, which would mean that the facts are ‘there’ to be latched on to, 
independently of  the latching-on. It doesn’t matter to the truth of  the proposition that 
Jess is cycling that I know that she is. And it doesn’t matter to the truth of  the proposition 
that I am standing on Henry’s paint-tube that I know that I am. I might know about these 
things, but their being as they are doesn’t depend on my knowing about them. But if  
practical knowledge is a condition on acting intentionally; if  intentional action is 
essentially a kind of  knowing action; then the fact that I am salting my chips, or upsetting 
Dan, when these are things I do intentionally, is dependent on my knowing that I am. Any 
account which accepts that intentional action is essentially known cannot shrink back 
from accepting that they are providing an account of  practical knowledge which is at 
odds with certain philosophical assumptions about what knowledge (per se) is like. I will end 






                                                                                                                                                                      
Intentionally and Acting for a Reason,” 294; Peacocke, “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I),” 373–
374; Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 4; Setiya, “Knowledge of  Intention,” 172.  
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c. The Special Relationship Constraint  
 
In this section I have tried to explain why the phenomena of  intentional action and of  
practical knowledge seem to be in a very tight relationship with one another, and to 
introduce some considerations relevant to deciding the exact nature of  this special 
relationship.  
 
With this in mind we can now lay down a second constraint on an acceptable account of  
practical knowledge: 
 
 The Special Relationship Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge should contain a plausible conception of  
the nature of  the special relationship between practical knowledge and intentional 
action.  
 
Any account of  practical knowledge which resulted in the conclusion that many of  our 
intentional actions are not objects of  practical knowledge would not contain a plausible 
conception of  the special relationship – it won’t count the relationship as special enough. 
But additionally, an account which construes the relationship as a conceptual one will 




4. Further Remarks on Practical Knowledge 
 
In this concluding section I will make a couple of  further comments about the way in 
which some have thought about practical knowledge, and re-cap both our initial sketch 
of  practical knowledge, and our two initial constraints. 
 
a. Practical Knowledge and tense  
 
Throughout this chapter I have been thinking of  practical knowledge as knowledge of  
current or ongoing intentional actions. But practical knowledge is often assumed to take in 
both present and future intentional action. This is because knowing what one will 
intentionally do sometimes displays philosophically interesting features very similar to 
those displayed by one’s knowledge of  what one is intentionally doing (I will return to 
the ‘sometimes’ in (c)). 
 
For example, I know that I will make a coffee when I have finished editing this chapter. 
This knowledge too seems to display FPA, to be epistemically ungrounded and to be 
psychologically immediate. Although it is possible for someone to contradict me if  I say “I’m 
going to make a coffee in a minute” (“No you’re not – the kettle’s on the blink”), in many 
cases I do seem in a better position than someone else to know what I am going to do. 
The reason why seems related to the fact that my knowledge that I will make a coffee 
looks epistemically ungrounded: although someone else will need to ask me or recall 
general patterns of  behaviour to know that I will make a coffee when I’ve finished 
editing this Chapter (“She’s only had one coffee this morning; she usually has at least two 
and she tends to make one after finishing a chunk of  work”), my knowledge doesn’t seem 
based on facts like this - even assuming I recognise these facts. Finally, I can say straight-off 
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if  prompted that I am going to make a coffee (“Do you want a coffee?” - - - “I’m going 
to make one myself  in a minute – I’ll make you one too”), and the knowledge I express 
when I do so doesn’t seem to represent a discovery, or something I have noticed about 
myself.  
 
Despite these similarities between one’s knowledge of  one’s future intentional actions 
and one’s ongoing intentional actions, our starting-sketch construes practical knowledge 
as knowledge of  what one is intentionally doing. There are a few reasons for this 
decision. First, even if  practical knowledge does come in a future-directed form as well 
as a present-directed one, it makes for a simpler discussion to at least begin by 
considering practical knowledge in just one of  these forms. Second, I don’t want to pre-
judge the issue because one of  the accounts we will consider – due to Lucy O’Brien – 
thinks of  practical knowledge as only taking in ongoing actions. In the end, I will suggest 
that there are good reasons even beyond the similarities described in the previous 
paragraph, to regard practical knowledge as taking in both present and future actions; 
this will be captured in one of  our later constraints (see Ch. 5, §2(b)). But to consider 
these reasons here would take us too far afield and complicate my discussion. So for now 
we will proceed by considering only present-directed practical knowledge.  
 
b. Knowledge of practical reasons?  
 
Practical knowledge is also sometimes thought to take in not only an agent’s intentional 
action, but also her practical reasons (the reasons for which she acts). My knowledge that I 
am typing, the thought goes, is intimately bound up with my knowledge of  why I am 
typing, viz. in order to edit this chapter, to finish my Thesis, and so on. 
 
Again, it has been thought that one’s knowledge of  one’s intentional action and one’s 
knowledge of  one’s reasons have similar features. I am typically in a better position to say 
what my reasons are than someone else might be, so my knowledge of  my reasons seems 
to display FPA. My knowledge of  my reasons doesn’t seem to be based on evidence (it’s 
not as if, asked why I’m typing, I’d say “Usually, typing means I’m working, so I must be 
doing it in order to work.”), and it seems like it can’t be based on perception, so my 
knowledge of  my reasons seems to be epistemically ungrounded. Finally, I can usually give 
my reasons for acting straight-off, and seemingly without making a discovery about 
myself, so my knowledge of  my reasons seems psychologically immediate.  
 
Things can go wrong, of  course. In some cases someone else might have a better idea of  
my reasons than I do, for instance if  I am self-deceived (perhaps I don’t care much about 
getting work done; I’m just trying to avoid cleaning the house). Psychological immediacy 
can break down too - finding oneself  in the kitchen with no idea why is something that 
certainly happens. In such a case one’s knowledge of  one’s reasons may be restored by 
noticing that it’s 6pm, the time one usually waters the spider-plants, or pours oneself  a 
Scotch. Still, typically, one’s knowledge of  one’s practical reasons might be thought to have 
the same features as one’s knowledge of  one’s intentional action.  
 
But why think that the very same capacity – the very same kind of  knowledge - takes in both 
one’s intentional action and one’s practical reasons? Isn’t knowledge of  one’s reasons 
better understood as an instance of  psychological self-knowledge; knowledge of  certain kinds 
of  mental state; beliefs, desires and – some add - intentions? Well first, the idea that 
reasons (including practical reasons) are mental states is not without its problems – some 
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prefer to think of  them as (at least sometimes) facts in light of  which we act.24 But more 
importantly, being able to give the reason for which one is acting has seemed to some 
internally related to the fact that one’s action is done intentionally.25 If  this is right, and if  
intentional action and practical knowledge are themselves internally related – an idea 
considered in §3(a)&(b) (and which we will consider in detail in Chapters Five and Six) - 
then we might expect knowledge of  reasons to have a closer relationship to knowledge 
of  intentional action than would be allowed for by a view of  the former as just another 
kind of  psychological self-knowledge.  
 
As with the question of  whether practical knowledge takes in future intentional action, I 
have chosen to start by ignoring the possibility that practical knowledge is also 
knowledge of  one’s reasons for acting. First because not all of  our protagonists think of  
practical knowledge as taking in practical reasons, so I don’t want to pre-judge this issue 
from the start. And second because deciding what to say on the issue will – again – 
require philosophical work which would take us too far afield to do now. We will come to 
the issue – again – in Chapter Five (§2(b)). I will stop short of  saying that practical 
knowledge is knowledge of  an agent’s practical reasons, as well as being knowledge of  
her intentional action, but we will see that practical knowledge is importantly sensitive to an 
agent’s practical reasons. The import of  this distinction will be clear only in the context 
of  the discussion of  Chapter Five, so we will put the question of  the practical knower’s 
relationship to her practical reasons to one side until then.  
 
c. Practical Knowledge, practical reasons and intention  
 
In (a) I said that our knowledge of  certain of  our future intentional actions appears to 
have similar features to those which appear to attach to practical knowledge as described 
in §2. Which future intentional actions are known in this seemingly special way? The 
answer is those one has decided, or intends to do. Various philosophers have been impressed 
by the seeming fact that, as Grice puts it, “the ordinary concept of  intention is such that 
if  one intends to do A, one is logically debarred from relying on evidence that one will in 
fact do A.”26 The reason seems to be that my intentional actions are just those actions 
which it is in some sense up to me to perform. Any intention-independent evidence that I 
will do something seems at the same time to be evidence that it is not up to me to do that 
thing. If  a wave of  nausea appears to me to be strong evidence that I will be sick, then 
being sick does not appear to me to be something I can choose to do or not; whereas if  
being sick does appear to me to be something I can choose to do or not, then any wave of  
nausea would not appear to me to be strong evidence that I was going to be sick.  
 
The concepts of  decision and intention also have tight relations to that of  practical reasons: 
decisions and intentions are formed on the basis of, and justified by, practical reasons. So 
the two suggested extensions to our sketch of  practical knowledge which I considered 
under (a) and (b) are related, in both having internal links to the concepts of  decision and 
intention.  
 
And it ought not go unnoticed that our starting sketch itself  is of  a phenomenon 
somehow internally linked to intention: recall that practical knowledge is knowledge of  
                                                          
24 Hyman, “How Knowledge Works”; Dancy, Practical Reality, 103; Alvarez, Kinds of  Reasons, 3. 
25 Anscombe, Intention; Vogler, “Anscombe on Practical Inference”; Newstead, “Interpreting Anscombe’s 
Intention §§32FF”; Thompson, “Naive Action Theory.” 
26 Grice, “Intention and Uncertainty,” 269. See also Hampshire, Freedom of  the Individual. Ch. 3 and 
Anscombe, Intention. esp. §§2-3. 
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specifically intentional action. These observations suggest that the concept of  intention 
might turn out to play some special role in an account of  practical knowledge. Indeed 
this is just the conclusion I hope to draw at the end of  Part One, and the thought which 




This Chapter has provided an initial sketch of  our target phenomenon. §1 introduced 
practical knowledge as knowledge with a certain kind of  content. §2 detailed three 
philosophically interesting features which apparently attach to knowledge with this 
content: FPA, epistemically ungroundedness and psychological immediacy. §3 explained that the 
relationship between practical knowledge and its object seems to be of  a special kind, 
and considered some possibilities for thinking about its specialness. And §4 considered 
two ways in which some have wanted to extend the scope of  practical knowledge (from 
present to future intentional action, and from intentional action to practical reasons), and 
gestured at the idea that an agent’s intentions might play a special role in her practical 
knowledge. 
 
During this Chapter we met with two initial constraints on any account of  practical 
knowledge. It is worth re-capping these before moving on to Chapter Two:  
 
 
 The Apparent Features Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge will either accommodate, or explain away, 
all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features. 
 
 
The Special Relationship Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge should contain a plausible conception of  




More constraints will be added as we go along, uncovered through the process of  
considering the pro’s and con’s of  the accounts of  practical knowledge we will discuss. 
This process starts in the next Chapter with a look at two approaches to practical 









Lucy O’Brien’s and Sarah Paul’s conceptions of  practical knowledge are rather different 
from one another. O’Brien thinks, and Paul does not, that practical knowledge is 
grounded in a kind of  conscious awareness of  acting. Paul thinks, and O’Brien does not, 
that knowledge of  one’s intention inferentially grounds practical knowledge. But despite 
their differences, O’Brien and Paul have it in common that they both represent alternatives 
to Intentionalism about Practical Knowledge, the view that an agent’s practical knowledge is in 
some sense constituted by their intention. So I am considering O’Brien’s and Paul’s views in 
a single chapter as a means to motivating my consideration of  Intentionalism. For in the 
end I will reject both views (for different reasons) and Intentionalism will appear likely to 
overcome the problems in both.  
 
Each account is likely to seem attractive from a certain philosophical point of  view. Lucy 
O’Brien’s account may well look attractive from the point of  view of  someone struck by 
the fact that being an agent seems to carry with it a distinct phenomenology: moving my body 
feels different to having my body move. And Paul’s view is likely to look attractive from a 
rather different starting-point; one from which it is important if  possible to characterise 
practical knowledge as – despite not being grounded in perception - continuous with and 
the same in kind as our other ordinary empirical knowledge.1 
 
I consider O’Brien’s account in §1 and Paul’s in §2. I will argue that O’Brien does well on 
the Apparent Features constraint but fails to meet the Special Relationship constraint in two 
different ways. Paul does not meet the Apparent Features constraint and does not clearly 
meet the Special Relationship constraint. My discussion of  Paul leads me to set out a new 
constraint, which her account also fails to meet: the Why Knowledge? constraint requires 
any account of  practical knowledge to leave it unmysterious why the phenomenon it 
describes really is a kind of  knowledge. I suggest that O’Brien’s problem comes from tying 
practical knowledge to the phenomenology of  acting, and that Paul’s comes from seeing 
practical knowledge as inductively inferentially justified. Since these are the core elements 
of  each view, it seems likely that the reasons for rejecting O’Brien’s and Paul’s accounts 








                                                          
1 Paul is also motivated by wanting to avoid identifying intentions with beliefs (Paul, “How We Know What 
We’re Doing,” 2–3.). We will consider views which make this identification in Chapter Three. 
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1. Lucy O’Brien’s Consciousness-Based Account 
 
A few clarificatory remarks will be useful before I introduce Lucy O’Brien’s account of  
practical knowledge. First, O’Brien is unusual amongst our protagonists in that it is not 
completely clear whether the phenomenon she is interested in is quite the same as that 
sketched in Chapter One under the name ‘practical knowledge’; different things she says 
pull in different directions. But what matters in this discussion is not whether as a matter 
of  fact O’Brien is interested in our target phenomenon, but whether the account she 
provides is apt to do duty as an account of  our target phenomenon. Throughout this 
section I will be speaking as if  O’Brien intends her account to capture our target 
phenomenon, but this is only really to make discussion easier. (This practise will also 
gloss over the fact that O’Brien does not use the expression ‘practical knowledge’ but 
instead tends to talk of  ‘agent’s knowledge’ or ‘our knowledge of  our own actions’.) I 
will only be in a position to explain why the question of  what phenomenon O’Brien is in 
fact interested in explaining is hard to call when we have considered her view in detail, so 
I will explain the concern more fully when I conclude this section in (f).  
 
Second, O’Brien’s consciousness-based account of  practical knowledge is perhaps less 
well-known than that of  Chris Peacocke.2 I have chosen to consider O’Brien’s account 
over Peacocke’s because I think it is better worked-out in certain respects, and because it 
accords better with our commonsense-human methodology.3 As I suggested in my 
introduction to this Chapter, I suspect that the problems I bring up for O’Brien will be 
equally problems for Peacocke, indeed for any consciousness-based view. I won’t have 
time to argue for this per se but I will make some general comments in concluding this 
section which explain why I think that consciousness-based accounts seem inapt to 
capture our target phenomenon.4 
 
Finally, to see O’Brien’s account in context we ought to note that it is provided as part of  
a broader project of  understanding psychological self-knowledge.5 O’Brien thinks that 
many of  our psychological goings-on are mental actions, which would mean that an 
account of  practical knowledge can do duty as an account of  much of  our psychological 
self-knowledge. I won’t consider the prospects for this project here; my concern is only 
with what O’Brien says about practical knowledge per se. With this in mind and in keeping 
with the rest of  my discussion in this Thesis, I will concentrate in this section on what 
O’Brien has to say about our knowledge of  those of  our actions which are not mental.6 
                                                          
2 Peacocke, “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge”, “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)” and 
“Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II).” See also Pickard, “Knowledge of  Action Without 
Observation.”  
3 In particular, Peacocke’s view makes ineliminable use of  a theoretical notion of  ‘tryings’, understood as 
mental events which cause both the bodily movements involved in acting, and an experiential state in 
which one seems to be acting in a certain way (Peacocke, “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and 
Knowledge.”). When one is acting in this way, one is entitled to take the appearance at face-value, doing 
which furnishes one with knowledge. But ‘tryings’, understood in this way, are not part of  commonsense 
psychology; they are theoretical posits (I try to hit the stumps by throwing the ball, not by performing a 
mental action which kick-starts a bodily one). O’Brien’s account does not rely on Peacocke’s theoretical 
notion of  ‘trying’. For her own objection to Peacocke’s ‘tryings’ (which are independent of  mine), see 
O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 146–155. 
4 Indeed the same kinds of  objection as I make against O’Brien are leveled against Peacocke and Pickard in 
Newstead, “Interpreting Anscombe’s Intention §§32FF.” 
5 See in particular O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents and “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force.” 
6 She talks about knowledge of  non-mental actions in Chapter 9 of  Self-Knowing Agents, and in her earlier 
(2003) paper, “On Knowing One’s Own Actions,” on which that chapter is based. Knowledge of  mental 
actions is discussed in Chapter 6 of  Self-Knowing Agents and in “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force.” 
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The plan for this section is as follows. In (a) I describe O’Brien’s account in some detail 
and explain how it meets the Apparent Features constraint. In (b) and (c) I give two 
different reasons why the account seems to flout Special Relationship constraint. The 
second of  these reasons is that O’Brien limits the scope of  practical knowledge to our 
more basic actions, and in (d) I reject O’Brien’s motivation for doing so. In (e) I explain 
why allowing practical knowledge such a limited scope is not an optional element of  
O’Brien’s view, but stems from understanding practical knowledge in terms of  conscious 
awareness of  action. I conclude in (f) by raising some more general worries about linking 
practical knowledge so tightly with the phenomenology of  agency. 
  
a. Agent’s Awareness and Practical Knowledge 
 
O’Brien accepts that practical knowledge is not epistemically grounded in any of  the 
‘usual’ ways we considered in Chapter One (§2(b)), but she denies it is altogether 
epistemically ungrounded. Her thought is that: 
 
… our beliefs about what we are doing are given epistemic support by what we are in 
fact doing: we know what we are doing because we are doing it.7  
 
The fact that the agent is doing something is made available to her as a distinctive 
epistemic ground for a judgment that she is doing it, via ‘agent’s awareness’, a sui generis 
specifically first-personal, potentially non-conceptual awareness of  acting. To be agent-
aware of  what one is doing is not yet to judge that one is doing it, but it does give the 
agent a prima facie entitlement to such a judgment.8 Because I am agent-aware of  typing, any 
judgment I make to the effect that I am typing will be one I am entitled to make, at least 
assuming that I have no over-riding reasons to think that my agent’s awareness is non-
veridical. As long as my judgment is true, it will constitute knowledge. This in a nut-shell 
is O’Brien’s account of  practical knowledge.  
 
But is it right that, on a view like this, my knowledge that I am typing grounded in the fact 
that I am typing, as O’Brien suggested in the passage quoted above? Doesn’t a view like 
this instead involve the claim that my knowledge that I am typing is grounded in my agent’s 
awareness of  typing? No. To see why not we need to consider the details of  O’Brien’s 
understanding of  agent’s awareness.  
 
We are agent-aware of  those things we do consciously, something which, O’Brien points 
out, might be understood in one of  two ways. On what we might call a ‘second-order’ 
model, I will be typing consciously only if  I am typing, and if  I am in some state which 
takes my typing as its object. On this model, my consciousness of  typing would be a state 
separate from my typing itself, and it would be this – rather than my typing itself  – which 
would entitle me to judge that I am typing. But O’Brien accepts a different - what we 
might call an ‘adverbial’ – model of  acting consciously, on which acting consciously is 
acting in a certain way or mode;9 on which being agent-aware of  typing is a matter of  typing 
in this mode, and so on which as long as I am typing in this mode, my typing and my 
consciousness of  typing are aspects of  the same event or process. On the adverbial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(2005). 
7 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 182; this is characterised as a “naïve thought”, not something to be argued 
for. 
8 See also Peacocke, “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge,” 107. 
9 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 183.  
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model, my judgment that I am typing can be grounded in my typing itself, as long as I am 
typing in whatever way or mode constitutes it’s being done consciously.  
 
So far so good. But what is involved in typing in the ‘conscious’ mode, and how exactly 
does doing so entitle me to judge that I am typing?10 I act in the conscious mode, thinks 
O’Brien when I act “with a sense of  control”: 
 
We, of  course, carry out many actions as a matter of  habit, or as relatively automatically 
and inattentively, but when we are conscious of  what we are doing – when we are agent 
aware – we seem to act with a sense of  guiding our action, with a sense of  control.11 
 
Having the relevant sense of  control over one’s action requires that the action is done 
“directly on the basis of  an evaluation of  the possible ways of  acting, grasped as possible 
actions”.12 Because the relevant possibilities are possibilities for the agent’s own action, in 
realising one of  these possibilities the agent “secures awareness of  the possibility realized 
as an option for her”,13 resulting in awareness which is specifically first-personal and 
agential, and so apt for grounding first-person judgments that one is acting in some way. 
 
It is important to be clear about the epistemological role O’Brien sees agent’s awareness 
as playing. Agent’s awareness entitles an agent to judge that she is acting in the way given 
in the content of  the agent’s awareness. The judgment is not “justifiable with reference to 
reasons statable by, or comprehensible to, the knowing subject”,14 but is nevertheless a 
rational transition rather than a merely reliable one because not only does it “[tend] (in 
normal circumstances) to lead to true beliefs” but because further, “its tendency to do so 
is explained by constitutive or relatively a priori features of  the nature and content of  the 
states or acts of  the subject involved.”15  
 
The idea of  being epistemically entitled to make a judgment by the presence of  a likely 
non-conceptual state which cannot be given in justification of  that judgment deserves 
philosophical attention, and receives it in the epistemology literature. If  the idea is 
problematic, then so too is O’Brien’s account of  practical knowledge, but I am not going 
to assess the idea of  epistemic entitlement here - I will assume that O’Brien can help 
herself  to the notion. If  the notion is a good one, it brings clear benefits to O’Brien’s 
account because it enables her to reconcile the seeming tension between, on the one 
hand, thinking of  our judgments about what we are doing as seemingly epistemically 
ungrounded and, on the other, as properly speaking knowledge. Thinking of  the agent as 
entitled to her practical judgments by her agent’s awareness enables O’Brien to think of  
her as knowing what she is doing, whilst explaining why agents won’t see their judgments 
as epistemically grounded in any of  the usual ways, for their judgments are not grounded 
in any of  the usual ways, and the agent’s justification is not transparent to her. 
  
                                                          
10 It is here that O’Brien offers more detail than Peacocke; see Ibid., 184–188. 
11 Ibid., 184. 
12 Ibid., 187. 
13 Ibid., 185. 
14 O’Brien, “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force,” 588. For more on the relevant notion of  entitlement see 
Sosa, “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective”; Peacocke, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge” and Being 
Known; Burge, “Content Preservation” and Peacocke, “Three Principles of  Rationalism.” O’Brien picks 
out the first three as containing her favoured gloss on the notion. For more detail on the way in which 
agent’s awareness might entitle an agent to judgments about what she is doing, see Peacocke, “Action: 
Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge,” 105–108. 
15 O’Brien, “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force,” 590. O’Brien objects to simple reliabilism in O’Brien, 
Self-Knowing Agents, 178. See also Peacocke, “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge,” 105–6. 
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Let’s consider directly how O’Brien explains practical knowledge’s apparent features. 
First, the fact that practical knowledge is based on agent’s awareness - itself  specifically 
awareness of  one’s own action - underwrites a first-/third-person asymmetry in the domain 
of  intentional action. Only I have agent’s awareness of  my typing and so I have a route to 
knowledge of  the fact that I am typing which is not available to you, so my knowledge 
that I am typing displays FPA. This route is, as we have just seen, not an inferential one; 
my agent’s awareness entitles me to judge that I am typing but I do not infer that I am 
typing from my agent’s awareness. Inference can only take one from judgment to 
judgment and my agent’s awareness is not itself  a judgment. My practical knowledge is 
not perceptually based because my agent’s awareness is not a perceptual state, including a 
proprioceptive one, so my knowledge is epistemically ungrounded in any of  the usual ways. 
Although it is nevertheless epistemically grounded - in agent’s awareness - O’Brien can 
explain (as I explained in the previous paragraph) why it would seem epistemically 
groundless. Finally, given my agent’s awareness of  typing, I can judge that I am typing, on 
O’Brien’s view, without needing to engage in consideration, or otherwise to figure out or 
notice that I am typing. On O’Brien’s account my practical knowledge appears to be 
psychologically immediate because it is so. 
 
So O’Brien’s view seems to meet the Apparent Features constraint rather well. But it has 
serious problems, which I turn to now. 
 
b. O’Brien and the Special Relationship 
  
Part of  what the Special Relationship constraint demands is that an account of  practical 
knowledge should explain why only intentional actions are objects of  practical knowledge. 
O’Brien accepts this.16 But is not obvious, on her view, why this should be.  
 
Initially, she seems to have a neat explanation, which draws on the generally accepted 
entailment from an action’s being an upshot of  practical reasoning to its being 
intentional. We saw in (a) that we are agent-aware when we act consciously, and that 
conscious action is “the result of  a process of  evaluation of  the possibilities available, 
grasped as possibilities”.17 A process of  assessing possibilities for action which results in 
the realisation of  one of  those possibilities looks like a process of  practical reasoning.18 
If  this is right then we have practical knowledge only of  our intentional actions because 
a) practical knowledge is grounded on agent’s awareness, b) we have agent’s awareness 
only of  what we do on the basis of  practical reasoning and c) actions done on the basis 
of  practical reasoning are intentional.  
 
But the suggestion faces problems. First, O’Brien seems to think of  the process of  
assessing the possibilities for action as (at least potentially) involving operations on non-
conceptual contents,19 which means that the ‘assessment of  possibilities’ which give rise to 
agent’s awareness of  the ensuing action doesn’t look like practical reasoning as ordinarily 
understood; this involves operations on propositional attitudes.  
                                                          
16 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 169–170. 
17 Ibid., 184. 
18 Whether or not this is O’Brien’s view is unclear. For some relevant but inconclusive remarks see (Ibid., 
185–6.). 
19 Ibid., 167; ibid., 186. 
 24
But even putting that issue to one side, a problem remains. Recall that acting consciously 
was identified with acting “with a sense of  control”,20 and opposed to acting “as a matter 
of  habit, or […] relatively automatically or inattentively”.21 This would be another reason 
to link practical knowledge with intentional action, if  the relevant kind of  ‘control’ was 
that we typically have over our specifically intentional actions. But it is very unclear why 
doing something on the basis of  an assessment of  the possibilities for action would 
guarantee that one acts consciously, or with sense of  control in this sense. For assume 
that the agent engages in the process of  assessment consciously (‘attentively’); I cannot see 
what rules out that the chosen action is done (‘realised’) inattentively and/or automatically. 
I might for instance be fully consciously engaged in choosing between making tea or 
coffee, and might consciously and attentively decide in favour of  the latter, but then go 
on to make coffee on autopilot, my attention taken up with something else entirely; 
working out a crossword clue, talking on the phone, or whatever. 
It does not help to stress, as O’Brien does, that agent’s awareness requires realising a 
possibility for action directly in response to one’s assessment.22 For whatever ‘direct’ might 
mean here, the problem does not depend on imagining a temporally extended or causally 
complex ‘gap’ between one’s assessment of  the possibilities for action and one’s 
realisation of  one of  them. The problem does not rest on any particular conception of  
the relation between the assessment and the realisation, only on the idea that the 
assessment and the realisation are distinct events or processes. And this is hard to deny 
given that the assessment might not have resulted in the realisation (I might have got 
distracted; there might have been no coffee left etc.). As long as they are conceived as 
distinct, any amount of  conscious attention to the assessment does not seem to entail 
conscious attention to the realisation.  
An option here would be to drop the idea that the assessment is what underwrites agent’s 
awareness, and to think of  it instead as a property of  the realisation itself. On this view, 
consciously making coffee, and so being agent-aware of  doing so, would just be 
consciously attending to making coffee whilst doing it. But then we lose the link between φ-
ing consciously and φ-ing intentionally. For I can consciously attend to those things I do non-
intentionally too - like sneezing, for example, or falling over.  
I am not denying that sneezing and falling over on the one hand, and making coffee on 
the other, involve different kinds of  awareness. The problem for O’Brien is how she is 
able to distinguish these kinds. She needs to do so in order to explain the epistemological 
and psychological differences between my practical knowledge that I am making coffee, 
and my non-practical knowledge that I am sneezing or falling over. The worry is that if  
agent’s awareness is merely a matter of  consciously attending to the realisation of  some 
possible action, then it’s hard to see what the difference is between agent’s awareness, 
which is supposed to be particular to our intentional actions, and the kind of  awareness we 
have of  those things – like sneezing or falling over – which we do non-intentionally. And 
this means that we lose the link between practical knowledge and intentional action which the 
Special Relationship constraint requires us to keep intact.  
The dilemma is between an account which ties agent’s awareness to a process we can 
identify or link with practical reasoning, but which has difficulty explaining why agent’s 
awareness should in fact attach to the resulting actions, and an account which 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 183 et passim.  
21 Ibid., 184. 
22 Ibid., 185 et passim; O’Brien italicizes ‘directly’ but does not explain in what sense it is being stressed.  
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understands agent’s awareness as a property of  the realisation of  a possibility for action, 
but which seems to undermine the link required by the Special Relationship constraint, 
between practical knowledge and intentional action.  
 
c. O’Brien on Practical Knowledge’s scope 
 
We have considered why it is not obvious that O’Brien can accommodate the fact that 
only intentional actions are objects of  practical knowledge, but she also has a difficulty, I 
will suggest, in allowing that enough intentional actions are objects of  practical knowledge. 
 
In Chapter One, we saw that even if  φ-ing intentionally does not entail knowing that one 
is φ-ing, it is at least typically or paradigmatically an object of  practical knowledge. But 
according to O’Brien’s account only a very restricted class of  our intentional actions are 
objects of  practical knowledge. O’Brien thinks that we only have practical knowledge of  
our actions under their more basic descriptions. We will see here why she thinks this, and 
I will explain why her motivation is mistaken in (d). In (e) we will see that the nature of  
her account of  practical knowledge as grounded in conscious awareness of  acting means 
that she is barred from adopting a more realistic, i.e. broader, conception of  practical 
knowledge’s scope.  
 
O’Brien distinguishes between one’s knowledge that one is acting (rather than not) and 
one’s knowledge of  what one is doing; knowledge that one is – specifically - φ-ing.23 She 
thinks that whilst one is straightforwardly first-person authoritative that one is acting 
(when one is), one has only limited authority about what one is doing: we have FPA over 
our actions only under their basic descriptions.24  
 
We saw in Chapter One (§1) that an action can be intentional under more than one 
description. One of  these descriptions characterises one’s action as basic, as something 
one can ‘simply do’, that is, do without needing to do anything else. All other 
descriptions of  the action will be non-basic. If  I illuminate the room by turning on the 
light, which I do by flipping the switch, which I do by moving my finger, my action is 
basic under the description moving my finger and non-basic under the others.25  
 
We have FPA over our actions only under their more basic descriptions, thinks O’Brien, 
because less basic descriptions “seem to advert to the subject’s main purpose or motive 
in doing what she is doing”, and because: 
 
… it seems […] that while the subject will […] be authoritative about what her purpose 
in acting is, and authoritative about the fact that she is acting for the purpose of  doing 
one thing rather than another, she may not be authoritative about whether her purpose 
came off. 26 
 
O’Brien illustrates the idea with an example of  someone playing snooker. Call this 
person Bev. Bev intends to get the pink ball in the corner pocket; she hits the cue-ball 
which strikes the pink, sending it along the top cushion and neatly into the corner 
pocket. It is implausible, thinks O’Brien, that Bev is authoritative about whether “she is 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 160–161. 
24 Ibid., 160–3. 
25 See Ibid., 163. The example is, of  course, from Davidson (“Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 4). 
26 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 162. 
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getting the ball in the corner pocket”27 because Bev, no less than her opponent, has to 
wait and see whether the ball goes in. (Note the similarity of  this example to Davidson’s 
Carbon Copier example introduced in Chapter One (§3(b)).) 
 
O’Brien concludes that:  
 
The claim of  first-person authority with respect to our actions is to be understood as 
relative to certain descriptions which could be regarded as basic.28 
 
And she thinks that restricting the scope of  practical knowledge to basic actions “draws 
the boundaries between those actions over which we are authoritative and those which 
we are not, in intuitively the right place”: 
  
Those actions which we take ourselves to know how to carry out ‘just like that’ […] do 
seem to be those actions we can know that we are doing immediately, without any 
needing [sic.] to know that we have done anything else, or needing to check by 
monitoring feedback from bodily awareness of  other perceptual faculties.29 
 
Because practical knowledge is first-person authoritative (as O’Brien accepts30), restricting 
the scope of  authority to basic actions is equally restricting the scope of  practical knowledge 
to basic actions.  
 
But O’Brien is not right to think that the basic/non-basic distinction is co-located with 
the divide between those actions of  which we have (authoritative) practical knowledge 
and those of  which we do not. For our knowledge of  many of  our non-basic intentional 
actions is not only first-person authoritative, but has all the other features of  practical 
knowledge too. The point does not depend on assuming that basic action-descriptions 
are purely bodily descriptions of  actions; O’Brien accepts that some of  the things we can 
‘simply do’ have higher-level descriptions than this. e.g. “picking up the cup just before us, 
writing familiar words…”31 The objection is that much of  our practical knowledge is of  
actions which are non-basic even when ‘basic’ actions are described at a level higher than 
mere bodily movement. 
 
Consider writing a thank-you letter; rearranging your bookshelf; replacing the inner-tube 
on your bike; making a cup of  coffee; planning a holiday; making a cake. All of  these can 
be done only by doing other things, so none are basic actions. It is very hard to imagine 
them being doing unknowingly, and the knowledge in question has the apparent features 
of  practical knowledge. Let’s consider one example in detail. 
 
I am writing a thank-you letter. I can see my hand holding the pen, passing over the page 
with delicate movements and leaving writing in its wake, I am proprioceptively aware of  
the movements I am making and can feel the pressure between the pen and the page. I 
am unlikely to be specifically attending to any of  this, but clearly I could. But my knowledge 
that I am writing a thank-you letter is independent of  all this for familiar reasons (see again 
Ch. 1, §2(b)): I don’t need to wait and see what I am writing, unlike a nosy neighbour 
would have to. She must wait until I have written “Dear Molly, …” to know that it is a 
letter I am writing, and wait a little longer – until I have written “I’m writing to thank you 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 189. 
29 Ibid., 167. 
30 Ibid., 158–160. 
31 Ibid., 167. 
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for…” - in order to know it’s a thank-you letter. My knowledge is not grounded in this 
way.  
  
Partly for this reason, my epistemic position is different to that of  my nosy neighbour. 
My neighbour’s observations are consistent with a different hypothesis, e.g. that I am 
making a prop for a play. She can choose the most likely hypothesis on the basis of  
further considerations (perhaps she knows I’m in a play which requires just this kind of  
prop; or perhaps she knows that my grandmother Molly has recently sent me a gift). But 
it would be absurd to imagine me choosing between hypotheses in this way. So there is an 
epistemic asymmetry between me and my neighbour: my knowledge is first-person 
authoritative. And because I don’t hypothesise, my judgment doesn’t seem based on evidence 
either.  
 
If  asked, I can say straight-off  what I am doing. I can say that I am writing a thank-you 
letter and not just that I am moving my hand or writing. And my capacity to say straight-off  
doesn’t seem to depend on my having noticed or discovered that I am: my knowledge that I 
am writing a thank-you letter is psychologically immediate.  
 
As well as having all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features, my knowledge that 
I am writing a thank-you letter seems tightly bound up with the fact I am doing it 
intentionally. It is hard to imagine my writing a thank-you letter without knowing that I 
am; if  I don’t know I am writing a thank-you letter, then I won’t know what, or even 
whether, to write as I approach the page. I might end up with picture of  a cat instead. A 
stretching of  the imagination apt to deliver a case of  unknowingly writing a thank-you 
letter seems also to deliver a case of  doing so non-intentionally; doing so in my sleep, for 
example. A different stretch which delivers a letter-writing which is known only by 
observation or on the basis of  evidence, also delivers a case of  non-intentional letter-
writing; writing in the manner of  someone speaking in tongues. Both stretchings of  the 
imagination represent me as too cognitively cut-off  from what I am doing to count as 
doing it intentionally. And so my practical knowledge of  this non-basic action of  writing a 
thank-you letter seems very tightly bound up with the fact that I am doing it intentionally.  
 
Restricting practical knowledge to basic action misdescribes the facts. Even worse, not 
only does practical knowledge in fact take in non-basic actions, it seems to need to do so. 
We have already mentioned that an action’s being an object of  practical knowledge has 
moral and legal relevance (Introduction (d); Ch. 1, §3(a)). If  I poison you knowingly I am 
on different footing, morally and legally speaking, than if  I poison you unwittingly; and 
assuming I know I am poisoning you, it makes a difference to my moral and legal status 
whether my knowledge is practical or not. Poisoning is not something I can simply do, and 
so is not a basic action. But very generally, we care the most, from a moral and legal 
perspective, about people’s actions under their non-basic descriptions. The only reason it 
matters morally and legally speaking that I moved my hand thus is that it was an act of  
poisoning. And very many morally significant actions are too complex and extended in 
time to be easily thought of  under single basic descriptions at all. Consider saving the baby, 
going vegetarian, taking up an aggressive tax-avoidance scheme, spying for the Russians. To maintain 
the link between practical knowledge and the relevant kind of  moral and legal 
responsibility, we must think of  practical knowledge as taking in actions under their non-
basic descriptions.  
 
So any account of  practical knowledge which restricts it to basic action flouts the Special 
Relationship constraint, for the reason that it classifies a vast number of  our intentional 
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actions as not objects of  practical knowledge, when in fact they not only are but need to be 
in order to be subject to the kinds of  moral and legal classification we know them to be 
subject to. 
 
d. The Snooker Example reconsidered  
 
We must resist restricting practical knowledge’s scope in the way O’Brien does. But 
O’Brien did not make the restriction for no reason. She thought that it followed from the 
possibility of  being “ignorant of  the consequences of  [one’s] actions”32, illustrating the 
idea with the snooker example. So I want to explain here why I don’t think that attention 
to the snooker example does warrant the scope restriction O’Brien makes. I will 
distinguish two ways in which O’Brien generalises from the snooker example, and suggest 
that neither generalisation is warranted. Bev might lack practical knowledge that she is 
potting the pink (although I will suggest later (Ch. 5, §3(a)) that even this is not obvious), 
but this doesn’t mean that practical knowledge does not in general take in intentional 
actions under their non-basic descriptions.  
 
Note first that even if knowing (at t) that one is potting the pink always requires knowing 
(at t) that the pink will go in the pocket, this is consistent with knowing non-perceptually 
and authoritatively (at t) that one is potting the pink. For one can know non-perceptually 
and authoritatively that the pink will go in the pocket. Let’s agree that this is not possible 
for someone like Bev, who is not very good at snooker. Still, it is possible for someone 
like Ronnie O’Sullivan, who is.  
 
If  the pink in question isn’t particularly tricky and/or if  he is on good form, Ronnie 
might know in (and whilst) striking the cue-ball that the pink is going (to go) in the pocket. We can 
see in his behaviour that Ronnie knows that the pink is going in whilst striking the cue-
ball – after doing so he immediately gets up, walks round the table to where the white 
ball will end up and gets down to take his next shot. When he’s in his best form he doesn’t 
even bother looking to see if  the pink goes in the pocket – he already knows that it will.  
 
We can stipulate that that the movement of  the cue and the passage of  the balls are 
identical for Ronnie and for Bev. And let’s agree that neither player will know 
authoritatively and non-perceptually that they are potting the pink unless they know 
authoritatively and non-perceptually that the pink will end up in the pocket (although I will 
come back to this assumption). Being skilled and well-practised at something can mean 
that because one knows one is doing it, one also knows that one will succeed in having done it. 
We should resist generalising from the fact that someone relatively unskilled at a certain 
kind of  non-basic action needs to ‘wait and see’ that they are pulling it off, to the 
conclusion that non-basic actions of  this kind could only ever be known by their agents on 
the basis of  observation, and so not authoritatively, and so not practically.  
 
We imagined that both Bev and Ronnie needed to know, whilst taking their shot, that 
they will have potted the pink, in order to know whilst taking their shot that they were potting 
it. But not all cases look like this. In certain cases, one can be doing something without 
later having done it, a phenomenon often labelled ‘the openness of  the progressive’ (the 
‘progressive’ being the aspect attaching to propositions of  the form “x is φ-ing”). And if  
someone can be φ-ing without ever having φ-d, then she can know that she is φ-ing without 
knowing that she ever will have φ-d. Writing a thank-you letter seems to work like this: I 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 160. 
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might be writing a thank-you letter – and know that I am - and never end up having written 
it – if  for instance I suffer a stroke half-way through and never regain my capacity to 
write (and at any rate have other thing to worry about).  
 
This gives us a second reason for not generalising in the way O’Brien does from the 
snooker example: that was an example in which knowing that one is doing something 
requires knowing that one will have done it. Bev (although not Ronnie) needed to rely on 
perception for the latter, and so the former too. But where doing something does not 
require having done it, knowing that one is doing it does not require knowing that one has 
done it. Perception has no role to play in this kind of  case, analogous to the role it played 
in the Bev example.   
 
The cases don’t carve up neatly. We can even describe a snooker case which looks more 
like the letter-writing case: Ronnie has just struck the cue ball exactly as before. The shot 
proceeds in just the same way, when BOOM!!! – the arena is blown sky-high by a bomb. 
Later, on the news, we hear what seems perfectly true, “Earlier this evening the Crucible 
Theatre was blown up just as Ronnie O’Sullivan was potting a crucial pink.” The pink never 
ended up in the pocket but Ronnie was potting it when the bomb went off, and if  the 
explosion does not undermine the fact that he was potting it, nor does it undermine the 
fact that he knew that he was.  
 
We needn’t consider which features of  different kinds of  case are relevant to them falling 
into one or the other category. And I have not tried to exhaust all the ways in which one 
can, and cannot generalise from the Bev case. I have just highlighted two ways in which 
O’Brien’s original snooker case is unlike other kinds of  case, by way of  explaining why 
generalising from the Bev case in the way O’Brien does is unmotivated. Even if  Bev fails 
to have practical knowledge that she is potting the pink, this doesn’t mean that no non-
basic actions are objects of  practical knowledge. It doesn’t even mean that no pink-pottings 
are objects of  practical knowledge.  
 
It is possible that I have been reading O’Brien’s scope restriction too strongly, for what 
she says is that attention to the snooker example shows that “drawing a description of  an 
action from an intention is not sufficient to give one authority over the action”.33 But if  the 
thought were only that we are not authoritative over all of  our intentional actions, then 
restricting the scope of  practical knowledge would not be a solution. For O’Brien accepts 
that we can fail to be authoritative even about some of  our basic actions.34 We needn’t 
decide here whether or not I have been reading the scope restriction – as stated - overly 
strongly, for as we are about to see, O’Brien’s explanation of  practical knowledge seems to 
commit her to a view on which practical knowledge takes in only our basic actions; 
perhaps even only our bodily ones.  
 
e. Agent’s Awareness and Basic Action 
 
Assuming that O’Brien can give a good account of  what is involved in knowing our basic 
actions (that is, putting to one side the worries from (b)), I want to explain here why I 
don’t think she can broaden the scope of  her account of  practical knowledge, even if  she 
might want to in light of  the considerations of  (c) and (d).  
 
                                                          
33 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 162; my emphasis.  
34 Ibid., 189. See also Roessler and Eilan, “Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology,” 
23–24. 
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O’Brien gives the following gloss on the way in which acting on the basis of  an 
assessment of  the possibilities for action (grasped as such) is supposed to secure agent’s 
awareness:  
 
Agent’s awareness of  bodily action would […] involve the agent having a grasp of  the 
possible ways that she could move her body as a basic action, and carrying out one 
action rather than another on the basis of  an assessment of  the possibilities available to 
her. The agent’s grasp of  which actions are available as basic actions will be based on a 
general grasp of  the ways in which she can move her body without doing anything else. 
This grasp will itself  be based on ways that she has moved her body in the past. It will 
also be based on a particular grasp of  the position of  her body at the time of  action, 
which itself  will be based on the ways she has recently moved it.35 
 
O’Brien here explicitly commits herself  to the idea that the possibilities which are 
grasped prior to action are possibilities for moving one’s body. Recall also that this grasp is 
supposed to be at least potentially non-conceptual. Agent’s awareness is supposed to 
attach to an action which is realised on the basis of  one’s assessment of  the possibilities, 
and somehow to do so in virtue of  being realised on this basis (again, we are ignoring the 
problems with this idea discussed in (b)). If  the process of  assessing possibilities is 
supposed to furnish one with agent’s awareness, and the grasp of  these possibilities is a 
grasp of  possibilities for bodily movement then it seems able only to deliver awareness of  
whichever basic bodily movement results from the assessment. And if  practical 
knowledge is essentially grounded on agent’s awareness, then practical knowledge could 
only be of  one’s basic bodily movements.  
 
The worry is not that (say) making a coffee is not something an agent can consider as a 
possibility for action, but that possibilities like this don’t seem to be of  the right kind to 
play the role O’Brien needs them to play. This is at least in part because by ‘conscious’, 
O’Brien seems to have in mind some kind of  ‘feeling of  doing’, and this seems to at least 
involve a bodily component. It is something we can recreate in imagination when we 
imagine ourselves moving our bodies; the kind of  thing which misfires in Alien Hand 
Syndrome, when the body moves but the ‘feeling of  doing’ is absent or in certain kinds 
of  phantom-limb hallucination, in which it seems to an (e.g.) armless person that she is 
moving her arm.36  
 
The experience O’Brien has in mind is more than the experience of  one’s body’s moving; 
it is the experience of  moving one’s body – of  doing something with one’s moveable parts. 
And for this reason it is something properly called ‘agent’s awareness’, and conceived as 
distinct from proprioception. But whilst awareness of  this kind might entitle me to judge 
that I am moving my arm (rather than just that my arm is moving), it doesn’t seem able to 
entitle me to judge that I am making coffee or rather generally to judge that I am doing 
anything described in terms which go beyond bodily movements: the awareness in question 
seems inherently unable to stretch much, or at all, beyond my bodily actions.  
  
Understanding agent’s awareness in such a way that it could take in actions conceived 
independently of  their bodily components would enable O’Brien to broaden the scope 
of  practical knowledge so that it took in actions under descriptions at a much higher 
level than the bodily. But doing so would also be moving away from an account which 
                                                          
35 O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 184. 
36 That O’Brien is keen to accommodate phenomena of  these kinds is made clear in Ibid., 189. 
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bases practical knowledge on the phenomenon O’Brien describes under the label ‘agent’s 




O’Brien’s account happily met the Apparent Features constraint but had two separate kinds 
of  difficulty with the Special Relationship constraint. It seemed unclear why agent’s 
awareness would be awareness of  only intentional action, and it was not possible to have 
agent’s awareness, in O’Brien’s sense, of  those of  our intentional actions which were non-
basic, which meant that O’Brien could not account for the fact that we do – at least 
typically - have practical knowledge (as described in Chapter One (§§1&2)) of  our actions 
under their non-basic descriptions. So we should reject the idea that practical knowledge 
is grounded in agent’s awareness.  
 
I began my discussion of  O’Brien by saying that it was not clear to me whether she is 
interested in quite the same phenomenon as we are. I can now explain why this is hard to 
call. On the one hand, she wants to account for a kind of  knowledge which has just the 
content and special (apparent) features we set out in Chapter One (§1 & §2); this is 
shown by how well she meets the Apparent Features constraint. But on the other hand, an 
account of  practical knowledge as grounded in agent’s awareness seems badly placed to 
do so, not least because the scope of  the kind of  knowledge with this content, and these 
features, seems much broader than O’Brien’s account allows for. There is another 
problem, too, with thinking of  practical knowledge – of  our target phenomenon – as 
grounded in the phenomenology of  conscious action, which I will outline by way of  
concluding. 
 
Words like ‘conscious’ and ‘aware’ can mean all sorts of  things, but for O’Brien acting 
consciously is understood in opposition to acting absent-mindedly, inattentively or as a 
matter of  habit. I am agent-aware of  what I am doing when I am attentively involved in it, 
focussed on it, when it is central to my experiential state. But very often what one is 
intentionally doing is not central to one’s experiential state, or an object of  one’s attention, 
as when I am making a coffee whilst trying to solve a crossword clue, or like just now 
when I was typing ‘coffee’ but concentrating on the point I wanted to make. Recall 
Falvey reading his book whilst waiting for his dough to rise. What he’s occupied with is 
what’s going on in his book, but he’s still making bread. Very often too, we do things both 
intentionally and habitually, as when I lock the door on leaving the house. All these 
things are not only done intentionally, but are at least typically objects of  practical 
knowledge – if  asked one can say ‘straight-off ’ that one is doing any of  these things, for 
example, and one’s knowledge doesn’t appear to be epistemically grounded. With this in 
mind, tying practical knowledge very tightly to conscious awareness or the phenomenology of  
acting begins to look like going in the wrong direction.  
 
This attention-independence of  practical knowledge doesn’t make it unusual as a kind of  
knowledge. On the contrary, knowledge in general is usually thought of  as a dispositional 
kind of  thing. My knowledge that the pangolin is an endangered species does not require 
me to be constantly consciously thinking about it, or attending to the fact. And just as 
well, for I know an indefinite number of  facts. This isn’t a delusion of  omniscience (indeed 
it is consistent with another truth; that I am ignorant of  an indefinite number too); it is a 
fact about what knowledge must be like. If  I needed to consciously attend to facts in 
order to know them I would be overwhelmed with conscious thoughts and unable to get 
on with things; unable to use any of  my knowledge.  
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The fact that I needn’t be consciously engaged with a fact in order to know it is as true 
of  my knowledge that I am making a coffee, that I am typing and that I am writing a 
PhD Thesis as it is of  my knowledge that the pangolin is endangered. And the reasons 
are the same too; I am currently engaged in a number of  ongoing projects, all of  which I 
know that I am doing, but I can’t attend to all of  them at the same time.  
 
I have explained how, because O’Brien’s account of  practical knowledge sees it as 
grounded in the conscious experience of  acting, it is ill-placed to capture our notion of  
practical knowledge. And I think we have good reason to think that any account which 
takes this approach will be similarly ill-placed. Consciousness-based accounts of  practical 
knowledge seem bound to misdescribe the phenomenology of  practical knowledge. I 
don’t mean by this that practical knowledge has a distinctive phenomenology which such 
accounts misdescribe, but that such accounts go wrong by tying practical knowledge to a 
particular phenomenology, when – like propositional knowledge more generally - it 
doesn’t seem to have any.  
 
2. Sarah Paul’s Inferentialist Account 
 
Like Lucy O’Brien, Sarah Paul accepts that practical knowledge is ungrounded in 
perception, but she denies that it is wholly epistemically ungrounded in any of  the usual ways. 
On her view, my practical knowledge that I am typing is constituted by a belief  that I am 
typing which is inferentially grounded on my knowledge that I intend to be typing, plus some 
supporting premises.37  
 
The discussion is structured as follows. In (a) I explain how Paul’s account fares on our 
two initial constraints. We will see that unlike O’Brien, she has some difficulty meeting 
the Apparent Features constraint, and that it is at least not obvious how well she meets the 
Special Relationship constraint, although her difficulty is very different from O’Brien’s 
(indeed Paul’s account does very well in accommodating practical knowledge’s scope). In 
(b) and (c) I consider Paul’s epistemology in more detail and bring out a further problem 
for her account, which takes the form of  a dilemma: at first sight it is hard to see how 
the inference Paul sees as underwriting practical knowledge can justify my judgment that I 
am typing rather than my judgment that I can or might be typing (b). And although there is a 
way of  bolstering Paul’s inference to get over this problem, doing so comes at the cost of  
introducing a problematic regress. Because of  this she flouts a new constraint, which I 
introduce in (d): the Why Knowledge? constraint demands that an account of  practical 
knowledge ought not leave it mysterious why the phenomenon it describes is a kind of  
knowledge. 
 
a. Inferentialism and our two Constraints  
 
Paul aims to “explain agential knowledge with a simple, familiar epistemic structure”,38 
that of  inductive inference from evidence. We already know that inductive inferences can 
furnish us with knowledge, and Paul’s strategy is to find a structure of  this kind 
underlying practical knowledge. She accepts that practical knowledge can’t be inferred 
                                                          
37 Paul develops the account given in Grice, “Intention and Uncertainty.” See also Donnellan, “Knowing 
What I Am Doing.” Paul gives an account of  future-directed practical knowledge very similar to her 
account of  present-directed practical knowledge, but I will concentrate here only on the latter (see again 
Ch. 1, §4(a)). 
38 Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 19. 
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simply from perceptual clues or from a combination of  these and general knowledge of  
one’s tendencies (see again Ch. 1, §2(b)). Instead, she thinks that we infer our practical 
knowledge from, inter alia, knowledge of  our intentions. I know that I am typing, she 
thinks, because I intend to be doing so, I know this of  myself, and I have inferred that I 
am typing on this basis. We will consider the inference, including its subsidiary premises, 
in more detail in (b). First, though, let’s see how Paul’s inferentialist account fares on our 
two initial constraints. 
 
For Paul, the particularities of  practical knowledge – its special (apparent) features – are to 
be explained by the particularities of  one’s knowledge of  the crucial premise about one’s 
intention. Paul seeks to accommodate practical knowledge’s apparent FPA, explaining 
this as a product of  the agent’s special epistemic relationship to her own intentions.  There 
is a first-/third-person asymmetry between my and your knowledge that I am typing 
because there is a first-/third-person asymmetry between my and your knowledge of  my 
intentions, and because my knowledge of  what I am doing is inferred from this. I won’t 
here consider Paul’s account of  our knowledge of  our own intentions.39 The important 
point is that assuming that our knowledge of  our intentions itself  displays FPA – thinks 
Paul – so will the practical knowledge which is inferred from it. For this reason Paul 
would take herself  to meet the requirement from Chapter One that a good account of  
practical knowledge should have something plausible to say about exactly what practical 
knowledge’s FPA amounts to.  
 
Whether or not she does is unclear. One might worry that her account locates FPA in the 
wrong place. John Schwenkler puts the point like this:  
 
[O]n an account like Paul’s while there will clearly be fundamental differences between 
your and my respective ways of  knowing about my intentions, it appears that once that 
knowledge is in place, you may be in every bit as good a position as I am to know what I 
am doing on the basis of  the knowledge of  those intentions plus my general tendencies 
and the evident favourability of  my circumstances […] [Yet it] seems as if  it is 
knowledge of  one’s actions, and not just of  the intentions that underlie them, that ought 
to be characterized by first-person privilege […].40 
 
Paul might respond that another person de facto won’t ordinarily have as detailed a grasp 
of  my tendencies, capacities and circumstances as I have, and that given this, FPA really 
does transmit from one’s knowledge of  one’s intention to the practical knowledge 
inferred from it. Further discussion would be needed to consider whether this response 
is adequate. But I will pass over this here, because there is a more serious problem with 
Paul’s capacity to meet the Apparent Features constraint.  
 
The problem is with her capacity to explain practical knowledge’s apparent epistemic 
ungroundedness. Recall that in order to meet the Apparent Features constraint, an account 
must either accommodate or adequately explain away each of  practical knowledge’s 
apparent features. Because she thinks that practical knowledge is inferred from evidence, 
Paul must explain away the seeming non-evidential nature of  practical knowledge. But it’s 
not clear that she can.  
 
In Chapter One (§2(b)) I said that one of  the manifestations of  practical knowledge’s 
seeming epistemic ungroundedness – which includes its evidential ungroundedness – was that 
                                                          
39 But see Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing” and “How We Know What We Intend.” 
40 Schwenkler, “Perception and Practical Knowledge,” 143. 
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if  asked how one knows that one is intentionally doing something, an agent will typically 
have nothing to say. How do I know that I am typing? Well, I just do. It certainly doesn’t 
seem to me that my knowledge that I am typing is based on the fact that I intend to be 
doing so. But why should this be if  my practical knowledge that I am typing is inferred 
from knowledge that I intend to be doing so?   
 
Paul considers this kind of  worry but dismisses it as “unconvincing”41 once we recognise 
that inferences needn’t occur in or be tracked by consciousness. But although Paul is 
right to think that a judgment can be inferentially grounded without coming at the end 
of  a conscious ‘premise-premise-conclusion’ train of  thought, this isn’t an adequate 
response to the worry about apparent epistemic ungroundedness. (It might be a good 
explanation of  practical knowledge’s apparent psychological immediacy, but I won’t consider 
this here.)  
 
For part of  the reason we might think of  a given belief  as inferentially based is that its 
subject could, if  asked, give the premises of  the supposed inference as her reasons for 
holding the belief. I’m dreading getting soaked later. How do I know I’ll get soaked? I 
haven’t gone through any ‘premise-premise-conclusion’ thought-process in coming to 
know this, but if  you ask me why I believe I’ll get soaked, or how I know I will, I can 
reconstruct my grounds: “It’s pouring down with rain and looks unlikely to stop. I have to 
go out later, I don’t have a mac or a brolly, so I’ll (probably) get soaked…” 
 
Paul owes us an account of  why, if  asked how one knows what one is doing (or will do), 
an agent won’t represent her knowledge of  her intention as her grounds in this way. The 
apparent epistemic ungroundedness of  practical knowledge means that not only would Paul’s 
inference take place non-consciously, but it would actually be opaque to the knower; 
unreconstructible on questioning. And not only is the inference unreconstuctible, but it is 
likely to be actively disavowed by the practical knower. If  someone were to suggest to me 
that my evidence for thinking that I am typing is my knowledge that I intend to be doing 
so, I wouldn’t find the suggestion particularly compelling. Usually, the criterion for 
thinking of  a bit of  knowledge as inferentially based is exactly that its premises are 
reconstructible and would be avowed by the knower if  asked for them. But these criteria 
are not met by my knowledge that I am typing, and in light of  this we lack positive 
reason to think that it is inferentially based on my knowledge of  my intention.42 Paul does 
not meet the Apparent Features constraint because she fails to explain away the apparent 
epistemic – specifically evidential - ungroundedness of  practical knowledge.   
 
What about the Special Relationship constraint? Thinking of  practical knowledge as 
inferred from intention certainly explains why only intentional actions should be objects 
of  practical knowledge, and because intentions can concern actions under their non-
basic descriptions, Paul looks likely to get practical knowledge’s scope right too. On these 
points Paul’s account is clearly an improvement on O’Brien’s. But it’s less clear whether 
Paul accurately characterises the nature of  the special relationship between practical 
knowledge and intentional action, for the view is consistent with the brute empirical 
possibility that someone might simply fail to make the relevant inference, indeed that 
someone could systematically fail to do so. The result would be a person who had the 
normal capacity to act intentionally but whose knowledge of  these actions – if  any - 
didn’t appear to display FPA, epistemic ungroundedness or psychological immediacy, and this 
                                                          
41 Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 10.  
42 For a similar thought see Hampshire and Hart, “Decision, Intention and Certainty,” 9–10. 
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might be thought implausible. Clearly there is more to say here, but we should at least be 
suspicious of  Paul’s capacity to meet the Special Relationship constraint.  
 
One more point is worth making before we move on. One assumption of  Paul’s 
inferentialist view is that the capacity to know about one’s intentions is independent of  
the capacity to know about one’s own intentional actions. But this might be doubted. 
Kieran Setiya, for example, argues that in the same way that knowledge of  our perceptual 
states is transparent to knowledge of  the world, our knowledge of  our intentions is 
transparent to knowledge of  what we are doing.43 In both cases, the result is that the 
capacity for self-knowledge of  one’s own psychological state (perception; intention) is 
dependent on the capacity for knowledge of  what those states represent (perceptible 
goings-on; intentional actions). And if  this is right, Paul’s account must be rejected, for it 
rests on a false assumption. I won’t consider Setiya’s argument here, but I will come to a 
related conclusion in (c); that Paul’s inference fails to reduce the capacity to know what 
one is doing to the capacity to know what one intends.  
 
Summing up, then. Paul fails to meet the Apparent Features constraint because she fails to 
explain away the appearance of  epistemic ungroundedness which attaches to practical 
knowledge. The appearance of  epistemic ungroundedness means that any inference 
would not only need to occur non-consciously, but would also be unreconstructible by the 
agent. And second, she doesn’t obviously meet the Special Relationship constraint because 
her view seems to allow for a wide-spread dislocation between acting intentionally and 
having practical knowledge of  one’s action. In the next section I will consider Paul’s 
epistemology of  practical knowledge more closely, and will describe what I think is an 
even more serious problem than the ones gestured at here.  
 
b. Practical Knowledge’s evidence-base 
 
On Paul’s view, my knowledge of  what I intend gives me the crucial premise from which 
to infer knowledge of  what I am actually doing, but clearly this premise is not enough on 
its own to ground my practical knowledge. In order to infer that I am φ-ing from the fact 
that I intend to be φ-ing Paul says that I must also know (or at least justifiedly believe44) first 
that I can φ if  I intend to, and second that my circumstances are conducive to φ-ing.45 
 
To facilitate discussion, let’s set out Paul’s inference-schema for present-directed practical 
knowledge: 
 
Inference-Schema for Practical Knowledge 
 
P1)  I intend to be φ-ing    
P2) I can φ if  I intend to φ    
P3) My circumstances are conducive to φ-ing 
               
C) I am φ-ing   
 
Paul needs it to be the case that premises of  the form (P1)-(P3) justify an agent in 
making a judgment of  the form (C); that I am φ-ing, but it is unclear at first glance how 
they could do so. The problem is not that the premises do not entail the conclusion; the 
                                                          
43 Setiya, “Knowledge of  Intention.” 
44 From now on I will talk simply of  one’s knowledge of  one’s intention, leaving the parenthesis implicit. 
45 Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 15. 
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premises of  an inductive inference can never be expected to do this. The problem is that it 
is hard to see how they even make the conclusion likely true, and so reasonable to believe. 
For instance, although my knowledge that I currently intend to be typing, that I can type 
if  I intend to, and that my circumstances are conducive to typing clearly justify the 
conclusion that I could or might be typing, they don’t seem to justify the conclusion that I 
am in fact typing. There seems to be a justificatory gap between the premises and the 
conclusion of  Paul’s inference-schema.46  
 
Paul appears cognisant of  this kind of  worry; she recognises that she needs to explain 
the sense in which “what the agent knows without observation extend[s] beyond his own 
mind to what actually happens”.47 But I don’t think that her explanation of  how this works 
is successful. Briefly, the idea is that because (as we commented in §1(d) above) doing 
something need not entail that one will have done it (the ‘openness of  the progressive’), 
someone can know that they are doing something without knowing that they will have done 
it.  
 
Paul considers how Jen knows that she is walking to the faculty, independently of  
perception. Her suggestion is that because Jen knows that her intention in walking is to 
get to the faculty, so as long as she can be confident that walking to the faculty is 
something she can do if  she intends, and that her circumstances are conducive to doing 
it ((P2) and (P3)), she can know that in walking she is walking to the faculty. And because 
she can be walking there even if  she doesn’t end up getting there (the openness of  the 
progressive), she can know that she is walking there on the basis of  knowing that this is 
her intention, and in particular without having to rely on perception to give her clues 
about whether she is getting there.48  
 
It ought to be clear from the comments I made in §1(d) that I think that these kinds of  
consideration about the progressive are interesting, and of  relevance to understanding 
practical knowledge. But I don’t think they help Paul bridge the justificatory gap between 
the premises and conclusion of  her suggested inference. For even if  we accept that Jen 
can know that she is walking to the faculty on the basis of  knowing that her intention in 
walking is to walk to the faculty, and that the mechanism behind this has something to do 
with the openness of  the progressive, Paul tells us nothing whatsoever about how Jen 
knows that she is walking. Paul might be able to explain, with reference to features of  the 
progressive tense, how practical knowledge spreads amongst action-descriptions (in this 
case, from walking to walking to the faculty) but she doesn’t tell us how it gets started.  
 
Jen is supposed to know that she is walking by inference from knowledge that (1) she 
intends to be walking, (2) that she can walk if  she intends to and (3) that her 
circumstances are conducive to walking. But the justificatory gap remains unbridged – 
these premises seem to justify Jen only in believing only that might or could be walking; 
they fall short of  grounding her practical knowledge that she is (in fact) walking (so too 




                                                          
46 For a similar objection to the inferentialist model (although pre-dating Paul’s particular presentation), see 
O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 177. 
47 Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 16; my italics. 
48 Ibid. §5. 
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c. Infinite Regress 
 
The foregoing assumes a certain reading of  what I will call the ‘capacity premise’ (P2) - 
that “I can φ if  I intend to φ” - on which knowing that one can φ if  one intends to means 
knowing that φ-ing is the kind of  thing one is able to do intentionally (in execution of  
one’s intention). But there is a stronger reading of  the capacity premise, on which “I can 
φ if  I intend to φ” means something more like “Intending to φ now is generally sufficient 
for φ-ing now”.49 If  Jen believes that intending to now be walking is generally sufficient 
for now being walking, then she would seem to be justified in believing that she is walking, 
on the basis of  knowing that she intends to be doing so (as long as she knows that her 
circumstances are conducive). If  I know that A is generally sufficient for B, and I know 
that A obtains then I can thereby know – by inference - that B obtains.  
 
For this to work, Paul would need to say something about what ‘generally sufficient’ is 
supposed to mean here. Clearly, the sufficiency in question cannot be logical sufficiency 
since it is – and is recognised by agents to be - brutely empirically possible to intend to 
be doing something yet not actually be doing it, as when I intend to be saying something 
funny, but am not. The sense of  ‘sufficient’ would need to strong enough to justify an 
inference from one’s intending (now) to φ to one’s (now) φ-ing, but weak enough not to 
generate logical entailments between intending and doing. The capacity premise, however 
it is to be understood in detail, needs to embody a recognition that intentions to be φ-ing 
tend to be accompanied by φ-ings.  
 
We can bypass the question of  how exactly to understand the stronger interpretation of  
the capacity premise, by simply adding in a premise whose content captures this tendency 
of  intentions to result in the intended actions. The result is the following, bolstered 
inference-schema: 
 
Bolstered Inference-Schema for Practical Knowledge 
 
P1)  I intend to be φ-ing    
P2’) I can φ if  I intend to φ 
P2’’) I tend to be φ-ing when I intend to be φ-ing 
P3) My circumstances are conducive to φ-ing 
               
C) I am φ-ing  
 
 
For clarity I have split the capacity premise into two, one interpreted along the original 
lines (P2’) and one (P2’’) in which the dispositional link between intention and 
performance is made explicit.  
 
Although the bolstered premise bridges the justificatory gap we considered in (c), its 
prospects are not good. For both versions of  the capacity premise presuppose prior 
practical knowledge, and this, as I will explain, leaves Paul without an account of  how 
practical knowledge is possible.50  
 
                                                          
49 Thanks to Jane Heal for this suggestion.  
50 Strictly, this means that the current objection is as much of  a problem for the original inference-schema 
as for this bolstered version.  
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According to the bolstered inference-schema, Jen’s judgment that she is walking is 
justified in part by her knowledge that she tends to (be) do(ing) what she intends to (be) 
do(ing). But how does she know this? Paul suggests that past experience of  exercising 
one’s agency will play some role in an agent’s knowledge of  the supporting premises, 
although does go into detail.51 Still, it is easy to see how past experience of  agency might 
furnish one with knowledge of  (P2’’). Jen will have had past experiences of  intentionally 
doing those things she intended to be doing, and I guess Paul takes it that the knowledge 
embodied in a premise of  the form of  (P2’’) is a generalisation from these past instances.  
 
The generalisation will be based on many past instances of  intending to be doing 
something which she was then. Jen’s knowledge that she tends to be doing what she 
intends to be doing (P2’’) is an inductive generalisation from various past bits of  
knowledge of  conjunctions of  the form “I intend to be φ-ing, and I am φ-ing”. Knowing 
the conjunctions will have required knowing both conjuncts, and herein lies the problem, 
for this will have required having had various bits of  prior knowledge of  the form “I am 
φ-ing.” But this seems to mean that her current practical knowledge essentially 
presupposes past pieces of  practical knowledge, since these past pieces are required for 
her to know premises of  the form (P2’’), which in turn are needed to ground judgments 
of  the form “I am φ–ing” rather than merely judgments of  the form “I might be φ-ing”.  
 
If  this is right, Paul’s account of  the epistemology is incomplete: she seems able to 
explain how a given bit of  practical knowledge is justified by reference to her inference. 
But when we ask what entitles the agent to her knowledge of  her premises (or why she is 
reasonable in believing them), we find ourselves needing to cite previous bits of  practical 
knowledge. If  Paul is right, these must be justified by further inferences of  the same 
kind, which depend on yet further previous bits of  practical knowledge, and so on. Any 
bit of  practical knowledge depends on further (prior) bits of  practical knowledge and so 
on ad infinitum. The regress which ensues is vicious because it leaves Paul unable to 
explain why judgments inferred in the way Paul suggests would count as knowledge at any 
level.  
 
It might be suggested, in response, that the regress is not infinite; and so not 
problematic. One might say that although a great deal of  our practical judgments do 
depend for their justification on prior practical knowledge (for the reasons just given), at 
bottom there is a kind of  knowledge of  one’s own intentional action which is not practical, 
and so which does not itself  rely on the same kind of  inference, but which, given a critical 
mass of  instances, can license the generalisation to (P2’’). Once this generalisation has 
been made, an agent is in a position to derive – via Paul’s bolstered inference – practical 
knowledge. Positively, the most plausible version of  this suggestion claims that the 
regress bottoms-out in observation-based judgments of  the form “I am (intentionally) φ-
ing”. 
 
But the view this suggestion leaves us with is not attractive, for many will find it deeply 
implausible that as a matter of  fact there is a period of  time during someone’s 
development in which she is able to act intentionally but can come to know what she is 
doing only by observation. This would also be a stretch of  time during which one’s 
knowledge of  what one was intentionally doing lacked FPA and psychological immediacy: if  a 
little tot knows that she is intentionally (e.g.) eating banana only by observing herself  
doing this, then intentionally eating banana is something she could fail to notice, and is 
known, if  at all, as a discovery about herself. But it doesn’t seem particularly plausible – 
                                                          
51 Paul, “How We Know What We’re Doing,” 15. 
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for reasons we considered in Chapter One (§2(c)) – to think of  someone as able to act 
intentionally but capable of  noticing, or failing to notice, what they are doing.  
 
A more sophisticated kind of  response involves denying that the bits of  knowledge of  
the form “I am φ-ing” are knowledge of  one’s actions as intentional.52 One can only know 
that one is intentionally φ–ing, on this view, after one has made the generalisation to (P2’’): 
all self-knowledge of  intentional action is practical knowledge and is based on Paul’s 
bolstered inference. Prior to generalising to (P2’’) our tot is both incapable of  practical 
knowledge, and incapable of  intentional action. These capacities go together. This avoids 
the unpalatable consequence that during an initial stage our tot can act intentionally but 
know that she is doing so only observationally and psychologically mediately.  
 
But this response has a different consequence which I think is equally implausible. On 
this picture our tot would have to go through a period in which she could intend to do 
things, and know this about herself, but could not act intentionally. The idea that the 
capacity to form intentions and to know that one has them, could float free of  the 
capacity to act intentionally and to know that one is doing so, is hard to take seriously. It is 
hard to think of  a creature forming intentions and recognising themselves as doing so, 
but not being able to execute these intentions. Sure, sometimes we fail to execute our 
intentions, and a small child is likely to be more incompetent than most. But it is hard to 
imagine a period in a creature’s life in which intentions were commonly and self-
consciously formed but never executed. It is hard to know how such a creature at such a 
stage could be motivated to form intentions they recognised did not tend to come to 




I have described various problems with Paul’s account. It was not obvious how well she 
was able to meet the Special Relationship constraint and she seemed to fail to meet the 
Apparent Features constraint. In the previous two sections I have described a dilemma 
which seems to undermine her ability to meet a fourth and very important constraint, 
which we can now state as follows:  
 
 The Why Knowledge? Constraint 
 
Any account of  practical knowledge ought not to leave it mysterious why the 
phenomenon it describes is a kind of  knowledge. 
 
On one horn of  the dilemma, described in (b), Paul flouts this constraint because a 
judgment of  the form “I am φ-ing” is not justified by the inference’s premises; at best 
they justify the agent in judging “I might (or could) be φ-ing”. Yet practical knowledge is 
knowledge that one is in fact φ-ing. Bolstering the premise-set to bridge this justificatory 
gap comes at the expense of  inviting a problematic regress, for the extra premise needed 
to do so itself  depends on prior bits of  practical knowledge. The regress cannot be 
stopped without generating implausible consequences. For these reasons we ought to 
reject Paul’s account, and because the problems are problems with the very idea that 
practical knowledge might be inferred from knowledge of  one’s intention, it seems likely 
that any view of  this broad kind will be subject to the same objections.  
                                                          
52 Thanks to Alison Fernandes for this version of  the response.  
53 Some empirical work relevant to these thoughts is discussed in Roessler, “Intentional Action and Self-




Concluding Part One 
 
 
In Part One I have tried to do three things; to clarify our target phenomenon - practical 
knowledge; to consider and reject two broad approaches to understanding it by considering 
and rejecting exemplars, and to introduce and explain three constraints on a good 
account of  practical knowledge. It is useful to re-cap these three constraints:  
 
The Apparent Features Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge will either accommodate, or explain away, 
all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features. 
 
The Special Relationship Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge should contain a plausible conception of  
the nature of  the special relationship between practical knowledge and intentional 
action.  
 
The Why Knowledge? Constraint 
 
Any account of  practical knowledge ought not leave it mysterious why the phenomenon 
it describes is a kind of  knowledge. 
 
Neither of  the accounts I considered in Chapter Two met all of  these constraints. 
O’Brien met the Apparent Features constraint but, because she tied practical knowledge to 
an agent’s conscious awareness of  acting, the account was unable to meet the Special 
Relationship constraint. It was hard to see why only intentional action should be an object 
of  practical knowledge, and to see how very many of  our intentional actions – the non-
basic ones - could be. In addition, the view conflicted with the fact that we can know 
what we are doing even when we are not consciously attending to doing those things; 
with the fact that practical knowledge, like all propositional knowledge, appears to be 
dispositional. Practical knowledge as we described it in Chapter One seems much more 
pervasive than O’Brien’s picture allowed, and the account was rejected.  
 
Paul’s account didn’t have the same problems as O’Brien’s, but it still had problems. It 
was not able to meet the Apparent Features constraint and not obviously able to meet the 
Special Relationship constraint, although Paul’s worries here were different from O’Brien’s. 
Most seriously, I suggested, a dilemma infected Paul’s capacity to meet the new Why 
Knowledge? constraint. The problem seemed to be in particular with the idea that 
judgments about what one is doing are – on Paul’s view – inferred from judgments about 
one’s intention and abilities. I suggested that the inference would go through only if  one 
of  the premises linked intending with acting, but introducing such a linking premise led 
to the regress problems we considered at the end of  §2. I suggested that Paul’s account 
ought to be rejected. 
 
Both O’Brien’s and Paul’s accounts did have benefits, though, which are best seen by 
comparing the two, since they mirror one another. Because Paul’s account does not tie 
practical knowledge to the phenomenology of  acting, and because it linked practical 
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knowledge’s content to that of  intention, it was easy to see how Paul avoided the kind of  
problems which O’Brien had with the Special Relationship constraint (viz. of  accounting for 
the breadth of  practical knowledge’s scope, and its dispositional character). And because 
O’Brien’s account does not think of  practical knowledge as inferred from evidence of  any 
kind, she was able to avoid the kinds of  problem Paul had with meeting the Apparent 
Features constraint (viz. of  explaining why practical knowledge should appear 
epistemically ungrounded). 
  
So perhaps what we need is a view which combines the helpful features of  both 








In this Part we will start to consider Intentionalism – the idea that an agent’s practical 
knowledge is in some sense constituted by her intention. The considerations in Part One 
gave us reason to take this idea seriously, by suggesting that we dismiss two major 
alternative ways of  thinking about practical knowledge. But how is the idea supposed to 
work? The idea is apt to seem strange from the get-go given the common assumption 
that knowledge is constituted by belief  (when true and held in epistemically favourable 
circumstances). How could practical knowledge be constituted by intention? 
 
One move is to think of  intention as itself  a kind of  belief. If  that is right, then 
intentions could constitute knowledge in the way beliefs do, and practical knowledge’s 
special features – those which differentiate it from other kinds of  knowledge – could be 
explained by reference to the differences between intentions and ‘ordinary’ beliefs. I will 
refer to the idea that intentions are a kind of  belief  as ‘Cognitivism about Intention’ – 
Cognitivism for short – and I will call a view of  practical knowledge which includes this 
idea Cognitivist Intentionalism, or CI.  
 
David Velleman and Kieran Setiya both defend versions of  CI and I will consider both 
versions in Chapter Three. Both views are found problematic, although Velleman’s rather 
more so. In Chapter Four I argue that Cognitivism itself  is untenable, which leads me to 
reject any version of  CI. This sets the scene for a consideration of  the view I will defend 











David Velleman and Kieran Setiya both accept that practical knowledge is constituted by 
intention, and that intentions are a kind of  belief. In the language I will be using, they are 
both Intentionalists about practical knowledge, and Cognitivists about intention: they both 
accept Cognitivist Intentionalism or CI. 
 
Accepting Cognitivism means that Velleman and Setiya are able to adopt Intentionalism in a 
way which fits with what I will call the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge; the familiar 
picture of  knowledge as constituted by a belief  which is true and held in epistemically 
favourable circumstances. Velleman and Setiya both agree that practical knowledge is 
constituted by a belief  of  a special kind – an intention-belief  (as I will call them) – which 
is true and held in epistemically favourable circumstances. But they disagree on the 
nature of  these circumstances. Velleman’s conception of  them is internalist whereas 
Setiya’s is externalist.  
 
This difference, it turns out, is important. The main point of  §1 will be that Velleman 
inherits the major problems faced by Sarah Paul, for the reason that on point of  
epistemology (and despite first appearances), the two epistemological pictures are more 
or less the same. We will see how Setiya’s externalism immunises him against these 
problems in §2, but we will also see that Setiya has problems of  his own.  
 
1. Velleman’s Internalist Cognitivist Intentionalism 
 
Velleman’s account of  practical knowledge1 must be understood from the perspective of  
a Causal Theory of  Action (henceforth ‘CTA’). CTA comprises an account of  the 
constitution and of  the explanation of  intentional action.2 Intentional actions are constituted 
by bodily movements which are the causal upshots of  the agent’s reasons or motivations 
(understood as mental states), and they are to be explained in terms of  these reasons, 
where this explanation is understood as a species of  efficient-causal explanation.3  
 
                                                          
1 I concentrate on Velleman’s view as presented in his Practical Reflection, but later work (The Possibility of  
Practical Reason) will become relevant in (d). Velleman is clear that the later work does not represent a 
substantial change of  mind, but a development of  the earlier account (“Preçis of  The Possibility of  
Practical Reason,” 223).  
2 Velleman thinks of  the objects of  practical knowledge as autonomous or full-blooded actions, not intentional 
ones (Velleman, “Preçis of  The Possibility of  Practical Reason,” n. 6.), but for reasons noted earlier (Ch. 
1, §1), I will proceed as if  he gives an account of  our knowledge of  the latter. 
3 Velleman’s version of  the causal theory is atypical. He describes his argument with standard CTA in his 
Introduction to The Possibility of  Practical Reason, 5–12. This argument is not relevant to my discussion in 
this Chapter.  
 46
Velleman’s account of  practical knowledge is an attempt to respond to two problems. 
First, he wants to reconcile practical knowledge’s psychological immediacy – what he calls its 
‘spontaneity’ – with CTA, in light of  the following seeming tension between the two:   
 
We usually know what we’re doing, and we seem to know it quite spontaneously, without 
having to discover it. We feel as if  we’re inventing what we do and hence that we don’t 
have to find out. But if  our actions are caused by our motives, then they must follow a 
predetermined course that isn’t really ours to invent […] How, then, can we have 
spontaneous knowledge of  them?4 
 
I will adopt Velleman’s terminology throughout this section, speaking of  practical 
knowledge as ‘spontaneous’ rather than ‘psychologically immediate’, but ask the reader to 
recall that these labels name the same feature of  practical knowledge. 
 
The second problem is to do with the internal coherence of  the idea of  spontaneous 
knowledge. The worry is that if  practical knowledge is spontaneous – not based on a 
discovery or episode of  noticing (etc.) - then it cannot be based on evidence. But if  an 
attitude with an empirical content is not evidentially grounded, it doesn’t deserve the name 
‘knowledge’. Velleman notes that certain philosophers – he has in mind in particular 
Elizabeth Anscombe and Stuart Hampshire5 - have suggested that practical knowledge is 
“a unique kind of  knowledge that simply doesn’t require grounds”.6 But he thinks that 
this position is deeply problematic in that it “[makes] epistemological exceptions” in 
practical knowledge’s favour,7 by exempting it from “the usual requirements of  evidential 
support”.8  
 
Any attitude, in order to be knowledge, must “be able to vouch for its truth by means of  
evidence”,9 and so knowledge (at least empirical knowledge) must be based on evidence 
for thinking its content true. Anything called ‘knowledge’ which does not meet this 
evidential criterion is not “worthy of  the name”10 ‘knowledge’. Velleman, then, is mindful 
of  the importance of  meeting the Why Knowledge? constraint, and of  potential conflicts 
between doing so and adequately explaining practical knowledge’s psychological immediacy 
(and so meeting the Apparent Features constraint).  
 
His response to both problems looks like this: far from being in conflict with the causal 
aetiology of  intentional action, practical knowledge itself  plays an ineliminable role within 
it. Practical knowledge is spontaneous because it causes the actions it concerns. And despite 
its spontaneity, practical knowledge is nonetheless evidentially grounded because the beliefs 
which constitute it stand as evidence for their own truth. Velleman’s response to both 
problems rests on his identification of  intentions as a kind of  belief. Practical knowledge 
plays a role in the causal aetiology of  intentional action in virtue of  the fact that its 
constituting attitudes – intentions-beliefs – do so. And the beliefs which constitute 
                                                          
4 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 4. For a similar worry see Roessler and Eilan, “Agency and Self-Awareness: 
Mechanisms and Epistemology,” 20–21. 
5 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 25. Velleman specifically cites Hampshire and Hart, “Decision, Intention and 
Certainty” here, adding that he “would list Anscombe, Grice, Kenny, and Melden as agreeing, or likely to 
agree with Hampshire and Hart.” (Ibid, n.14)  
6 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 25. 
7 Ibid. A similar worry is found in O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, 178. 
8 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 105. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 25. 
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practical knowledge are self-evidencing because they are intention-beliefs, which unlike 
ordinary beliefs, tend to cause their own truth.  
 
I will explain these ideas in more detail in (a), and then explain how the account meets 
two of  our constraints in (b). In (c) and (d), though, I will argue that Velleman’s account is 
no real improvement on Paul’s in relation to the Apparent Features and Why Knowledge? 
constraints. I will conclude in (d) that Velleman’s account has significant internal 
difficulties and ought to be rejected.  
 
a. Velleman on Practical Knowledge  
   
In outline, Velleman’s view is as follows: Intentions are a kind of  belief, and practical 
knowledge is constituted by these intention-beliefs. Specifically, intentions are beliefs of  
the form “I will φ” or “I am φ-ing”,11 but they differ from ordinary beliefs in two 
important ways. First, they are formed in response to the agent’s motivations for acting as 
intended (practical reasons), rather than in response to sufficient prior evidence for 
thinking that one will act as intended (theoretical reasons). My intention-belief  that I will 
go to the bar, for example, is not formed in response to reasons which make my going to 
the bar look likely (if  my bar-going already looked likely it’s hard to see what point there 
would be in forming the intention to go there), but in response to reasons I have for going 
there (I want a pint). It is because the attitudes constituting practical knowledge are not 
formed in response to evidence for their truth that practical knowledge does not 
represent a discovery; that it is spontaneous. 
 
Second, intention-beliefs are self-fulfilling. Since intentions (this is where CTA comes in) 
tend to cause the actions they concern, they tend to cause their own truth. When my 
intention-belief  that I will go to the bar causes me to go to the bar, my intention-belief  
turns out true. Not all intention-beliefs cause their own truth (sometimes we don’t do 
what we intend), but as a category they have a tendency to do so. This is a causal property 
of  intention-beliefs, but it underwrites an epistemic property: because intention-beliefs are 
self-fulfilling, they are also self-evidencing or self-justifying (I will use these interchangeably). If  
my intention-belief  that I will go to the bar is likely to cause me to go to the bar, then my 
having this intention-belief  is evidence that I will go to the bar, so is evidence for its own 
truth. It is because the attitudes constituting practical knowledge are self-evidencing that 
they – if  true – meet “the usual requirements of  evidential support”12 and so count a 
kind of  knowledge.  
 
But why are intention-beliefs self-fulfilling; what is the mechanism here? The answer is that 
agents capable of  intentional action come pre-packaged with a desire to know what they 
are doing.13 This desire inhibits an agent from doing things she does not believe she will 
do, and prompts her to do things she does believe she will do. Having an intention-belief  
that I will go to the bar thus adds to my antecedent motivations for going there and, ceteris 
paribus, causes me to do so. Let’s consider the idea in more detail by going through 
another example.  
                                                          
11 In fact Velleman thinks that intention-beliefs have more complex contents than this. The details don’t 
matter at the moment but we will come to them in (d). 
12 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 105. 
13 Ibid., 47, et passim. In later work Velleman alters the suggestion so as to allow that one’s aim to know 
what one is doing is determined not by a desire, but by some sub-personal mechanism. His reasons are 
given in The Possibility of  Practical Reason, 12–20. Throughout, Velleman thinks of  it as constitutive of  
being an agent that one aims to know what one is doing.  
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I am working with the radio on quietly in the background. My concentration is flagging 
and I am likely to get distracted if  I leave it on, because an interesting programme is 
about to start which would likely monopolise my attention. I had wanted to finish this 
section before I took a break, so perhaps I should turn the radio off. On the other hand, 
perhaps listening to something interesting for half  an hour might set me up for better 
concentration later; so perhaps I should take my break now, and turn the radio up so I 
can hear it better. I have some motivation for turning the radio off, and some for turning 
it up; neither set of  motivations are overwhelming in strength. What to do? In the end I 
decide to turn the radio off, and go on to do so.  
 
Here is Velleman’s causal-motivational story: because my motivations to turn the radio off  
and to turn it up were roughly equal in strength I was not compelled to do either, and 
prior to deciding what to do I was (more or less) just as likely to do either. When I decide 
to turn the radio off  I do so on the basis of  my motivations for turning it off (had I decided 
to turn it up it would have been on the basis of  my motivations for doing this instead). 
Deciding is forming an intention-belief, in this case with the content that I will turn the 
radio off. Because I now have a belief  (an intention-belief) that I will turn the radio off, my 
desire to know what I am doing kicks in, inhibiting me from doing anything I don’t 
believe I will do (including turning the radio up) and prompting me to do what I do 
believe I will do, viz. to turn the radio off. The balance of  my motivations has been 
shifted; I now have stronger motivation for turning the radio off  than for turning it up. I 
am caused, by these motivations, to turn the radio off.  
 
Here is Velleman’s epistemological story: because I recognised that my motivations to turn 
the radio off  and to turn it up were roughly equal in strength, my evidence that I would 
turn the radio off  was, and appeared to me to be, no stronger than my evidence that I 
would turn it up (and vice versa). So I didn’t have sufficient reason to believe I would either 
turn the radio up, or turn it off. Nevertheless I can form an intention-belief  on the basis 
of  one set of  motivations, and I in fact decide to turn the radio off; forming an intention-
belief  that I will do so. Intention-beliefs are self-justifying (because they are self-
fulfilling), so I now have a justified intention-belief, one which ‘meets the usual 
requirements of  evidential support’. All that needs to be the case for me to thereby have 
knowledge is for the intention-belief  to turn out true. And it does (ex hypothesi): I turn off  
the radio (for reasons explained in the previous paragraph). 
 
What exactly do I have practical knowledge of  in this example? That I will turn off  the 
radio, or – a bit later – that I am turning it off? Jonathan Dancy14 worries that Velleman 
confuses present-directed with future-directed knowledge of  intentional action. Velleman 
clarifies things as follows: 
  
In the first instance, […] an agent aims at the former. But […] I also think that an 
agent’s primary means of attaining the former is by attaining a short-term version of the 
latter.15 
 
Intention-beliefs are typically formed prior to performing the action in question, but 
because an agent knows, in virtue of  her intention-belief, that she will act in a certain way, 
this means that when she comes to acting in that way, her action comes as no surprise and 
she knows that she is performing it. I simply assume here that Velleman’s strategy of  
                                                          
14 Dancy, “On Knowing What One Is Doing,” 239–240. 
15 Velleman, “Replies to Discussion on the Possibility of  Practical Reason,” 277. Velleman is responding 
directly to Dancy here. 
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understanding present-directed practical knowledge in terms of  a ‘short-term version’ of  
future-directed practical knowledge is unproblematic. 
 
Let’s sum up by clarifying how Velleman explains practical knowledge’s spontaneity 
consistently with meeting the Why Knowledge? constraint. The formation of  intention-
beliefs is not constrained by prior evidence for their truth in the way that the formation 
of  ordinary beliefs is; this is why practical knowledge is spontaneous and does not 
represent a discovery on the basis of  evidence. But once formed, intention-beliefs are 
evidentially grounded; they constitute evidence for themselves. And so the practical 
knowledge they constitute is – like empirical knowledge in general – evidentially 
grounded. This is how, thinks Velleman, we can maintain that practical knowledge is 
‘worthy of  the name’. Velleman’s trick has been to separate the psychology of  practical 
knowledge from its epistemology. Its spontaneity is a feature of  its psychology; the 
intention-beliefs which constitute it are not formed in response to or occasioned by sufficient 
evidence for their truth. But this does not mean that on point of  epistemology they are not 
evidentially grounded Intention-beliefs themselves give an agent sufficient evidence for 
thinking them true. In the terminology from Chapter One, we can think of  Velleman as 
pulling practical knowledge’s apparent epistemic ungroundedness apart from its apparent 
psychological immediacy, seeking to explain away the former appearance, and to accommodate 
the latter, motivated by a recognition of  the importance of  meeting the Why Knowledge? 
constraint.  
 
Velleman’s Cognitivism plays a central role in his account. It is because intentions are a kind 
of  belief that they are capable of  constituting knowledge, which is understood according 
to Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge as constituted by belief  which is true and held in 
epistemically favourable circumstances. And it is because they are a special kind of  belief  
that first, they can be formed without sufficient prior evidence (they are ‘spontaneous’ 
and practical knowledge is psychologically immediate) and second, they are nevertheless 
justified (they are self-justifying, and so if  true will constitute knowledge). Because 
intention-beliefs are self-justifying they need not be inferred from evidence in order to be 
grounded in evidence. 
 
b. The Special Relationship Constraint 
 
Let’s start to assess Velleman’s view. Like Paul, he ties the content of  practical knowledge 
to the content of  intention, and so like Paul would seem to avoid O’Brien’s scope 
difficulty. Indeed, we can assume that any version of  Intentionalism is bound to do as well 
as Paul did on this score. 
 
Paul had a different problem with the Special Relationship constraint, viz. that it seemed 
brutely empirically possible on her view for an agent to be capable of  intentional action 
yet to lack the capacity for practical knowledge (see again Ch. 2, §2(a)). Velleman seems 
to improve on Paul’s account here. For a case in which someone acts intentionally will be 
a case in which their action is caused in part by their intention-belief, and this means that 
anyone acting intentionally has a true intention-belief  that they are acting. And since 
intention-beliefs are self-justifying, anyone acting intentionally will have a true and justified 
intention-belief, which means that they’ll have knowledge that they are acting as 
intended. So on Velleman’s view, acting intentionally either entails or comes very close to 
entailing practical knowledge, and the Special Relationship constraint seems to be met.  
 
But he doesn’t do so well on our two other constraints, as we will see. 
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c. The Apparent Features Constraint 
 
Velleman initially appears to do well on the Apparent Features constraint, since he happily 
accommodates both practical knowledge’s psychological immediacy (‘spontaneity’) and its 
FPA. We have already seen (in (a)) how he explained practical knowledge’s psychological 
immediacy and I won’t bring up any problems for this explanation. Let’s consider why, on 
Velleman’s view, practical knowledge should display FPA. 
 
A new bit of  terminology is useful here. For Velleman, practical knowledge is “the cause 
of  what it understands”.16 This characterisation picks up on the fact that, as described 
above, practical knowledge’s constituting attitudes (intention-beliefs) play a role in the 
causal aetiology of  the objects of  that knowledge (the intended actions): my intention-
belief  that I will turn off  the radio causes me to turn it off.17 The idea that practical 
knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’ underwrites a first-/third-person 
asymmetry in relation to propositions about what someone is doing intentionally, 
because only a person’s own beliefs (their intention-beliefs) have the relevant causal role. So 
Velleman seems to accommodate practical knowledge’s FPA and to explain exactly what 
it amounts to, which was a requirement of  meeting the Apparent Features constraint (see 
again Ch. 1, §2(d)). 
 
It is with practical knowledge’s apparent epistemic ungroundedness that Velleman has a 
problem. Indeed, it is the same problem I suggested Paul faced. Like Paul, Velleman must 
explain away this apparent feature of  practical knowledge because like Paul, Velleman 
denies that practical knowledge is epistemically ungrounded: it is, he thinks, grounded on 
the evidence it provides for itself  and only because it is, is it ‘worthy of  the name’ 
“knowledge”.  
 
On the face of  it, Velleman has a story to tell which was not available to Paul. For on his 
view, practical knowledge is not inferred from evidence, even though it is epistemically 
grounded in evidence. So perhaps I am at a loss to answer the question “How do you 
know you are turning off  the radio?” because I hear it at a request for the evidence in 
response to which I formed my intention-belief, and I recognise that I didn’t form my 
intention-belief  in response to any evidence, but in response to my motivations. 
 
But this response is problematic. For there is no reason to think that an agent can only 
hear “How do you know you are φ-ing?” as a request for information about the aetiology 
of  her intention-belief  or knowledge. If  Velleman is right that knowledge per se requires 
evidential grounds, then in seeing myself  as knowing that I am turning off  the radio, I 
must seemingly either recognise my judgment as epistemically grounded, or flout some 
rationality requirement. We can stipulate that I can think of  myself  as knowing that I am 
turning off  the radio, consistently with being rational, and ask: why wouldn’t I hear “How 
do you know you are turning off  the radio?” as a request for my evidential grounds?  
 
A pragmatic response is available: I won’t hear the question in this way because everybody 
knows that intention-beliefs are self-evidencing. Because this is common knowledge and if  
it is also common knowledge that I am intentionally turning off  the radio, then there is no 
point in my interlocutor asking for my evidence; the involvement of  my intention 
ensures that the answer to their question is already mutually known. This would explain 
                                                          
16 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 102. 
17 We shall see later (Ch.5; §1(e)) that this is not the only way to understand the claim that practical 
knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’. 
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both why I don’t hear the question as a request for my evidence and why it seems like a 
stupid or strange question to ask. 
 
One worry about this response is that it seems to depend on thinking of  ordinary agents  
as at least implicitly accepting Velleman’s unusual metaphysics of  practical knowledge; as 
accepting that practical knowledge is constituted by a kind of  belief  which unlike 
ordinary beliefs is self-justifying and can be formed in the absence of  reasons for 
thinking it true. I will complain about this conception of  intention directly in (d), but I 
will put this worry to one side here in order to concentrate on a bigger problem with the 
pragmatic strategy. 
 
The pragmatic response it isn’t a satisfactory answer to our question, for my interlocutor 
can force me to hear the question as request for my knowledge’s epistemic grounds, rather 
than for its psychological aetiology. She can ask me directly, “What is your justification for 
believing that you are turning off  the radio?” or “On what evidence do you believe that you 
are turning off  the radio?” But now Velleman is in just the same boat as was Paul (see 
again Ch. 2, §2(a)); it just doesn’t seem to me as if  my knowledge that I am turning off  
the radio is evidentially grounded. From my perspective, my intention to be turning it off  
just doesn’t seem to constitute evidence that I am, even if I accept that my intending to do 
things usually leads to my doing them. 
 
Interestingly, Velleman accepts this datum:  
 
To the question “How do you know what you’re doing?” the most obvious reply is 
“Well, I’m the one who’s doing it!” – which suggests that doing something is a special 
way of  knowing about it.18 
 
I find what Velleman says in this passage very plausible (and will provide my own 
account of  how doing something is a special way of  knowing about it in Chapter Six). 
The problem for Velleman is that his account doesn’t do his own observation justice.19  
 
Like Paul, Velleman thinks that practical knowledge is evidentially based on the agent’s 
intention. And like Paul, Velleman fails to explain why this evidential basis should be 
opaque to the agent. The fact that Velleman denies that practical knowledge is inferred 
from evidence might explain why it should appear to be psychologically immediate 
(‘spontaneous’) but it does not adequately explain away practical knowledge’s apparent 
epistemic – in particular, evidential - ungroundedness. Velleman does no better than Paul on the 
Apparent Features constraint. 
 
d. The Why Knowledge? Constraint 
  
I have already remarked that Velleman is mindful of  the need to meet the Why Knowledge? 
constraint; to give an account of  practical knowledge on which it is not mysterious why it 
really is a kind of  knowledge. Velleman’s worry about meeting this constraint is a worry 
about how practical knowledge could be spontaneous, consistently with its being evidentially 
grounded. And despite the fact that (as I argued in (c)) he doesn’t sufficiently explain away 
the appearance of  epistemic ungroundedness, he does have a story to tell about practical 
knowledge’s evidential basis.  
 
                                                          
18 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 18.  
19 A similar objection can be found in Langton, “Intention as Faith,” 258. 
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But in order to work, his story about practical knowledge’s grounds must be complete. My 
complaint against Paul’s account was that her story about the agent’s epistemic grounds 
was not complete, because either her premises failed to justify a conclusion about what 
the person is actually doing, or – on a bolstered version of  the Pauline inference – because 
her premises depended essentially on prior practical knowledge, leaving Paul’s account of  
practical knowledge’s grounds ultimately unexplained. For this reason, I argued, Paul 
flouted the Why Knowledge? constraint. Again, I don’t think Velleman improves on Paul’s 
account in relation to this issue. For although their accounts look very different, this 
different is down to a different conception of  the psychology of  practical knowledge, and 
not a different conception of  its epistemology. On point of  epistemology Velleman’s 
account pretty much coincides with Paul’s bolstered account. But the problem for Paul’s 
bolstered account was a problem with its epistemology. 
 
In (a) we saw how thinking of  intention-beliefs as self-fulfilling meant seeing them as self-
justifying, but Velleman’s epistemology is more complicated than I suggested there. 
Agents’ intention-beliefs are not justified merely because they are self-fulfilling, but 
because, in addition, agents believe that they are: 
 
… the agent isn’t entitled to expect himself  to do something unless he has reason to 
believe that he’ll do it if  he expects to.20 
 
And such a person does have a reason to believe that he’ll do what he expects (intend-
believes): a feature of  Velleman’s account I have so far suppressed is that intention-
beliefs not only are self-fulfilling, they also represent themselves as such. This, for Velleman, 
is part of  the content of  intentions; in the abstract, intentions have the content “I’ll φ 
because I hereby intend to.”21 The ‘because’ represents one’s intention-belief  as likely to 
cause the intended action, whereas the ‘hereby’ indicates that the intention which will do 
the causing is this very one. Both the ‘because’ clause and the ‘hereby’ clause are within the 
scope of  one’s belief. My intending to turn off  the radio thus involves my believing: 
 
a) That I intend to turn off  the radio 
b) That this intention will or is likely to cause me to turn off  the radio 
c) That I will turn off  the radio 
 
For Velleman, these ‘three’ beliefs are aspects of  the same attitude, so unlike Paul, 
Velleman does not think I infer from (a) and (b) to (c). Still, on point of  epistemology the 
similarity with the bolstered Pauline account is glaring. Both Paul and Velleman think that 
a belief  of  the form “I will φ” is epistemically grounded on an evidence-set which includes a 
belief  of  the form “I intend to φ” and a belief  about how intention typically links to 
action. The belief  in (b) is about a particular (singular) causal relationship this intention-
belief  is likely to enter into, but it must, presumably, be justified by a generalisation 
linking intentions-to-φ with φ-ings. With this in mind, Velleman’s and Paul’s epistemologies 
turn out to look pretty much identical: for both, part of  what evidentially grounds an 
agent’s practical knowledge is her knowledge that she tends to do, or to be doing, what she 
intends to do, or to be doing.  
 
                                                          
20 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 97. For ‘expectation’ read ‘intention-belief ’: In Practical Reflection Velleman 
first characterizes practical knowledge’s constituting attitudes as ‘self-fulfilling expectations’; later in the 
book he identifies these with intentions (Velleman, Practical Reflection, Ch. 3 & 4). 
21 Ibid., 140; my square brackets. 
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Does Velleman fall into the same regress as did Paul (see again Ch. 2, §2(c))? Yes, I think 
so, although it takes a little longer to see why, for an option is open to Velleman which 
was not open to Paul. Paul was explicit that agents come to know the link between 
intention and action ‘from experience as an agent’, and this committed her to thinking of  
this knowledge as inductively generalised from past instances of  conjunctive knowledge 
of  intention and of  action. It was the thought that the relevant knowledge was justified 
by an inductive generalisation which caused the regress problem. But Velleman need not 
accept that the knowledge of  the link between intention and action is justified in this 
way. There is another option available to Velleman; he can ‘go functionalist’. 
 
What intentions are, says the functionalist, is completely determined by their functional 
role, part of  which is to cause actions which match their contents. An isomorphic 
account of  concept-possession has it that someone possessing the concept of  intention 
just is someone who recognises intention’s distinct functional role as characterising 
certain psychological attitudes. On this view, an attitude’s functional role is – as I will say 
- transparent to someone possessing the concept of  the attitude. Because it is part of  
intention’s functional role that they tend to cause the actions they represent, this will be 
transparent to anyone possessing the concept of  intention. This would explain how an 
agent could know that she tends to do what she intends, without having inductively 
generalised from past conjunctive beliefs of  the form “I intend to be φ-ing and I am φ-
ing”, and so without presupposing prior practical knowledge in the way Paul did. On the 
functionalist view, the agent knows this in just virtue of  possessing the concept of  
intention. 
 
I’ll accept for the sake of  argument that Paul’s regress is avoided by the functionalist 
strategy. 22 The problem is that the strategy is not available to Velleman. The self-fulfilling 
nature of  intentions is only one aspect of  intention’s functional role, and it is implausible 
that its other aspects, as Velleman understands them, are transparent to anyone 
possessing the concept of  intention. Because the functionalist cannot pick and choose 
which aspects of  an attitude’s functional role will be transparent to someone possessing 
the concept of  the attitude, Velleman must choose between his complete conception of  
intention’s functional role, and the functionalist account of  concept-possession. Either 
way his account of  practical knowledge falls down, as we shall see.  
 
What are the other aspects of  intention’s functional role, and why is it implausible that 
they are transparent to someone possessing the concept of  intention? We have already 
seen that for Velleman, intentions are a special kind of  belief. In more detail, he thinks 
of  ‘ordinary’ beliefs as having three jointly defining features: a particular direction of  
guidance, constitutive aim, and direction of  fit. An attitude’s direction of  guidance is a matter of  
whether it tends to cause, or to be caused by what it represents. Ordinary beliefs tend to be 
caused by what they represent, but intentions, recall, are self-fulfilling which means that they 
tend to cause what they represent. So intention’s direction of  guidance differs from that 
of  ordinary belief. But intentions are nevertheless a kind of  belief  because they share a 
constitutive aim and a direction of  fit with ordinary beliefs. I want to suggest that it doesn’t 
                                                          
22 Could Paul herself  not step back from her commitment to agents knowing the linking premise ‘I tend to 
do what I intend’, and adopt the functionalist response? Not, I don’t think, without stepping back from 
her inferentialist strategy itself. For the Functionalist response requires thinking of  a belief  of  the form 
“I intend to be φ-ing” and a belief  of  the form “I am φ-ing” as somehow internally related to one 
another. But this would collapse the logical gap between premises and conclusion which is a feature of  
inductive inference. Would the resulting view nevertheless be a good one? I can’t address the altered 
Pauline view in detail here, but it seems unlikely to do any better than her view (as considered in Chapter 
Two) in relation to the Apparent Features constraint.  
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seem plausible to think that anyone possessing the concept of  intention recognises them 
as having these features, even implicitly. 
 
Belief ’s constitutive aim is truth: an attitude is a belief  only insofar as it aims to be true. 
Intentions are supposed by Velleman to share belief ’s constitutive aim because: 
 
When I form [an intention] I aim to settle a question in my mind only insofar as I can 
thereby settle it in fact; I aim, that is, to avoid representing an arrangement that I am not 
thereby managing to make.23 
 
My intention to turn off  the radio, thinks Velleman, ‘aims at being true’ in the sense that 
its point is to cause me to turn off  the radio, a condition which would render its content – 
that I will turn off  the radio - true. Any attitude which did not have this aim would not be an 
intention, thinks Velleman, or a belief. (Intentions are unlike ordinary beliefs in that they 
tend to meet the aim off  their own bat; they are self-fulfilling.)  
 
If  intentions constitutively aim at truth, they must be capable of  being true. But it’s not 
obvious that commonsense psychology thinks of  intentions as ever being true (or false). 
We certainly don’t say that people’s intentions are – like their beliefs - true (or false); we 
say that they are (competently) carried out, or not. In common parlance, talk of  ‘true 
beliefs’ is usually a semantic notion, whereas talk of  ‘true intentions’ is usually a moral one. 
So it is not obvious that this feature of  intention’s functional role – as Velleman 
conceives it – is transparent to people possessing the content of  intention.  
 
It might be responded that the fact that we don’t speak of  intentions as (semantically) 
true or false doesn’t entail that they are not. Perhaps we don’t think of  intentions as 
having true (false) contents because they don’t represent their propositional contents as 
true, as do beliefs. Instead they represent their propositional contents as to be made true. 
But this doesn’t mean, the response continues, that intentions’ contents are not true or 
false, so it doesn’t mean that intentions can’t aim at truth. 
 
But Velleman can’t give this response, for it requires distinguishing intention’s direction of  fit 
from that of  belief, and Velleman thinks that intention and belief  share a direction of  fit: 
  
Because choosing [i.e. forming an intention] entails settling a question in one’s mind, it 
requires more than representing an answer to be arranged. If  it were still to be arranged 
that I was going to act, then it would not yet be settled that I was going to act […] 
Settling on a future action thus requires representing the action as arranged: my choice 
makes it true that I am going to act, by representing it as true that I’m going to act. It 
therefore has the same direction of  fit as belief.24 
 
This point is not ad hominem, but goes to the heart of  Velleman’s epistemology of  
practical knowledge, for we have already seen that Velleman’s commitment to Cognitivism 
is central to his claim that intentions can constitute practical knowledge. And his 
commitment to Cognitivism just is his commitment to the claim that intentions share two 
out of  the three defining features with ‘ordinary’ beliefs; that intentions are unlike 
ordinary beliefs only in relation to their direction of  guidance.  
 
                                                          
23 Velleman, The Possibility of  Practical Reason, 25. 
24 Ibid. See also Ibid., 10. 
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There is another problem for the claim that intentions share a constitutive aim with 
beliefs, too; at least on Velleman’s understanding. Velleman glosses the aim-claim in terms 
of  correctness conditions: 
 
The norm of  correctness for belief  is […] internal to the nature of  belief  itself. The 
concept of  belief  just is the concept of  an attitude for which there is such a thing as 
correctness and incorrectness, consisting in truth or falsity. […] Philosophers have 
traditionally accounted for this feature of  belief  by saying that beliefs constitutively aims 
at the truth.25 
 
Assuming intentions have propositional, truth-valued, contents, it is still not obvious that 
commonsense psychology represents them as incorrect insofar as they fail to cause facts 
matching these contents. Assume I have an intention whose content is that I am typing 
‘causal’, but that I am actually writing ‘casual’, so that my intention’s content is false. What 
has gone wrong? On Velleman’s view, my intention is incorrect because it is false, in just 
the same way that Bev’s belief  that the pangolin is prospering is incorrect because it is 
false (the pangolin is endangered).  
 
But we don’t think of  things in this way. If  I recognise that I am typing ‘casual’ and not 
‘causal’ I will – as Anscombe pointed out26 – correct my action and not my intention. 
Whereas if  Bev recognises that the weight of  evidence shows that pangolins are being 
hunted to extinction, she will correct her belief. If  she doesn’t she’s irrational. But I am not 
irrational for maintaining my intention to type ‘causal’ when I realise I am not currently 
doing so. It is not rational to give up on what one is writing just because of  making a typo. 
Nothing would ever get written. So again, possessing the concept of  intention doesn’t 
seem to entail thinking of  intentions as sharing a constitutive aim with beliefs. 
 
I take no stand here on whether Velleman is right that intentions share a constitutive aim 
and direction of  fit with – and so are a kind of  - belief  (though I will argue against 
Cognitivism from a different direction in Chapter Four). But if  they do, then this does not 
seem to be transparent to people in possession of  the concept of  intention. So intention’s 
functional role is not transparent to possessors of  the concept. So the functionalist way 
out of  Paul’s regress problem is not available to Velleman, and he has to fall back on 
understanding the “I tend to do what I intend” premise as constituting an inductive 
generalisation from past practical knowledge. And so – like Paul – his account of  
practical knowledge’s grounds is incomplete and he flouts the Why Knowledge? constraint.  
 
And I take no stand on whether we should be functionalists about concept-possession. 
But if  we should then we have to reject Velleman’s Cognitivism, since – again - the functional 
role which intention appears to us to have is not the one Velleman describes. But Velleman 
cannot give up his Cognitivism, because as I explained above (in (a) and (b)) it is central 
to his explanation of  how practical knowledge’s spontaneity is consistent with its status 





                                                          
25 Velleman, The Possibility of  Practical Reason, 16. 
26 E.g. in Anscombe, Intention. These issues will be explored in detail in Ch. 5. 
27 And to his explanation of  how practical knowledge’s spontaneity is consistent with CTA, accepting 




At the end of  the last Chapter I suggested we might expect a view on which practical 
knowledge is constituted by intention to fare better than one on which it is inferred from 
knowledge of  one’s intention, and Velleman’s internalist CI offered just this. But his 
account ended up being more or less the same as Paul’s on point of  epistemology: on 
both accounts knowing what one is doing depends on knowing what one intends and 
knowing that (roughly) intending to do something makes doing it likely. Because his 
account of  the epistemology of  practical knowledge is similar to Paul’s, Velleman faces  
the two main problems faced by Paul’s account, the first of  which is about practical 
knowledge’s epistemic appearance (as ungrounded) and the second of  which is about its 
epistemic  grounds. 
 
So it is worth considering a version of  CI which involves a different understanding of  
practical knowledge’s epistemological underpinnings. Kieran Setiya offers an externalist 
version of  CI, to which I now turn.  
 
2. Setiya’s Externalist Cognitivist Intentionalism 
 
The main problem for Velleman and Paul – that of  a potential regress within practical 
knowledge’s justification – depended on the presupposition that for an agent’s tendency 
to do what she intends to justify her belief  that she was φ-ing (her intention to be doing 
so), the agent must believe that she tends to do what she intends. It was not enough that 
she has a disposition to φ when she intends to, she must in addition recognise this about 
herself.  
 
Kieran Setiya dispenses with this presupposition. On his view merely being disposed to do 
what one intends justifies an agent in believing that she will φ when she intends to. On 
this externalist version of  CI, the agent doesn’t need to know that she has this disposition, 
and so questions about how she knows it just don’t come up, which means that the 
completeness of  Setiya’s account of  practical knowledge’s epistemology is not threatened 
by regress. 
 
Setiya characterises himself  as a Cognitivist, but unlike Velleman he offers no clear or 
settled view about how intention and belief  relate, in different places suggesting that 
one’s belief  that one is φ-ing is constituted by one’s intention to φ;28 that forming an 
intention is forming a belief;29 that beliefs figure in our intentions;30 that intentions have 
corresponding beliefs;31 that intention is a species of  belief;32 and that intending is a mode of  
believing33. At least some of  these characterisations of  the relationship conflict with one 
another, and at least some of  his works contain more than one characterisation. In light 
of  this interpretative difficulty I will treat Setiya as taking over Velleman’s conception of  
the relationship between intention and belief. This seems fair given that Setiya introduces 
                                                          
28 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge,” 396. 
29 Ibid., 397. 
30 Ibid., 402. 
31 Ibid., 407. 
32 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge Revisited,” 131. 
33 Setiya, “Knowing How,” 303. 
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his conception of  practical knowledge as a response to Velleman’s, from within the 
Cognitivist viewpoint, nowhere criticising Velleman’s version of  Cognitivism.34 
 
I will spell out Setiya’s externalist version of  CI in (a) and consider how well it meets our 
constraints in (b). I will conclude in (c) that although Setiya’s account represents an 
improvement on Velleman’s, his commitment to Cognitivism is not obviously defensible. 
 
a. An Externalist Cognitivist Intentionalism 
 
How do I know that I am currently (intentionally) making Turkish coffee, according to 
Setiya? First, because I am making it intentionally, I am doing it in execution of  my 
intention to be making it. And my intention to be making it is a kind of  belief  that I am 
making it (Cognitivism). So I have a belief  that I am making it, which is true, because I 
am making it. And second, my belief  is – externalistically – justified, because I am disposed 
to do what I intend, which means that not only is my belief  true but it is non-accidentally 
true.  
 
Rather generally, dispositions underwrite non-accidental relations between conditions and 
outcomes. This is reflected in the fact that citing a disposition can be a way of  explaining 
some fact or event. “Why did that liquid start to boil?” - - - “Because it is water, and its 
temperature reached 100ºC, and water boils (is disposed to boil) at 100ºC”. When we 
explain a phenomenon by saying “Because…”, we represent what follows the ‘because’ 
as non-accidentally related to the phenomenon to be explained. This is a conceptual 
point linking the concepts of  explanation and non-accidentality.  
 
Thought of  in one way, giving the justification for a belief  is explaining why that belief  
constitutes knowledge (or: would constitute knowledge if  it were true). So we can see 
why a belief ’s being non-accidentally true is relevant to its constituting knowledge. Setiya 
can be thought of  as trying to explain how my intention-belief  that I am making Turkish 
coffee counts as knowledge, if  true, by describing the feature of  it which makes its truth 
non-accidental to the fact that I have it. I am disposed to do what I intend-believe that I will 
do. And this means that when I do in fact do what I intend-believe I will do, my intention-
belief  is non-accidentally true, and so knowledge. Setiya dispenses with Velleman’s and 
Paul’s assumption that in order for my disposition to do what I intend to play a role in 
the justification of  my intention-belief, it must be something I recognise. Instead, the 
disposition just needs to be one I have.  
 
Two clarifications are in order before we turn to assessing Setiya’s account. First, his view 
is not that because I am disposed to do what I intend, my intention-belief  that I am 
making Turkish coffee is grounded on evidence. Setiya disagrees with Paul and Velleman that 
practical knowledge is evidentially grounded in any sense. On this score, Setiya’s view has 
more in common with O’Brien’s: they both agree that agents are entitled to make 
judgments about what they are intentionally doing without this meaning that their 
judgments are “justifiable with reference to reasons statable by, or comprehensible to, the 
knowing subject”.35 The disagreement between O’Brien and Setiya is over what condition 
of  the agent entitles her to judgments about her intentional actions. For O’Brien it is the 
agent’s agent-awareness; for Setiya it is their disposition to do what they intend.  
 
                                                          
34 Setiya also accepts some version of  CTA (see e.g. Setiya, “Explaining Action,” 380), but it does not play 
an important a role in his account of  practical knowledge as it did in Velleman’s. 
35 O’Brien, “Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force,” 588.  
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Second, to avoid confusion I want to explain why I have chosen not to characterise 
Setiya’s view in the way that he himself  characterises it; as one on which, 
 
… it is knowledge how that explains the otherwise troubling possibility of  knowledge in 
intentional action and of  the knowledge embodied in prospective intention.36 
 
Setiya gives at least two glosses on knowing how to φ in his early papers on practical 
knowledge. He starts by thinking of  knowing how to φ as (roughly) the capacity (ability) to 
φ in execution of  one’s intention to φ,37 later moving to think of  it as the disposition to φ 
when one intends to φ.38 These two understandings cannot be identified, since - rather 
generally - having a disposition to do something presupposes having a capacity to do it, 
but not vice versa. So Setiya must choose between the disposition-characterisation and the 
capacity-characterisation of  knowing how to φ.  
 
And it is clear that Setiya should choose the disposition-understanding. For whereas being 
disposed to do what one intends ensures that if  one acts as intended, one’s intention-
beliefs is non-accidentally true, we cannot say the same for the agent’s capacity to do what 
she intends. I am capable of  executing my intention to do the washing up but this doesn’t 
bear on whether I will, given that I intend to, in the same way that the fact that I am 
disposed to wash up when I intend to bears on whether I will, given that I intend to. (The 
choice between a disposition- and a capacity-reading of  Setiya’s epistemology mirrors the 
choice between Sarah Paul’s initial inference-schema and the bolstered version in Chapter 
Two (§2(c)).) 
 
To introduce more confusion, ‘knowing how’ to do something is usually understood as 
referring to what Ryle had in mind (see again Ch. 1, §1), and Setiya himself  encourages 
this use.39 But Ryle seemed to be talking about a capacity, and not a disposition! The 
upshot is that it is confusing to talk of  knowing how to do something as underwriting one’s 
knowledge that one is doing it. So this is why I avoid representing Setiya’s view as one on 
which it is know-how which underwrites practical knowledge, and describe it as one on 
which a disposition to do what one intends acts as external justification for the agent’s 
intention-belief. Let’s see how the view fares.  
 
b. Assessing Setiya’s Externalist CI 
 
I have already explained why Setiya’s externalism means that he overcomes the problem 
which led both Paul and Velleman to flout the Why Knowledge? constraint. Like Paul and 
Velleman he also avoids O’Brien’s scope-related difficulty with meeting the Special 
Relationship constraint.40  
 
What about the problem Paul and Velleman had with meeting the Apparent Features 
constraint? Neither could explain why, given that (on their views) practical knowledge is 
epistemically grounded on evidence, it does not appear to be. Again, Setiya’s externalism is 
helpful here. On his view – as on O’Brien’s – there is no reason why my justification 
                                                          
36 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge,” 388; my italics. 
37 Ibid., 407. 
38 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge Revisited,” 135. 
39 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge,” 403. 
40 Setiya is mindful of  the importance of  getting the scope of  practical knowledge right (ibid., 394), and 
also of  needing to accommodate what I have called the dispositionality of  practical knowledge (Setiya, 
“Knowledge of  Intention,” 171). 
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should be transparent to me, because in general being entitled to a belief  by some 
external condition does not involve being aware of  one’s being so entitled. 
 
Setiya can give a similar account of  practical knowledge’s FPA as did Velleman: if  one is 
acting intentionally it is because one is executing one’s intention-belief. This intention-
belief  also represents it as being the case that one is acting as intended, which means that it 
is true. And because by executing one’s intention-belief, one is thereby manifesting one’s 
disposition to do what one intends, one’s intention-belief  is non-accidentally true. Only one’s 
own intention-belief  could be non-accidentally true of  one’s own action in this special 
way, and this explains the first-/third-person asymmetry in relation to facts about what 
one is intentionally doing.  
 
Setiya’s account is a clear improvement on Velleman’s (and Paul’s), but is not without its 
problems. I will mention two. First, Setiya does not say enough about how the 
epistemology of  practical knowledge is supposed to work and second, he fails to 
improve on a seemingly problematic aspect of  Velleman’s account which he himself  
brings up, and which I passed over in the previous section.  
 
As I explained in (a), Setiya thinks that the fact that when an intention-belief  is true, it is 
non-accidentally so, is relevant to the question of  the agent’s knowledge of  her intentional 
action. But he holds back from endorsing “an epistemology on which its being no 
accident that a belief  is true suffices for it to count as knowledge”.41  
 
Setiya does not explain why he is wary of  endorsing such an epistemology, and I won’t 
second-guess his wariness here. I just want to remark that if  he rejects such an 
epistemology, then his account of  practical knowledge is incomplete since it renders the 
requirement that the agent’s belief  be non-accidentally true merely necessary for practical 
knowledge. So his explanation of  how this condition is met – by the agent’s being 
disposed to do what she intends – is only a partial explanation of  what is involved in 
having practical knowledge. Unless Setiya accepts that non-accidentally true belief  is 
sufficient for knowledge, then he flouts the Why Knowledge? constraint, at least pending a 
description of  what more is needed for knowledge. My complaint here is just that Setiya 
is unclear about the status of  his account.   
 
The second worry is less ad hominem and concerns whether Setiya’s account is consistent 
with our commonsense-human approach. Start by considering an objection Setiya makes 
to Velleman’s account. Setiya thinks that even if  Velleman can explain why an intention-
belief  will be justified once formed, he cannot explain why the agent would be justified in 
forming it, given that they do not form it in response to prior evidence for its truth:  
 
Like many others, I find the forming of  beliefs without prior evidence epistemically 
suspect, even when the beliefs in question are believed, and even known, to provide 
sufficient evidence for themselves, once formed. To take an example from another 
context, consider “the situation you would be in if  you believed yourself  (perhaps with 
good reason) to be watched over by a benevolent spirit, who sees to it that whenever you 
form a belief  on a certain subject-matter (say, the winners of  horse-races), it is true.” If  I 
come to believe that Malabar will win, and I know that I have done so, my belief  will be 
supported by sufficient evidence, and it may well count as knowledge. I know my own 
belief  and I know that the benevolent spirit will make it true. But it still seems to me 
                                                          
41 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge Revisited,” 136; my emphasis. 
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unreasonable to form that belief. And this is just what I am doing when I make a decision 
[or: form an intention] on Velleman’s account.42 
 
Setiya thinks that the fix is to think of  the agent’s justification as pre-dating their forming 
their intention-belief.43 And on Setiya’s view, this is indeed the case, for the agent’s 
justification is embodied in a standing condition of  theirs; their disposition to do what 
they intend.44  
 
But I am not sure about Setiya’s description of  the problem in the Malabar case, and if  I 
am right, Setiya’s ‘fix’ is no such thing. Setiya thinks that the problem is with the idea that 
an agent could be reasonable in forming a belief  that Malabar will win without prior 
evidence. But what would count as reasonable here? If  we assume – as the example does 
- that agents can form beliefs at will, then it becomes appropriate to assess their belief-
formation by the dictates of  practical rationality. If  beliefs can be formed at will, then 
performing the action of  forming the belief  that Malabar will win on the basis of  the desire 
for Malabar to win and the belief  that if one believes that Malabar will win, then he will, is 
no less reasonable than performing the action of  feeding Malabar magic oats on the basis of  
a desire that Malabar will win and a belief  that if one feeds Malabar magic oats then he will. 
Both ‘actions’ – forming the belief  that Malabar will win, and feeding Malabar magic oats 
- seem perfectly reasonable ways of  satisfying one’s desire for Malabar to win. By 
analogy, if  Velleman’s agent can form intention-beliefs at will, she seems perfectly 
reasonable in doing so.  
 
But there is something wrong with the Malabar case, I think, and analogously something 
wrong with Velleman’s account, because it is not obvious that we can form beliefs at will. 
The problem is with the psychology of  the case quite independently of  what we think 
about its epistemology.45 Obviously Velleman won’t accept this – on his view it is a feature 
of  intentions that they are formed at will and not in response to prior evidence (see again 
§1(a)&(d)). Qua beliefs they constitutively aim at truth, but unlike ordinary beliefs they 
meet their aim not by being formed in response to antecedent evidence, but by causing 
the actions they represent; by being self-fulfilling. But it is far from clear that Velleman is 
doing anything other than claiming that intentions embody a kind of  belief  that can be 
formed at will.  
 
The problem for Setiya is this: first, he misdescribes the Malabar case as showing that 
there is an epistemological problem with forming beliefs at will, and infers that Velleman’s 
account of  practical knowledge is subject to an analogous problem. But quite apart from 
whether there is an epistemological problem with forming the Malabar belief  and 
analogously in Velleman’s picture with forming an intention-belief, there is a psychological 
block to forming beliefs without sufficient prior evidence. This is the real lesson of  the 
Malabar case, I suggest. And if  this is right, Setiya’s account is no better off  than 
Velleman’s. They both hold that intentions are a kind of  belief  which can be formed at 
                                                          
42 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge,” 400–401. The quotation is from Cian Dorr Dorr, “Non-Cognitivism and 
Wishful Thinking,” 99–100; the square brackets are mine. 
43 Setiya, “Practical Knowledge,” 405. 
44 Jane Heal has pointed out to me that it’s not clear that Setiya’s account is an improvement on Velleman’s 
on this score: isn’t Velleman’s agent’s belief that she is disposed to do what she intends, a standing state 
just like her disposition itself ? This seems right to me but I don’t have space to consider the point in 
detail. 
45 Rae Langton agrees with me here, and goes even further, suggesting that being self-fulfilling actually 
undermines a belief ’s capacity to constitute knowledge (Langton cites Humberstone, “Direction of  Fit,” 
62). I don’t consider these thoughts here, but see Langton, “Intention as Faith.”  
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will, and not in response to prior evidence for their truth. But Setiya does not, any more 
than does Velleman, give us an explanation of  why forming an intention-belief  at will is 
any more psychologically plausible than forming the analogous Malabar belief  at will.  
 
Velleman and Setiya both hold that intentions are a special kind of  belief  which can be 
formed at will, but for many the observation that intentions can be formed in the absence 
of  sufficient prior evidence for their truth will be a reason to deny that intentions are a 
kind of  belief. Setiya brings up a problem for Velleman which – if  I am right about how 




Setiya’s externalism enabled him to avoid the two major problems which led me to reject 
Paul’s and Velleman’s accounts. But Setiya’s account is not without problems of  its own. 
First, it is not obvious whether Setiya thinks that non-accidentally true belief  is sufficient 
for knowledge. If  it is not then his account of  what is required for practical knowledge is 
incomplete and he flouts the Why Knowledge? constraint. And second, like Velleman’s, his 
account depends on thinking of  intentions as a kind of  belief  which can be formed at 
will. But the idea of  a kind of  belief  which can be formed at will seems to conflict with 
what appears to be a commonsense-psychological truism about belief: you can’t decide to 
believe. Within the methodological context of  this Thesis, this is particularly problematic.  
 
The idea that intentions are a kind of  belief  has, then, caused problems for both 
Velleman and Setiya. And in the next chapter I will give a more sustained argument 
against Cognitivism which will lead us to rule out any account of  practical knowledge 









It is often assumed,2 although rarely argued,3 that intentions are propositional attitudes. I 
will call the claim that intentions are in all cases propositional attitudes ‘Propositionalism 
about Intention’, or Propositionalism for short,4 and I will argue here that it is false. This 
matters for now because it undermines any version of  CI - including but not restricted to 
those of  Velleman and Setiya. And it will matter later on (especially in Chapter Six) 
because it will constrain any version of  Intentionalism.  
 
In §1 I introduce the key ideas needed to make my argument; those of  a propositional 
attitude and of  what is involved in an intention’s being executed. I give the argument in §2: 
accepting for the sake of  argument that certain intentions are propositional attitudes, I go 
on to show that certain others cannot be; no propositional intention could be executed 
unless some non-propositional intention is executed. We do execute our intentions, so some 
intentions are not propositional attitudes. I consider in §3 how the Propositionalist might 
respond, but no response is found compelling. So in §4 I conclude that Propositionalism 
ought to be rejected, and a further constraint on an account of  practical knowledge - the 
Intention-Content constraint - is introduced. This constraint requires that an account of  
practical knowledge does not entail Propositionalism, and CI is rejected as flouting this 
constraint.  
 
Two notes before we start. First, I restrict my discussion in this Chapter to singular 
propositional intentions; intentions whose contents are propositions which make singular 
reference to an individual. I do this in order to simplify my discussion, but it is justified 
by a feature of  the argument I will give in §2. For the intentions which I am going to 
argue are not propositional are intentions which the Propositionalist will hold have singular 
                                                          
1 The ideas in this section have benefited greatly from discussions with, in particular, Chris Cowie, Ryan 
Cox, Tim Crane, Alison Fernandes, Alexander Greenberg, Jane Heal, Richard Holton, John Maier, Peter 
Sutton, and Jen Wright; from members of  the ‘Serious Metaphysics Group’ in Cambridge, and of  the 
‘Seriously Summery Summer Surrogate Seminar’ at King’s College London. 
2 For representative examples of  assumptions, see Harman, “Practical Reasoning,” 441; Fodor, 
“Propositional Attitudes,” 505–6; Searle, “The Intentionality of  Intention and Action,” 259; Vermazen, 
“Objects of  Intention”; Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 21; Shah and Silverstein, “Reasoning in 
Stages,” 101, and various works of  John Broome’s, e.g.  “Normative Practical Reasoning,” 176. 
3 I know of  only two arguments for the view. Wane Davis argues that we “achieve greatest generality” if  we 
translate all intention-attributions into propositional form (Davis, “A Causal Theory of  Intending,” 43). 
This argument would work only if  doing so would not misrepresent the facts; this Chapter argues that it 
does. John McDowell assumes that intentions are able to constitute practical knowledge and infers from 
the propositionality of  practical knowledge to the propositionality of  intention (McDowell, “What Is the 
Content of  an Intention in Action?,” 424). I will not discuss his argument here, but will make it clear in 
Chapter Six why I think the principle it rests on – that the content of  an attitude must match the content 
of  any piece of  knowledge it constitutes – is false. 
4 Thus my ‘Propositionalism’ is distinct from the ‘Propositionalism’ considered in e.g. Montague, “Against 
Propositionalism” and in Crane, The Objects of  Thought, 108; the view that all intentional attitudes are 
propositional ones. 
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propositional contents. From now on, then, ‘proposition’, ‘propositional’ etc. will be 
qualified by ‘singular’, although this qualification will be left implicit. 
 
Second, my conclusion is, I think the same as Annette Baier’s conclusion in “Act and 
Intent”,5 and some of  the considerations used in my argument are also used by Baier. But 
since our arguments themselves are distinct, and since Baier is responding to a particular 
account of  intentions which is not strictly a Propositionalist account,6 I will not discuss 
Baier’s argument in this Chapter, although I will indicate some points of  convergence 




The idea in §2 will be that attention to what is required for a propositional intention to be 
executed will show that not all intentions are propositional. So we need to know what it 
means for an attitude to be propositional, and what it means for an intention to be executed. 
This is our task in this section. 
 
a. Propositional Attitudes  
 
I do not aim to thoroughly investigate the notion of  a propositional attitude, just to say 
enough for our purposes. Propositional attitudes are attitudes with propositional 
contents. What are propositional contents like? I will note three uncontroversial features of  
propositional contents: they are truth-apt, they can be picked out (in English) using 
indicative ‘that’-clauses, and they are about something with propositional shape. We can’t 
use the first two features to find out whether a given intention is propositional or not, for 
reasons I will explain. But I think we can use the third.  
 
First, propositional contents are truth-apt. So if  we can decide whether an intention has a 
truth-apt content, we can decide whether it has a propositional content. 
 
We observed in our discussion of  Velleman that it sounds odd to call intentions true or 
false (Ch. 3; §1(d)), but we also saw there that this need not entail that they are not true or 
false. Although the strategy was not available to Velleman (for reasons there explained), a 
Propositionalist of  a different stripe might explain the oddness of  calling intentions ‘true’ 
or ‘false’ by reference to their direction of  fit. To recap the thought, imagine that Sharon 
has an intention whose propositional content is that she will deceive Phil. Now assume the 
orthodox view of  intentions as (contra Velleman) representing their contents as to be made 
true rather than as being true. The propositional content of  Sharon’s intention is that she will 
deceive Phil and this content is true, but it is represented by Sharon’s intention as to be made 
true and not as true. Contrast Linda’s belief  that Sharon will deceive Phil. Linda’s belief  has 
the same – true - propositional content as Sharon’s intention (ex hypothesi).7 But Linda’s 
                                                          
5 For related discussions see also Müller, “Radical Subjectivity: Morality Versus Utilitarianism”; Clark, “The 
Action as Conclusion,” 501–502; Thompson, “Naive Action Theory”; Alvarez, Kinds of  Reasons, 65–73; 
Dancy, “Action, Content and Inference,” 285–286; Boyle and Lavin, “Goodness and Desire.”  
6 That found in Chisholm, “The Structure of  Intention.”  
7 I am simply assuming here that beliefs are propositional attitudes, an assumption which has been rejected 
by David Lewis, who thinks of  believing not as a relation to a proposition but as the self-ascription of  a 
property (Lewis, “Attitudes de Dicto and de Se”). I think that the discussion of  this chapter could be re-
stated from the Lewisian standpoint, but cannot argue for this here. I will come back to Lewis’ idea in 
concluding the Thesis.  
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belief  represents the propositional content as being true. Both women’s attitudes are true, 
but Linda’s attitude is committal about its truth-value whereas Sharon’s is non-committal.  
 
So it is consistent with it seeming odd to call intentions true (or false), that they do in fact 
have true (false) contents. For this reason, the fact they don’t seem true (false) doesn’t tell 
us whether or not they are in fact propositional attitudes.  
 
Second, propositions can be expressed (in English) using an indicative ‘that’-clause, and 
propositional attitudes can be ascribed using a psychological verb which embeds such a 
clause: Bev hopes that her sister will call later; Lauren fears that she’s being followed. So if  we 
can decide whether an intention can be ascribed in this way, we can decide whether it has 
a propositional content.  
 
Is often observed that natural-language intention-attributions rarely contain an indicative 
‘that’-clause, but instead some kind of  infinitival ‘to’- construction. “Sharon intends to 
deceive Phil”; “Judge Julie intends Bev to go to prison”. But the Propositionalist will (and 
does8) resist the inference from this fact about the grammar of  common natural language 
intention-attributions, which they accept, to the conclusion that the attitudes thereby 
ascribed have non-propositional contents, which, of  course, they don’t. They are likely to 
point out that it is not in general a failsafe procedure to read off  the semantic structure 
of  what is expressed from the surface linguistic structure of  what expresses it. For some 
reason, the thought will continue, intention-attributions are unlike belief-attributions (and 
attributions of  other propositional attitudes) in that their content-clauses are not typically 
transparent to the attitudes’ contents.  
 
The observation that natural-language intention-attributions in fact tend not to contain 
‘that’-clauses does not render false the starting assumption that propositional attitudes 
can be attributed with a psychological verb embedding a ‘that’-clause. Nor does it mean 
that intentions have to be understood as an exception to that claim. For ‘to’-clauses can 
be transformed into ‘that’-clauses quite easily.9 Intentions can be attributed with a 
psychological verb embedding a ‘that’-clause and for the Propositionalist, this is the proper 
way to attribute them, since it is more revealing of  their structure than the natural-
language ‘to’-attributions.  
 
Where the ‘to’-clause contains a subject-expression and a predicate-expression, these can 
be put together in constructing a ‘that’ clause: “Judge Julie intends Bev to go to prison” 
becomes “Judge Julie intends that Bev will go to prison”. (We cannot simply carry over 
“go to prison” because “Bev go to prison” is not an indicative sentence. By inserting 
“will” we secure something clearly truth-apt.) We can do the same for any ascription of  
the form “S intends a to φ”, turning it into “S intends that a will φ”. Transformation is 
only slightly more complicated for intention-attributions with subjectless content-clauses, 
such as Sharon’s intention to deceive Phil. Here we must come up with a subject-expression 
in constructing our ‘that’-clause. But a suitable candidate is close at hand, since intentions 
whose contents are attributed with “to φ” only ever concern the actions or properties of  
the intender. So we can non-arbitrarily plug in an expression referring to the intender, and 
this gives us a propositional subject. More concretely, “Sharon intends to deceive Phil” 
becomes “Sharon intends that she [Sharon] will deceive Phil”.10  
                                                          
8 The tactic is commonplace (see again n. 2), but for a more thorough discussion than is usual, see Davis, 
“A Causal Theory of  Intending,” 43. 
9 Ibid.; Wallace, “Propositional Attitudes and Identity,” 149. 
10 This suggestion maps on to the standard syntax for infinitives, which construes infinitival clauses as 
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Of  course the fact that there are rules for transforming ‘to’-clauses to ‘that’-clauses does 
not show that intentions attributed using “to φ” in the content clause were all along really 
propositional intentions. This conclusion would follow only if  transforming the “to”- 
form into the “that”- form introduced no semantic difference, and the mere possibility 
of  transformation does not speak to this, just as the possibility of  transforming any 
statement about you into a statement about me (rule: replace any term referring to me 
with one referring to you) does not prove that we are identical. The point for now is that 
we can’t infer from the lack of  ‘that’-clauses in typical natural-language intention-
attributions to the conclusion that the intentions thereby attributed are not propositional. 
The fact that intentions are not typically attributed using ‘that’-clauses does not entail that 
they cannot be, nor that their contents might be more perspicuous if  attributed using a 
‘that’-clause.  
 
Finally, intentional states are about intentional objects. Tim Crane describes the idea, in a 
different context, nicely: 
 
[O]ne cannot adequately understand what [a given intentional] state is without knowing 
what its [intentional] object or objects are. […] Intentional objects are just whatever 
one’s intentional states are directed on. My thought [that my doctor smokes] is directed 
on my doctor, on smoking, and on the fact that he smokes: intentional objects can be 
ordinary objects, properties, events or states of  affairs (so ‘object’ here does not mean 
particular).11 
 
A propositional intentional state will be about a propositionally shaped intentional object. 
So if  we can decide whether an intention is about a propositionally shaped intentional 
object, then we can decide whether the intention is a propositional attitude.  
 
For an attitude to be about a propositionally shaped object it must minimally be about a thing, a 
property, and the-instantiation-of-the-property-by-the-thing.12 For short, we can say that 
a propositional attitude is about some x’s Φ-ing, where ‘Φ-ing’ is instantiating some 
property or behaving in some way (including but not limited to acting in some way). Tim’s 
thought is about some x’s Φ-ing; it is about his doctor’s smoking. This entails that it is also 
about his doctor and about smoking. If  Sharon’s intention to deceive Phil is propositional, it 
also must be about some x’s Φ-ing. It is clear from our attribution that her intention is 
about deceiving Phil. But if  the Propositionalist is right, then it is also about Sharon’s 
deceiving Phil, and so about Sharon too. 
 
The problem with the first two features of  propositional contents was that it didn’t look 
possible to see whether an intention’s content had these features without already having 
decided whether it was a propositional attitude. So although propositional intentions will 
                                                                                                                                                                      
containing hidden anaphoric reference, labeling this with ‘PRO’. In the standard syntax, “Sharon intends 
to deceive Phil” is rendered as “Sharon intends [PRO to deceive Phil]” (Radford, Transformational Grammar: 
A First Course, 313–317). I won’t be taking issue with the standard syntax: my argument is that the 
contents of  intentions such as Sharon’s don’t make semantic reference to their subjects. 
11 Crane, “The Intentional Structure of  Consciousness,” 37–38; see also Crane, The Objects of  Thought, Ch. 
4. 
12 I say ‘minimally’ because it might also be about two distinct objects and the relation between them. My 
belief  that Henry likes Izzy can be thought of  as being about Henry, about liking Izzy and about Henry’s 
liking Izzy. But it can also be thought of  as about Henry, Izzy, about being liked by and about Henry’s liking 
Izzy. I will stick to considering the simplest available decompositions of  the propositional contents we 
will be considering, which will always distinguish a single object and a single predicate within the 
proposition. 
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have these features, we can’t look for these features in deciding whether the intention is 
propositional. But we can, I think, use the final feature in this way, because there is an 
important relationship between what an intention is about and what is required for the 
intention to be executed, as I shall now explain.  
 
b. Executing an Intention 
 
Central to our commonsense understanding of  agency is a distinction between an 
intention’s being executed and its content’s merely being satisfied; a distinction recognised 
(although not necessarily in these terms) by anyone with the concepts of  intention and 
intentional action. Let’s consider the distinction.  
 
I intend to water the tomatoes. Remaining neutral on whether my intention’s content is 
propositional (as I will throughout this section), we can distinguish two kinds of  case in 
which I go on to water them. In one, I carry out my intention, watering them intentionally; 
in the other, I water them without carrying out my intention and so not intentionally - 
even though watering them was what I intended to do. In this second case my watering is 
related too accidentally to my intention to count as carrying it out. I slosh water all over the 
grow-bags after tripping over the step, for instance.13 
 
Intentions, I am assuming, can also concern the behaviour and properties of  objects 
other than oneself: Judge Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison is like this. The 
distinction also attaches to intentions like this, for there are two kinds of  case in which 
what Julie intends comes to pass. In the first, Bev goes to prison in virtue of  Julie carrying 
out her intention (there will be a story to be told about how she carries it out – by sentencing 
Bev, let’s imagine). In the second, Bev goes to prison alright, but independently of  
anything Julie does. Here Julie’s intention is not carried out, even though what Julie 
intended comes about.  
 
The distinction in the second pair of  cases is slightly different to that in the first. One of  
the differences between the cases in the first pair was whether what was intended was 
done intentionally, whereas what was intended was not done intentionally in either case in the 
second pair. This was because whilst watering the tomatoes was something I could do, Bev’s 
going to prison was not something Julie could do; poor old Bev would have to do that.  
 
But there is something common to the distinctions in both pairs. Intuitively, in the first 
case of  each pair, what is intended comes to pass because the intention comes to fruition in 
the way that it should, whereas in the second case of  each pair, what is intended comes to 
pass despite the fact that the intention fails to come to fruition in the way it should. It is 
this common distinction that I want to capture by talking about the execution and the 
mere satisfaction of  an intention. We can be more precise about the distinction as follows:  
 
i. An intention’s content is satisfied when what is intended is (somehow) brought 
about  
ii. An intention is – further - executed when what is intended is brought about, 
a. by the intender herself and 
b. intentionally 
 
                                                          
13 This distinction is familiar from the literature on causal deviance and CTA, but the distinction itself  is a 
commonsense datum, not something particular to CTA.   
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These conditions are supposed to be plausible independently of  whether or not 
Propositionalism is true. What is intended can be brought about if  it is a proposition or state 
of  affairs, but also if  it is an action, and so not propositionally shaped. Note also that (i) 
and (ii) are not intended as definitions of ‘satisfaction’ and ‘execution’: they are merely 
necessary conditions. Further, they are not supposed to comprise a theory about 
intention-execution and satisfaction or a reductive explanation of  the notions. Positively, 
they articulate the commonsense-action-theoretic distinction illustrated above, with some 
precision but on the same explanatory level. These points will become important in §3. 
 
Let’s see how (i) and (ii) classify the second case in each of  our pairs. The case in which 
Julie intends Bev to go to prison, and Bev does, but with no input from Julie, meets the 
satisfaction condition (i) since what Julie intended (for Bev to go to prison) is brought about. 
But it flouts the execution condition (ii) because this is not brought about by Julie (it 
flouts (ii.a)). The case in which I intend to water the tomatoes, and I do water them, but 
only because I trip also meets (i), because what I intended (to water the tomatoes) is 
brought about. And it meets (ii.a) because this is brought about by me. But it flouts the 
execution condition because I do not bring it about intentionally, but by accident (it 
flouts (ii.b)).  
 
I have stuck to an intuitive conception of  whether what is intended is brought about, 
because I have wanted to avoid making assumptions about what is intended, and so 
about whether the intentions in question are propositional or not. In the next section we 
will consider what is involved in bringing about what is intended when an intention is 
propositional.  
 
2. An Argument against Propositionalism 
 
I start by conceding, for the sake of  argument, that some intentions are propositional 
attitudes. Since it is plausible that an intention is about at least those objects and 
properties mentioned in the content-clause of  its natural-language ascription, I will start 
by assuming that when an ascription’s content-clause contains an explicit subject and 
predicate, it attributes a propositional intention. Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison, 
for instance, will be assumed to have the content that Bev will go to prison. All ascriptions of  
intentions for something other than the intender to do something (or become or remain 
some way) will contain explicit subject- and predicate-expressions, so I will assume that 
whenever an intention is naturally so-ascribed it is a propositional intention. And I will 
refer to any intention whose content is propositional as an ‘I(Φx)’, where ‘I’ stands for 
‘intention’ and ‘Φx’ makes the structure of  the attitude’s content explicit.   
 
Not all natural-language intention-attributions’ content-clauses contain explicit reference 
to a subject, as we saw in §1(a); some contain only a predicative expression. My intention 
to water the plants is like this, as is Sharon’s intention to deceive Phil. The Propositionalist 
holds that even these intentions are – really - I(Φx)’s. I am going to argue that at least 
some of  them are not, although I will not be arguing from facts about the linguistic 






a. The Problem 
 
Let’s start by considering what seems to be involved in executing an agreed I(Φx). Bev has 
been found guilty of  murder and Judge Julie intends her to go to prison. We will assume 
that Julie’s intention has the propositional content that Bev will go to prison – although I will 
sometimes use more colloquial language to indicate it.  
 
If  Julie’s intention is to be executed, she needs to meet conditions (ii.a) and (ii.b) from 
§1(b). Meeting (ii.a) requires her to bring about what she intends. She can’t do this by 
magic; she needs to employ her causal powers. In particular, she needs to employ them in 
bringing about Bev’s going to prison. She needs to cause Bev to go to prison. Let’s imagine she 
does this in the usual way – by sentencing Bev to a prison term (and doing whatever this 
involves – uttering certain words in court, signing various forms etc.). But she also needs 
to meet (ii.b), which requires her to intentionally bring it about that Bev goes to prison. 
She must intentionally sentence Bev. And this requires her to execute a further intention, to 
sentence Bev.14  
 
For the Propositionalist, this new intention of  Julie’s is another I(Φx). This means that it 
is not only about sentencing Bev, but is also about Julie; its content is that Julie will sentence Bev 
(from Julie’s perspective, that I will sentence Bev). In order to execute this intention Julie 
must (ii.a) bring it about that she sentences Bev, and (ii.b) do this intentionally. How does she 
do this? I will argue that the Propositionalist can give no acceptable answer to this 
question.  
  
b. Somehow Self-Causation: Regress 
 
The first suggestion is that all I(Φx)’s are executed in the same way, viz. by their subjects 
intentionally causing the x to Φ. Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison – whose content 
was the proposition that Bev will go to prison - was executed by Julie’s causing Bev to go to 
prison. Just so, on the current suggestion, Julie’s intention to sentence Bev – whose 
content is the proposition that she will sentence Bev - will be executed by Julie’s causing herself 
to sentence Bev. But this suggestion leads first to odd results, and second to a vicious 
regress.  
 
Prima facie, we can ask how Julie will cause herself  to sentence Bev. This ‘How?’ question 
intelligibly comes up whenever something or someone causes something to happen.15 
“The brick broke the window.” - - - “How?” - - - “By smashing into it”; “Julie will cause 
Bev to go to prison.” - - - “How?” - - - “By sentencing her.” If  Julie causes herself  to 
sentence Bev, it seems we can ask how she does this too. 
 
Here is one way in which she might do so: knowing herself  prone to nerves when passing 
custodial sentences, Julie downs a few shots of  tequila before walking into court. She 
knows tequila makes her vindictive and prone to power-trips, and the tequila technique 
has overcome her reluctance to send defendants down in the past. If  it works this time, 
then by employing it she will have caused herself  to sentence Bev. 
                                                          
14 I assume here that doing something intentionally is executing an intention to do it. Michael Bratman has 
argued against this ‘Simple View’ of  the relation between intentional action and intending (in Intention, 
Plans, and Practical Reason, Ch. 8). It would complicate my argument to consider Bratman’s objections to 
the Simple View here, but if  he is right I think a version of  my argument will survive. An interesting 
reason why he may not be right is given by Falvey in “Knowledge in Intention,” 41.  
15 See also Baier, “Act and Intent,” 653. 
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But although this describes a possibility, it is not the one I had in mind for this example, 
which was imagined as one in which Julie was simply able to sentence Bev. Let me be clear 
about what ‘simply’ means here. The idea is not that Julie is able to sentence Bev as a basic 
action in the sense described in Chapter Two (§1(c)): Julie cannot sentence Bev except by 
uttering certain words, signing certain forms etc., so under the description ‘sentencing 
Bev’ her action will be non-basic. Still, Julie seems ‘simply’ able to sentence Bev in the 
sense that she seems able to do so without doing anything – like employing the tequila 
technique - to cause herself to do so. 
 
If  this appearance is taken at face value then (assuming Propositionalism) we have a 
counterexample to the claim that executing any I(Φx) requires the intender to cause the x 
to Φ. But perhaps there is some reason why we ought not take this appearance at face-
value. Perhaps there is a more plausible way of  thinking about how Julie might cause 
herself  to sentence Bev, than that offered in the previous paragraph; a way which is 
consistent with the appearance that Julie can sentence Bev without causing herself  to do 
so. Without wanting to trawl through suggestions for this ‘more plausible way’, let’s 
simply posit some action α, which fits the bill; which is ex hypothesi an action by doing 
which Julie causes herself  to sentence Bev, and which for whatever reason does not 
conflict with the appearance that Julie need not act on herself  in so doing.  
 
Even helping ourselves to α, there is trouble. For if  doing α is to count as the execution of  
her intention to sentence Bev, then it must be something Julie does intentionally (it must 
meet (ii.b)), and so must be done in execution of  an intention to α. Like all intentions, this 
is, for the Propositionalist, another I(Φx); its content is that Julie will α. Our current 
assumption is that an I(Φx) is executed only if  the intender causes x to Φ. So executing 
this new intention requires Julie to cause herself  to α. How? Again it seems Julie will 
need to do something to cause herself  to α – call it β. If  doing β is to count as the execution 
of  her intention to α, she must β intentionally (ii.b), and so must execute an intention to β. 
But again her intention to β is – for the Propositionalist - another I(Φx), whose content 
is that Julie will β, which the current proposal tells us will be executed only if  she causes 
herself  to β. How does she do this? By doing something to cause herself  to β – call it γ … 
And so on ad infinitum. The regress is vicious because the conditions on executing any 
I(Φx) generate further distinct I(Φx)’s, which must be executed in order for the initial 
I(Φx) to be executed. Executing any intention becomes impossible.16  
 
But we can execute our intentions, so either they are not all I(Φx)’s – and 
Propositionalism is false - or not all I(Φx)’s intentions are executed by somehow causing 
the x to Φ. Let’s consider another way in which an I(Φx) might be executed.  
 
c. No-How Self-Causation: Incoherence 
 
I said above that whenever a person causes something to happen, there is something to be 
said about how - by doing what - the person did so. This was one of  the assumptions which 
generated our regress. But perhaps this assumption is false; perhaps at least sometimes 
we can cause things to happen without doing anything which causes them to happen; 
perhaps there are some cases in which people simply (in the sense of  ‘simply’ described 
above) cause things to happen; in which they cause things to happen no-how. If  Julie can 
cause herself  to sentence Bev no-how, this would stop the regress from (b); it would 
mean that although executing her intention for Bev to go to prison requires executing the 
                                                          
16 Two distinct but closely related regresses are described in Ryle, The Concept of  Mind, 65–6 and in 
Davidson, “Problems in the Explanation of  Action,” 102.  
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further intention to sentence Bev, this further intention can be executed without itself  
generating any more intentions.  
 
But apart from its capacity to block our regress, what reason do we have to think that 
things ever cause other things to happen without doing anything to so cause them? The idea 
is very hard to understand, perhaps incoherent.17 One way to bring out the problem is to 
consider the question of  when the effect happens and to ask for an explanation of  this 
fact.18 Say the brick broke the window at t - why did the window break then? Simply 
mentioning the brick won’t explain why the window broke at t rather than some time 
before or after t, at which the brick also existed. We need to mention something the brick 
did at t – viz. smashing into the window - to explain why it broke the window at t. 
 
It might be accepted that the idea of  an object’s causing something to happen without 
doing something to cause it to happen is in general incoherent, but suggested that when that 
object is an agent, and the something that happens an action of  theirs, there is an 
exception to the general rule that objects can cause things to happen only by doing 
things. After all, agents are in an especially metaphysically intimate relationship to their 
own actions, so perhaps it is true that the brick can cause the window to break only 
somehow, but still maybe Julie can cause herself  to sentence Bev no-how. 
 
But any appearance of  a solution in this suggestion is chimerical. For it is unclear that we 
can say anything about this ‘especially metaphysically intimate relationship’, except that it 
constitutes or underwrites an agent’s capacity to cause their own actions no-how, where 
she can cause other kinds of  happenings only somehow. What such a suggestion would 
need to provide is an explanation of  how and why no-how self-causation is possible, but 
instead it only claims that it is possible for agents, albeit now in the language of  
‘metaphysical intimacy’. The re-phrasing makes the suggestion itself  no more coherent or 
less mysterious. 
 
To be clear, my point is not that agents cannot cause themselves to act.19 I accepted that Julie 
could cause herself  to sentence Bev by downing tequila shots, although she does not in the 
example we are working through. There are everyday examples too. Because I am not a 
morning person, I usually have to get myself  to get up early: I do so by setting an alarm the 
night before. Because I am shy I sometimes have to make myself  approach people in social 
situations: I do so by giving myself  a pep-talk. These are intelligible, colloquial, examples 
in which agents cause themselves to act; in which they are not able simply (in the sense of  
‘simply’ explained above) to act. But they are intelligible precisely because there is 
something to be said in such cases about how – by doing what – the agents cause (more 
colloquially: get) themselves to act.20 In contrast, it is hard to understand the difference 
between my causing myself  no-how to (say) get up early, and my being able to do so without 
causing myself  to at all. 
 
It is not an attractive option for the Propositionalist to suggest that Julie can cause 
herself  to sentence Bev no-how. But there is prima facie another way in which the regress 
might be stopped. To this I now turn. 
 
                                                          
17 Adrian Haddock worries about this kind of  suggestion too; see Haddock, “At One with Our Actions, 
but at Two with Our Bodies,” 159. 
18 Thanks to Jane Heal for this way of  putting things.  
19 See also Baier, “Act and Intent,” 658. 
20 See also Ibid., 652–655. 
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d. Execution without Self-Causation: Collapse 
 
The Propositionalist thinks that Julie’s intention to sentence Bev has the propositional 
content that Julie will sentence Bev. The problem is to explain what is involved in executing 
this intention. In (b) and (c) we considered two ways of  understanding the claim that Julie 
needs to cause herself  to sentence Bev in order to execute her intention. But both were 
problematic. So the Propositionalist may be tempted to deny that in order to execute her 
intention that she will sentence Bev, Julie needs to cause herself  to do so.  
 
On this suggestion, executing certain I(Φx)’s requires the intender to cause x to Φ, but 
executing others does not; Julie’s intention that Bev will go to prison is of  the first kind (Julie 
can’t execute this except by causing Bev to go to prison), but her intention that she will 
sentence Bev is of  the second kind (she can execute this without causing herself  to sentence 
Bev). Like the suggestion in (c), this suggestion promises to stop the regress in (b).  
 
There are three closely related explanatory challenges for this suggestion. First, which 
I(Φx)’s are the privileged ones; those which can be executed without the agent causing x 
to Φ?21 Second, what is it about these privileged I(Φx)’s which explains why they can be 
executed in this special way, given that most I(Φx)’s can be executed only by causing x to 
Φ? And third, how are these intentions executed? 
 
An initial response to the first challenge suggests that the privileged set of  I(Φx)’s 
contains just those intentions which concern the intender’s own actions. I will refer to 
these as I(Φi)’s (‘i’ for me). But the suggestion does not work. As we saw above, executing 
some I(Φi)’s, does involve causing oneself  to Φ. For the Propositionalist, my intention to 
get up early is an I(Φi); its content is that I will get up early, but I may not be able to 
execute it other than by causing myself  to get up early (by setting my alarm). A second 
suggestion is the privileged set of  intentions is the set of  basic I(Φi)’s; intentions to do 
something as a basic action. But this won’t work either, for many non-basic actions can be 
done ‘simply’ in the current sense, i.e. without causing oneself  to do them. Julie – we 
have now accepted – doesn’t need to cause herself  to sentence Bev, but sentencing Bev is not 
a basic action of  hers; she does it by uttering certain words and signing various forms etc. 
 
So the Propositionalist owes us an account of  how she intends to delimit the class of  
I(Φx)’s the execution of  which does not involve self-causation. We can assume that it will 
contain only I(Φi)’s, but it does not look easy to specify which I(Φi)’s it will contain. The 
second explanatory challenge can be met only by meeting the first, since saying what it is 
about I(Φi)’s in the relevant class that accounts for the fact that executing them does not 
require self-causation would require saying which I(Φi)’s they are.  
 
Rejecting Propositionalism, by the way, affords a very easy answer to the first two 
explanatory challenges. The non-propositionalist identifies the class of  intentions which 
can be executed without self-causation with the class of  non-propositional intentions; 
those whose contents lack a propositional subject. And it is exactly this feature of  these 
intentions which explains why they can be executed without self-causation: because they 
are not about oneself, we should not expect bringing about what they are about to involve 
exerting one’s causal influence over oneself. Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison is about 
Bev’s going to prison, and so Julie needs to cause Bev’s going to prison. If  Julie’s intention 
                                                          
21 Someone taking the route considered in (c) would have to meet this challenge too; I consider it here 
because I think that the Propositionalist is more likely to pursue the current option.  
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to sentence Bev is not about Julie’s sentencing Bev, but is just about sentencing Bev, then Julie 
need not cause herself  to sentence Bev. She need cause only Bev’s sentencing.  
 
Let’s assume for the sake of  argument that the Propositionalist can meet the first two 
explanatory challenges (although I think it very unlikely). Let’s consider the third. This 
means assuming for the sake of  argument that Julie’s intention to sentence Bev is in the 
class of  intentions which can be executed without self-causation. What is involved in Julie’s 
executing her intention to sentence Bev? 
 
Note first that we cannot altogether dispense with the idea that executing an intention 
involves exerting one’s causal influence in bringing about what the intention is about. 
That idea was essential to the distinction between execution and satisfaction in §1(b), and this 
distinction is itself  essential to the commonsense concept of  intentional action.  
 
So the idea that certain I(Φi)’s can be executed without self-causation has to be the idea 
that in executing it, one exerts one’s causal influence over something other than oneself, in 
such a way as to result in or constitute one’s Φ-ing, but without this itself  amounting to causing 
oneself to Φ. For we are trying to explain how an I(Φi) might be executed without the 
intender causing herself  to Φ (the self-causation idea led to regress (b) or incoherence 
(c)). 
 
This doesn’t leave much theoretical wiggle-room for describing what is involved in Julie’s 
executing her intention to sentence Bev. Here is the only thing – I think – left to say: Julie 
must exert her causal influence over Bev in such a way as to cause Bev to get sentenced. We have 
already seen how she might do this – by uttering certain words and signing some relevant 
forms. In thinking of  her as exerting her causal influence over Bev we need not think of  
her as physically interacting with Bev in the first instance; the idea is just that Bev is 
affected by what Julie does. Importantly, Julie’s role is wholly on the cause side of  the 
cause-effect relation instantiated when she executes her intention, whereas on the effect 
side we find poor old Bev, and facts relating to her new status.  
 
As a description of  how, in executing her intention to sentence Bev, Julie’s causal powers 
are directed, the above seems plausibly true and certainly a way of  stopping the regress in 
(b). But the Propositionalist cannot accept the above account, because accepting it 
undermines Propositionalism. For the suggestion involves thinking of  Julie’s intention as 
executed by Julie’s directing her causal powers over Bev, in a sentencing-kind-of-way. And 
if  executing it involves directing her causal powers over only things other than herself, having 
it seems plausibly to involve a directing of  her mind over only these same non-Julie 
objects. So what her intention to sentence Bev is concerned with, or about, seems to be 
simply sentencing Bev, and not also about herself, and so not about her sentencing Bev. But 
this would mean that its intentional object is not Julie’s sentencing Bev but simply sentencing 
Bev. Because its intentional object is not propositionally structured, her intention is not a 
propositional attitude.  
 
e. Summing up 
 
Let’s re-cap the argument of  this section. I started by assuming for the sake of  argument 
that some intentions do have propositional contents, and took as an example Julie’s 
intention for Bev to go to prison. We said that its content was that Bev will go to prison.  
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We then asked what is involved in executing an I(Φx). In (b) we imagined that all I(Φx)’s 
are executed by somehow causing the x to Φ, but this led to a vicious regress. Two ways of  
stopping the regress were considered in (c) and (d). In (c) the suggestion was that some 
I(Φx)’s can be executed by causing the x to Φ no-how, but this seemed at best mysterious 
and at worst incoherent. So in (d) we considered the suggestion that some I(Φi)’s can be 
executed without any self-causation. But despite being plausible as a description of  what 
Julie might do in executing her intention, the suggestion seemed to undermine 
Propositionalism.  
 
Before moving on I would like to return briefly to some of  the considerations in §1(a). 
There I said that it seemed odd to call intentions ‘true’ or ‘false’, and that in natural 
language we don’t tend to attribute intentions using ‘that’-clauses. I said that we could not 
argue from these observations to the falsity of  Propositionalism, and I have not done so - 
my argument proceeded from metaphysical considerations about the requirements on 
intention-execution, derived from commonsense-action-theory. But if  my argument 
works, it explains and vindicates our natural language attributional practises and semantic 
intuitions. And it means that the relatively commonplace practise within philosophy of  
mind of  forcing that-clauses into intention-attributions is not a colloquially unusual but 
philosophically proper way of  making the content of  these attitudes perspicuous; it is a 
misleading practise which obscures the true content of  the attitudes thereby attributed.  
 
Let me turn to considering how the Propositionalist might respond to my argument.  
 
3. Three Responses and Conclusion 
 
I will consider three responses. The first is that my argument presupposes a problematic 
view about the role of  causation in agency. The second claims that there are reasons for 
accepting Propositionalism which are independent of  the considerations in §2. And the 
third suggests an account on which an agent’s being represented in the content of  her 
intention is consistent with her not acting on herself  in executing it. Taking each in turn I 
explain why I find these responses unconvincing.  
 
a. Causation and the Execution of Intention 
 
I said in §1 that executing an intention requires the agent to bring about – cause - what 
the intention is about, and then argued in §2 that there was no satisfactory way in which 
the intender could do this if  Propositionalism were true. The current objection is that 
along the way I have presupposed an unattractive conception of  agency and that if  we 
accept a more attractive one, the problems I have described disappear.22 
 
The unattractive view is the ‘Agent-Causal’ view that agents are a special, sui generis kind 
of  cause. It is thought unattractive because being sui generis, the kind of  causation it posits 
seems mysterious from a naturalistic perspective. As Davidson put it, we want the notion 
of  “cause” implicated in agency to be the “ordinary notion of  cause which enters into 
scientific or commonsense accounts of  non-psychological affairs”.23 The attractive view 
                                                          
22 Hugh Mellor, for instance, has made this suggestion to me. 
23 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” (Introduction, xv). Examples of  the Agent-Causal view can 
be found in Chisholm, “Freedom and Action” and in Taylor, Action and Purpose; some arguments 
between Agent-Causalism and CTA are discussed in Bishop, “Is Agent-Causality a Conceptual 
Primitive?” 
 75
is CTA, and is designed inter alia to avoid just these kinds of  difficulty by assimilating 
causation by agents to causation in the “ordinary” sense, viewing agents as causing things 
in virtue of  their mental states and events causing things - where intentional agency is a 
special case in which the mental events in question are (manifestations of) her beliefs, 
desires and/or intentions. The current objection has two parts. First, that I am assuming 
Agent-Causalism in saying that executing an intention requires one’s bringing about what it is 
about, and second, that if  we adopt CTA instead, my argument will not work. 
  
But it is not true that I assume Agent-Causalism. To understand why, we need to return 
to what I said in §1(b) about the status of  the requirements on intention-execution; of  
(ii.a) and (ii.b). I characterised these conditions as articulating merely necessary 
commonsense-action-theoretic conditions on intention-execution. The argument 
between CTA and Agent-Causalism is an argument about whether an agent’s causing 
something to happen can be explained in terms of  causal relations of  the ordinary kind; 
between facts or events. CTA says it can, Agent-Causalism says it can’t. My argument does 
require accepting (ii.a) and (ii.b), but it does not require accepting that (ii.a) and (ii.b) are 
the last word about how to understand intention-execution; that they cannot be re-cast in 
terms of  the causation of  bodily movements by mental states or events, or by facts about 
these. 
 
If  my argument works (if  any argument works), it works because the concepts it employs 
sit in a certain implicational structure. If  CTA’s proposed reduction works (if  any 
reduction works) it works because the reducing concepts sit in an implicational structure 
which can underwrite the implicational structure of  the reduced concepts. It follows that 
my argument will work just as well at a lower level of  description as it does at the 
commonsense-human level. I don’t assume Agent-Causalism, and my argument would 
not be undermined by the truth of  CTA.  
 
b. Execution-Independent Arguments for Propositionalism 
 
The second objection targets my argument’s penultimate move; the inference from the 
assumption that Julie does not act on herself in executing her intention to the conclusion that 
her intention is therefore not about her. (The ultimate move takes us from here to denying 
that her intention is propositional; this move seems safe given our understanding of  
content in terms of  ‘aboutness’ – see again §1(a)). The move is legitimate only on the 
assumption that the only consideration relevant to what an intention is about is how an 
agent’s causal powers are directed in executing it. But, the objection continues, there are 
independent considerations which suggest that Julie’s intention is about herself. I will 
consider two. 
 
First, it looks like a datum that Julie’s intention can be executed only by Julie. And this 
might be taken to suggest that her intention is about herself; is about her sentencing Bev 
and not just about sentencing Bev. If  her intention is about her sentencing Bev, then it looks 
like a propositional intention after all; an intention that she will sentence Bev.  
 
I agree that the datum needs accommodating: intentions can only ever be executed by their 
subjects.24 But it is not best accommodated by building reference to the intender into the 
content of  the intention. This would mean that all intentions are about the intender, and 
this seems implausible. Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison doesn’t seem to be about 
                                                          
24 Don’t I execute your intention if  I do what you tell me? No. I obey your command. We do make this 
distinction and ought not to ignore it.  
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Julie in the way that her intention to dye her own hair is about her.25 If  we can 
accommodate the datum without making what seems like an implausible claim, then we 
should.  
 
And we can – very easily in fact. For the datum falls out of  something we are already 
committed to, viz. the commonsense requirements on intention-execution from §1(b). 
According to (ii.a), an intention would be executed (and not merely satisfied) only if  what it 
is about is brought about by the intender herself. That entails that only Julie can execute her 
intention for Bev to go to prison, even though this intention’s content makes no 
reference to Julie, and the same goes for her intention to sentence Julie. Since our 
commonsense conditions on intention-execution explain our datum independently of  
any assumptions about the intention’s content, the datum gives us no reason to think of  
Julie’s intention to sentence Bev as being about Julie, and so no independent reason for 
Propositionalism.  
 
Another argument is given by Hector-Neri Castañeda.26 The thought is that intentions 
must contain reference to the subject because their canonical expressions do. Julie might 
express her intention to sentence Bev by asserting “I am going to sentence Bev”. But 
Castañeda’s argument ought to be rejected, for it is not in general the case that what 
someone says when they express an attitude matches the content of  that attitude. This 
principle would get us the contradictory result that my (first-order) desire for a coffee (or: to 
have a coffee or that I will have a coffee), when expressed in my (plausibly canonical) assertion 
“I want a coffee” is identical with the (second-order) desire for wanting a coffee (or: to want a 
coffee or that I want a coffee). So the principle that we can in general read off  the content of  
attitudes from the contents of  their canonical expressions leads to contradiction in the 
desire case, and must be rejected.27  
 
Of  course is open to the Propositionalist to suggest other independent reasons for 
thinking Propositionalism true, even though in executing certain intentions we do not act 
on ourselves. I have considered and rejected only the suggestions I think are most likely 
to be made. But it is important to recall that the current strategy for defending 
Propositionalism has two parts, not just one. For not only does the Propositionalist need 
to find a plausible reason, independent of  the considerations in §2(d), to think that the 
intentions I say are about only acting in some way are in fact about the intender’s own acting in 
that way, she would also need to meet the first two explanatory challenges I described 
there. And it looked hard to do this from a Propositionalist perspective. It looks hard, 
that is, to give membership conditions for the privileged set of  I(Φi)’s; those which can 
be executed without self-causation, and therefore to explain what it is about the 
intentions in this privileged class which explains why they are executable without self-
causation, given that I(Φx)’s in general – like Julie’s intention for Bev to go to prison – will be 
executed only by causing the x to Φ.  
                                                          
25 The implausible claim that all intentions are about the intender ought to be distinguished from the 
plausible one that all intentions are about doing something; about acting in some way. My argument has 
required assuming that some intentions are not about doing something but are about a state of  affairs (Bev’s 
going to prison, for example). For arguments that intentions are always about acting in some way, see 
Baier, “Act and Intent,” 649 and Clark, “The Action as Conclusion,” 501–2. Cf. Vermazen, “Objects of  
Intention.”  
26 Castañeda, “Intentions and Intending,” 141. 
27 The principle does seem to work in the case of  belief, but for reasons just explained, we should see this 
as a special case, and not as a paradigm, of  the semantic relationship between an attitude’s canonical 




In light of  these issues it seems hugely preferable to accept that at least some intentions 
are not propositional attitudes, but attitudes towards doing things, or towards things 
(actions) which are to be done.28 
 
c. An Irreducibly Agential “I” 
 
One thing my argument picks up on is that by intending something someone is in the 
capacity of  agent, whereas what she intends is in the capacity of  patient. One way of  
putting my conclusion would be to say that executing any intention requires executing at 
least one intention in relation to which the subject appears only as agent. I can act on 
myself, and my intentions can be executed by my so doing – my intention to get up early 
is like this if  executing it requires setting an alarm the night before. If  my argument 
works, it shows that it is impossible for all intentions to be like this: some intentions must 
include me only as agent (i.e. as intender), not also as patient (as part of  what is intended).29 
 
The final objection is that I have ignored a theoretical possibility, viz. that not all I(Φi)’s 
are made the same; some contain a special “I” (understood prononically) which 
represents the intender in an ‘irreducibly agential’ way.30 My intention to get up early 
tomorrow contains the usual “I”, which represents the self  as a patient in just the same 
way that Bev is represented as a patient in Julie’s intention to sentence Bev. But the “I” in 
Julie’s intention to sentence Bev – understood as her intention that she will sentence Bev – 
is different. This “irreducibly agential” “I” picks out Julie qua agent. The execution of  
intentions containing this special “I” is incompatible with the intender’s being acted on – 
and so acting on themselves - as patient.  
 
If  this idea works, it affords the Propositionalist responses to all three explanatory 
challenges of  §2(d). The class of  privileged I(Φi)’s which are executable without self-
causation is just the class containing the irreducibly agential “I”. And it is because the self-
reference they involve is irreducibly agential that they are executable without self-
causation; indeed what is intended will not be brought about if  the intender acts on 
herself, because the state of  affairs thereby instantiated is not one which contains the 
intender only qua agent, but one in which she is just as much patient.  
 
But the proposal is hard to accept because it is hard to make sense of  as a stable 
position. It is hard to get a grasp on the view without it’s collapsing either into the view I 
think we should adopt – one on which there is no reference to Julie in the content of  her 
intention to sentence Bev – or into the version of  Propositionalism which I have been 
arguing against, which sees Julie’s intention to sentence Bev as concerning Julie, qua 
patient.  
 
It is not easy to explain the worry here, in part because I find it hard to understand the 
proposal. But perhaps we can (literally) use our imaginations to a grasp on what the 
‘irreducibly agential “I” is supposed to be. I suppose that however it is supposed to work, 
this “I” is part of  the representational content of  an episode of  imagining oneself  doing 
                                                          
28 This positive suggestion is developed in Clark, “The Action as Conclusion.” 
29 This is close to how Baier puts things (Baier, “Act and Intent,” 658).  
30 Ryan Cox, Alison Fernandes and Chris Cowie have all (independently) suggested this to me. Castañeda 
(Castañeda, “Intentions and Intending,” 141–144) has a similar view in mind, except that his special “I” 
is not irreducibly agential, but irreducibly first-personal. I don’t respond to Castañeda’s suggestion because I 
think that positing an irreducibly agential “I” seems better-placed as a response to the present worry.  
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something. This is not intended as a definition; just a way-in to understanding what we 
are talking about. I imagine myself  feeding Egbert (the hamster) a mealworm. Because I 
am imagining myself  feeding him a mealworm, what I am imagining must – I suppose the 
thought goes – contain reference to me. But since I am not imagining myself  as in any 
way acted on, it must contain irreducibly agential reference to me.  
 
I find it hard to see how thinking of  my episode of  imagination as being about myself, 
under an irreducibly agential mode of  presentation, is supposed to be any different from 
thinking of  it as not being about me at all, but about only Egbert and mealworms and 
feeding. It is true that what I am imagining is different to what I would imagine if  I 
imagined, say, Alexander feeding Egbert a mealworm, but we can account for this 
difference without thinking of  the imaginative episode as being about me qua mealworm 
feeder; we just need to say that it’s not about Alexander - or anyone else - qua mealworm 
feeder. Additionally, when I explicitly direct my imagination at myself  – at my feeding 
Egbert a mealworm – what comes to mind is an imagined scenario from a perspective 
which is outside myself  qua mealworm feeder; I imagine myself  feeding Egbert the 
mealworm from an outside perspective, as if  during an out-of-body experience.31 My 
perspective qua imaginer is distinct from my perspective qua imagined mealworm feeder; 
it is the perspective of  someone perhaps in the top left-hand corner of  the room.  
 
The current objector is bound to complain that I am not taking her suggestion seriously. 
The irreducibly agential “I” is supposed to be something we are all familiar with. It is the 
“myself ” I imagine when I imagine myself feeding Egbert and when my perspectives qua 
imaginer and qua imagined coincide. But I can’t see why we are to think of  this episode of  
imagination as being about me at all and not just about feeding Egbert a mealworm. Why is it 
not enough for me to imagine myself  feeding Egbert that my perspective qua imaginer 
coincides with my perspective qua imagined? And we are back to square one, since the 
current objector will presumably say that this is enough, but that by imagining things 
from the mealworm feeder’s perspective, one is employing the irreducibly agential “I”. And 
I will complain that I don’t understand the difference between our positions, and we’ll be 
going round in circles.  
 
I don’t know how to bring this argument to an end. I suspect the suggestion of  an 
‘irreducibly agential “I”’ is incoherent if  it means that one is at the same time treating 
oneself  as an object of  thought but not as an object of  action. But I don’t know how to 
argue this except by gesturing, as I have done in the previous two paragraphs, at why I – 
personally - find the idea hard to grasp. I can only hope the reader finds it hard too, and 
that she also shares the sense that it is to be explained by the incoherence of  the idea of  
an ‘irreducibly agential “I”‘ which shares a syntax with the ordinary “I”, rather than by 
personal imaginative limitations.  
 
Luckily, I think I can bypass these loose ends. For we would only need to make sense of  
an irreducibly agential “I” if  we were antecedently convinced of  the need to think 
propositional, those intentions which I have argued are not. It is likely that we will have 
such a reason only given independent reason to think Propositionalism true. In the 
                                                          
31 Some related issues – albeit from a more empirically-minded point of  view than the one relevant to our 
discussions – are discussed in Marcel, “The Sense of  Agency: Awareness and Ownership of  Action.”  
Marcel argues that empirical data from abnormal psychology support the idea that the content of  the 
experience of  agency does not include reference to the subject. For discussion see Roessler and Eilan, 
“Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology,” 43–46. 
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absence of  such a reason, and given the argument against Propositionalism in §2, I think 
we can safely ignore the suggestion about the irreducibly agential “I”.  
 
d. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has argued that Propositional is false; that if  any intention stands a chance 
of  execution, it does so only via the execution of  some non-propositional intention. 
Although I assumed for the sake of  argument that some intentions are propositional 
attitudes, it is consistent with my conclusion that none of  them are, and it is a 
consequence of  my argument that in their most fundamental form, intentions are non-
propositional attitudes. The possibility of  executing intentions depends on the existence 
of  non-propositional intentions. The argument of  this chapter will lead to a new 
constraint on an account of  practical knowledge, which I will introduce in concluding 




Concluding Part Two 
 
 
Velleman’s and Setiya’s accounts of  practical knowledge depended centrally on 
Cognitivism, the idea that intentions are a kind of  belief. Holding that intentions are a 
kind of  belief  looks prima facie a clever move, one which enables a theorist to explain 
both why practical knowledge has unusual features compared to knowledge of  others’ 
intentional actions or one’s own non-intentional ones but also why it is nonetheless still a 
kind of  knowledge. On such a view, practical knowledge is unusual because it is constituted 
by beliefs of  a funny kind, but it is knowledge because it is constituted by beliefs 
nonetheless. We saw some internal problems with Velleman’s and Setiya’s accounts in 
Chapter Three (Velleman’s view came out worse than Setiya’s), but it might be thought 
that the general strategy of  understanding practical knowledge as knowledge in intention, 
where intentions are a funny kind of  belief, is a good one and worth pursuing in 
different guises.  
 
But if  the argument of  Chapter Four is correct, the general strategy is unworkable. If  
intentions are not propositional attitudes – at least not fundamentally so - then intentions 
are not a kind of  belief, since beliefs must be propositional attitudes because they must be 
truth-apt. Any version of  CI will flout what I will call the Intention-Content constraint: 
 
The Intention-Content Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge must not entail that intentions are 
propositional attitudes. 
 
Part One motivated taking some version of  Intentionalism seriously; the idea that practical 
knowledge is constituted by intention. And the current Part has motivated rejecting the idea 
that intentions are a kind of  belief; it has rejected Cognitivist Intentionalism. Part Three will 
consider a version of  Intentionalism which rejects Cognitivism, first via an interpretation of  
Anscombe’s view in Intention in Chapter Five, and then as developed in my own way in 





A Better Intentionalism 
 
This Part introduces, develops and defends two versions of  the idea that an agent’s 
practical knowledge is constituted by her intention, where intentions are conceived as 
distinct attitudes from beliefs.  
 
Chapter Five provides an interpretation of  Anscombe’s account of  practical knowledge 
in Intention, which I call Non-Cognitivist Intentionalism (NCI). I argue that NCI happily meets 
the Apparent Features and Special Relationship constraints, and does so in a unified way. NCI 
also meets a further constraint which is introduced and explained: the Structure-Sensitivity 
constraint demands of  an account of  practical knowledge that it should explain how 
practical knowledge takes in both present and future intentional actions, and that it is 
sensitive to the agent’s practical reasons. But it is not clear how NCI meets the Why 
Knowledge? constraint, nor how it meets the Intention-Content constraint introduced in my 
Conclusion to Part Two, consistently with a final new constraint, the Knowledge-Content 
constraint, which demands that an account explain why practical knowledge should be a 
kind of  propositional knowledge.  
 
Chapter Six introduces and defends Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism (NPI) which is a 
stronger view than NCI, and entails it. NPI takes over the benefits of  NCI, and – I argue 
– in addition meets the Why Knowledge?, Intention-Content and Knowledge-Content constraints. 











I have chosen to consider Anscombe’s account last for a couple of  reasons. First, I think 
Anscombe provides a unified way of  meeting various of  our constraints, the benefits of  
doing which are best seen against the background of  the discussion we have had up until 
now. And second, because I think the account is roughly right, at least if  developed in a 
certain way. I will develop it in this way in Chapter Six, so it makes sense to consider the 
view I find in Intention immediately prior to doing that.  
 
Intention is famously opaque, and although I do think the view I describe here as 
‘Anscombe’s’ stands a fair chance of  actually being her view – at least in relation to its 
major elements – the focus of  this chapter is not exegetical but philosophical. My aim is 
to describe the view I have found in Intention which is also a view which I think is broadly 
correct. So I will not be defending my interpretation against alternatives, although I will 
try to make it clear throughout how I get to my interpretation from what Anscombe 
actually says in Intention.1  
 
The main features of  Anscombe’s view, as I understand it, are set out in §1. This involves 
explaining how two different characterisations Anscombe gives of  intentional action 
converge. On one of  these, intentional action is action to which a special sense of  the 
question ‘Why?’ has application; on the other it is action which is the object of  practical 
knowledge. By tracing the interrelations between these three concepts – intentional 
action, the special sense of  ‘Why?’ and practical knowledge - we will gain a deeper 
understanding of  all three. For a central element of  Anscombe’s view about practical 
knowledge is that it is conceptually related to these other two phenomena. Throughout 
§1 we will see that the notion of  a behaviour’s having a point is of  central importance to 
understanding how these three phenomena interrelate, and so – for our purposes – of  
central importance to understanding practical knowledge. Practical knowledge will be 
understood as formally distinct from theoretical (‘ordinary’) knowledge in two 
fundamental ways: it is undermined not by an unsuccessful judgment, but an 
                                                          
1 Anscombe’s view is often linked with Stuart Hampshire’s: both think that practical knowledge is 
importantly linked to intention; both deny that it is based on epistemic reasons. I have chosen to 
concentrate on Anscombe’s view for a couple of  reasons. First, it is a very important feature of  
Anscombe’s view as I understand it, and of  mine, that practical knowledge is constituted by intention, and 
although Hampshire says much which suggests that this is his view (see e.g. Hampshire, Freedom of  the 
Individual, 53), he also suggests in places that it is constituted by belief  (see e.g. Ibid., 68), which makes 
interpretation tricky. Second, our investigation, like Anscombe’s, begins with present-directed practical 
knowledge, whereas Hampshire seems to think that practical knowledge is in its fundamental form of  
future actions (Hampshire, “Reply to Walsh on Thought and Action,” 411). A very interesting take on 
what Hampshire is up to is given in Roessler, “The Epistemic Role of  Intentions.” 
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unsuccessful performance, and rather than being ‘derived from the objects known’, it is 
‘the cause of  what it understands’. 
 
In §2 I explain the benefits of  Anscombe’s view. I will explain why the two fundamental 
formal features of  practical knowledge enable her account to meet the Apparent Features 
and Special Relationship constraints, and to do so in a unified way. We will also set out a 
further constraint on any account of  practical knowledge – the Structure-Sensitivity 
constraint – which requires an account to explain how practical knowledge is sensitive to 
the internal temporal and rational structure of  its object, intentional action. I also 
consider explicitly how we should understand Anscombe’s claim that practical knowledge 
is knowledge ‘in intention’. I will explain that understanding her as thinking of  practical 
knowledge as constituted by intention rather than by belief  gives us a unified explanation 
of  why practical knowledge would have the two formal features described in §1. And if  
this is right then her account also happily meets our new Structure-Sensitivity constraint 
too. Her account will be identified as a Non-Cognitivist Intentionalism; NCI. 
 
But the view is not without problems, three of  which I consider in §3. The first – that 
the account’s conception of  the relation between intentional action and practical 
knowledge is overly strong – is dismissed. The second and third are deemed more 
serious. The second is that Anscombe’s account is bound to flout the Why Knowledge? 
constraint and the third is that it can only meet the Intention-Content constraint by flouting 
a new, final, constraint. The Knowledge-Content constraint requires an account of  practical 
knowledge to leave is unmysterious why practical knowledge should be a kind of  
propositional knowledge. These two problems are left to be taken up in Chapter Six.   
 
1. Intentional Action, Practical Knowledge, ‘Why?’ 
 
Associated with Anscombe’s Intention are two characterisations of  intentional action, 
which is understood first as action “to which a certain sense of  the question ‘Why?’ is 
given application”2 and second, as the formal object of  practical knowledge.3 Prima facie it 
is not obvious why these two characterisations should converge on a single phenomenon. 
In this section I want to explain why, on Anscombe’s view of  things, they do converge, 
and in so doing elucidate the three notions – intentional action, the special sense of  
‘Why?’ and practical knowledge - in terms of  one another. 
  
In (a) I relate the idea of  ‘Why?’ questions to the idea of  kinds of  explanation, and 
explain the relevance to intentional action. In (b) I relate the applicability of  Anscombe’s 
special sense of  ‘Why?’ to an action’s having a point. In (c) I explain that for Anscombe, 
practical knowledge displays a formal feature (‘Theophrastus’ Feature’) which means it 
can only take in behaviours which have a point. In (d) I identify intentional action as 
action which gets its point in a special way and, and in (e) I explain how this relates to a 
second formal feature of  practical knowledge (‘Aquinas’ Feature’). I sum up in (f). This 
section seeks only to set out Anscombe’s view; I turn to considering its merits in §2 and 
its challenges in §3.  
 
 
                                                          
2 Anscombe, Intention, 9. 
3 “Without [practical knowledge] what happens does not come under the description – execution of  
intentions – whose characteristics we have been investigating.” (Ibid., 87–8.; see also Ibid., 11.) 
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a. Intentional Action, the question ‘Why?RA’ and a Special Kind of Explanation 
 
In saying that intentional actions are “actions to which a special sense of  the question 
‘Why?’ has application”,4 Anscombe characterises intentional actions as actions to which 
a special kind of  explanation is appropriate. For asking ‘why?’ of  some phenomenon is 
asking for an explanation of  it, and asking ‘why?’ in a certain sense is asking for a certain 
kind of  explanation. 
 
Asking “Why did Daisy blink?”, for example, might be asking for a teleological explanation 
of  her blinking (asking for the aim of  her blinking), or for an efficient-causal explanation 
(asking which prior events prompted her blinking). There are other kinds of  explanation 
too. One of  Anscombe’s key thoughts is that proper and peculiar to intentional action is 
a sui generis kind of  explanation, the explanation of  behaviour in terms of  practical 
reasons, or reasons for action (I’ll use these expressions interchangeably). In the sense 
Anscombe is interested in, the question ‘Why?’ seeks an explanation of  this kind. From 
now on I will use ‘‘Why?RA’’ to indicate the sense of  ‘Why?’ which seeks an explanation 
in terms of  the agent’s reasons for action and ‘‘Why?’’ (sans subscript) to indicate the 
question in some other sense, or neutrally between its various senses - context will 
disambiguate. 
 
If  we want to understand intentional action, thinks Anscombe, we need to understand 
the special kind of  explanation to which it is internally related, which means at the same 
time understanding the sense of  ‘Why?RA’. Although the special kind of  explanation is 
explanation in terms of  reasons for action, and ‘Why?RA’ asks for these, saying this is not 
enough. Because just as there are various kinds of  explanation, each linking with a 
different sense of  ‘Why?’, there are also various kinds of  reason, each being what might 
be given in explaining a phenomenon, each demanded by a different sense of  ‘Why?’. So 
Anscombe must elucidate these concepts together, which she does by considering when 
the question ‘Why?RA’ is refused, and when it is granted, application. For reasons of  
space I am going to concentrate on the responses which grant ‘Why?RA’ application. 
 
b. Granting Application to the Question ‘Why?RA’ 
 
To grant any ‘Why?’ question application is to implicitly characterise the queried 
phenomenon as of  the right kind to be explained in the way in question. So granting 
‘Why?RA’, asked of  a behaviour, is implicitly characterising that behaviour as of  the right 
kind as to be explained by reasons for action (in a special sense which we will fully 
understand only at the end of  (d)). Actions of  this kind are intentional ones. So granting 
application to ‘Why?RA’ asked of  a behaviour characterises that behaviour as an 
intentional action.  
 
There are two main ways in which ‘Why?RA’ might be granted application: positively and 
negatively. I take each in turn.  
 
Answering ‘Why?RA’ positively involves stating or suggesting a reason for action of  the 
special kind. Amongst these special reasons for action, Anscombe distinguishes two 
kinds. Stating or suggesting a reason might be stating or suggesting an aim or intention, or 
it might be stating or suggesting a motive.  Both categories are once further bisected. In 
giving an intention one might indicate something future or something present. In either 
                                                          
4 Anscombe, Intention, 9. 
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case, one states an action or state of  affairs at which the queried behaviour aims. A future 
intention is given “if  you say ‘[WhyRA] are you crossing the road[?]’ and I reply ‘I am 
going to look in that shop window’”.5 A present intention is given when the question 
“Why?RA are you lying on that bed?” is met with “I’m doing yoga”.6  
 
Motives are reasons which do not characterise an aim. The category is split into 
‘backwards-looking’ and ‘interpretative’ motives (although a person’s motives can be a 
mixture of  the two kinds7). Giving a backwards-looking motive is indicating that some 
event has happened in the past, which is (perceived by the agent as) good or bad in some 
respect and thus thereby invites a certain kind of  response. “Why are you burning down 
Jones’ house?” might be met with “He killed my father,” thus showing the house-burning 
as motivated by the backwards-looking motive of  revenge. Other examples of  backwards-
looking motives are “gratitude, and remorse, and pity for something specific”.8 To give an 
interpretative motive is not to suggest any particular past event to which the queried 
action is represented as an appropriate response, but “is to say something like ‘See the 
action in this light’”.9 Anscombe gives the examples of  love, curiosity, despair and vanity.  
 
One can grant application to ‘Why?RA’ positively – by explaining one’s action in terms of  
one of  these kinds of  reasons – without explicitly stating one’s reason. One might instead 
put one’s action in a context which makes its reason clear, to a greater or lesser extent. If  
I respond to the question “WhyRA are you working on a Sunday?” with “I have so much 
to do!” I make clear that I am working with the intention of  getting enough done. And if  our 
arsonist responds to “WhyRA are you burning that house down?” with “It’s Jones’ house”, 
he will make it clear to someone who knows what Jones has done that it is an act of  
revenge. Explaining that he is oiling the chain of  the bike because it’s Luke’s bike, Peter 
makes it clear – to me at least – that his motive is love. 
 
I distinguish these different kinds of  answer to ‘Why?RA’ because I want to explain what 
they have in common. They all explain or articulate the point of the queried behaviour.10 
Citing an aim or intention explains a behaviour’s point by representing it as a way of  
achieving that aim: to look in the shop window, I need to cross the road; lying on the bed 
like that is a way of  doing yoga. Backwards-looking motives explain a behaviour’s point 
by representing it as an appropriate response to a particular (good or bad) past event. 
You might not agree that revenge is an appropriate response to Jones’ having killed my 
father – you might advocate the formal justice system instead. But in understanding my 
arson as revenge (and recognising that vengeance matters to me), you will understand the 
point of  burning his house down from my perspective. You will understand that I see my 
arson as serving as a kind of  leveller; as restoring justice between us. Finally, giving an 
interpretative motive explains the point of  the queried behaviour by giving the light 
under which the behaviour’s point will be apparent. By giving love (say) as a motive for his 
action, Peter thereby suggests that love matters to him, and that the queried behaviour 
matters insofar as it is an expression of  love. The same goes for less admirable motives: 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 35. 
6 In Anscombe’s example the question is actually “What are you doing?” (Ibid., my emphasis). The 
possibility of  switching between ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ is of  great importance, as we shall see in §1(e) and 
again in §2(b). 
7 Ibid., 21. 
8 Ibid., 20. 
9 Ibid., 21. 
10 Anscombe characterises practical reasons as “reasons why it would be useful or attractive if  the 
description [of  the action] came true, not by evidence that it is true.” (Ibid., 6); we shall see in (d) that 
this is in fact only a partial characterisation of  the reasons particular to intentional action.  
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if  Luke says that his action is done out of  vanity then although he might say that vanity 
oughtn’t matter to him, he can’t consistently deny that it does. The action has a point 
because it satisfies his vanity. 
 
Let’s turn to the negative way of  granting application to ‘Why?RA’. Here, one answers in 
such a way as to state or suggest that one’s action was not done for a reason: 
  
Now of  course a possible answer to the question ‘Why?’ is one like ‘I just thought I 
would’ or ‘It was an impulse’ or ‘For no particular reason’ or ‘It was an idle action – I 
was just doodling’.11 
 
How can answering in this way be granting application to the question ‘Why?RA’, given that 
the question seeks the reason for which one’s action was done? The answer is that 
granting application to the question represents one’s action as of  a kind which could be 
explained in terms of  its practical reasons. But an action’s being of  this kind does not in 
all cases mean that it has such an explanation.  
 
We can use the notion of  a behaviour’s having a point to make the relevant distinction 
between a behaviour’s being of  the right kind to be explicable in terms of  practical reasons, 
and a behaviour’s actually having an explanation in terms of  (being done for) practical 
reasons. Reasons for action articulate the point of  an action. But not all actions have a 
point which is articulate; about which there is anything to be said in explanation of  it. 
Sometimes an action will have a point which is so to speak ‘atomic’.12 Say I do an 
impression of  Bob Dylan because I just thought I would: “I just felt like it.” In 
responding to ‘Why?RA’ thus, I imply that there is nothing to be said about why I felt like it 
but the fact that I did feel like it means that my doing it has a point. I do not do it in order to 
satisfy some desire, on Anscombe’s view (I recognise that this is a controversial description 
of  the case, but here I am restricting my attention to a statement of  Anscombe’s view as I 
understand it). In saying I did it simply because I felt like it I represent my action as 
having a point which is atomic; which does not admit of  its own articulation or 
explanation. Actions like this have their own point. The action is done, as we are apt to 
say, for its own sake.13 I will return to these kinds of  case in (c).  
 
Let’s sum up the important points. First, the question ‘Why?RA’ is given a positive answer 
when a reason of  some kind is stated or suggested. Reasons can be intentions, which can 
be future or present-directed, or they can be motives, which can be backwards-looking or 
interpretative (or they can be mixed). Reasons of  all kinds articulate the point of  an action, 
so giving a reason represents the queried behaviour as having a point. But some actions 
have an atomic point, a point which has no articulation, and such actions are ones in 
relation to which the question ‘Why?RA’ is applicable, but for which it has no positive 
response. Such actions are done for their own sake and attract responses to ‘Why?RA’ of  
the kinds Anscombe lists in the passage quoted above.  
 
c. Having a point and Theophrastus’ Feature 
 
We have just learned that in granting application to the question ‘Why?RA’, one represents 
one’s behaviour as having a point. Here I want to suggest that only behaviours which have a 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 25. 
12 Discussions of  actions like this can be found in Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good” and in Alvarez, 
“Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.” 
13 Cf. Alvarez, “Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.”  
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point could be objects of  practical knowledge. Thus we will have made a start on 
explaining how actions to which ‘Why?RA’ has application, and actions which are the 
objects of  practical knowledge, might be actions of  the same kind.  
 
It is plausible and widely accepted that knowledge (at least knowledge of  contingent 
facts, of  which practical knowledge is a kind) presupposes the possibility of  error; that 
“there is point in speaking of  knowledge only where a contrast exists between ‘he knows’ 
and ‘he (merely) thinks he knows’.14 We can link this idea with the idea of  knowing as 
involving a certain kind of  success: knowing is succeeding where one might have failed, 
whereas someone who merely thinks that they know has failed where they might have 
(and think they have) succeeded. Knowing is a kind of  success and the avoidance of  a 
certain kind of  error.  
 
A familiar way of  thinking about the kind of  success involved in knowing is in terms of  
one’s judgment matching the facts. A successful judgment is one which matches the facts, 
where the standard for success – and so for knowing - is set by how the facts are. If  one’s 
judgment does not match the facts it is, for that reason, mistaken and so not knowledge. 
Anscombe observes that “modern philosophy” thinks of  all knowledge as fitting this 
model, that: 
 
Knowledge must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the 
facts. The facts, reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said [judged], if  it is to be 
knowledge.15 
 
But in her view this is a mistake. Commonsense recognises a different way in which a fact-
judgment mismatch might be normatively assessed: 
 
In some cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for not being in accordance with the 
words [judgment], rather than vice versa.16 
 
On the assumption that knowledge involves a kind of  success and the avoidance of  a 
kind of  error, the fact that there are two ways of  normatively assessing a fact-judgment 
mismatch entails the logical possibility that there are two kinds of  knowledge, each 
involving a different kind of  success and the avoidance of  a different kind of  error. And 
exactly this thought is part of  Anscombe’s conception of  the difference between 
practical and theoretical knowledge. Theoretical (‘contemplative’17; ‘speculative’18) 
knowledge requires a successful matching between a person’s judgment and the facts, 
with the facts setting the standard for success, and the judgment being successful or 
otherwise depending on whether it meets this standard. Practical knowledge also requires 
a successful matching between judgment and fact, but here it is the judgment which sets 
the standard for success, and the facts which constitute a success insofar as they meet this 
standard, and a mistake insofar as they don’t.19  
                                                          
14 Anscombe, Intention, 14. Knowing is thus distinguished by Anscombe from being able to say (Ibid., 13). 
15 Anscombe, Intention, 57; my emphasis. 
16 Ibid., 4–5. See also Hampshire and Hart, “Decision, Intention and Certainty,” 9. 
17 Anscombe, Intention, 57. 
18 Ibid., 87. 
19 I am being deliberately non-committal here about what ‘judgment’ means for Anscombe, because I want 
to describe the formal differences between practical and theoretical knowledge (as Anscombe sees them) 
independently of  considerations about the identity of  each kind of  knowledge’s constituting attitude. 
Later on, as one might guess from the title of  this Chapter, I will suggest that we ought to think of  
Anscombe as thinking that theoretical knowledge is constituted by belief  and practical knowledge as 
constituted by intention, and that ‘judgment’ is to be read neutrally between these two attitudes. 
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But how could the facts be in error, or constitute a success, depending on someone’s 
judgment? Surely the facts just are as they are, independently of  what anyone thinks about 
them. How could they be answerable to us? 
 
But this intuition ignores those facts which are about what we do - these facts are 
dependent on us. And it is, of  course, these facts which are relevant to our investigation 
of  practical knowledge. Indeed Anscombe elaborates her observation that sometimes 
‘facts’ (rather than words or judgments) are impugned for a fact-judgment mismatch with 
an example in which it is clear just what kind of  ‘fact’ can bear this responsibility: 
  
e.g. I write something other than I think I am writing: as Theophrastus says (Magna 
Moralia, 1189b 22), the mistake here is in the performance, not in the judgment.20 
 
Read too literally, Anscombe’s claim that ‘the facts’ can be impugned for not being in 
accordance with a person’s judgment is misleading because it suggests that we should 
identify a person’s performance with the fact that they are performing as they are, and 
this doesn’t seem right. But Anscombe said only that in such cases the facts are “so to 
speak”21 impugned, indicating that she is speaking loosely. The idea is not the barely 
intelligible one that facts independent of  human involvement are sometimes in error for 
not turning out how someone thought they would, but the truism that a person can get 
things wrong in two different ways; they can make a mistake in judgment, or in 
performance. The facts are ‘so to speak’ in error if  I think I am writing ‘causal 
relationship’ but am in fact writing ‘casual relationship’. In this case I fail to know what I 
am writing because I am doing something other than what I think I am doing.22 
 
I will refer to this feature of  practical knowledge as ‘Theophrastus’ Feature’. Displaying 
Theophrastus’ Feature – being such as to be undermined by a mistake in performance – 
distinguishes practical knowledge formally from theoretical knowledge. Practical 
knowledge is undermined by a mistake in performance whereas theoretical knowledge is 
undermined by a mistake in judgment. Practical knowledge thus involves a success in 
performance whereas theoretical knowledge involves a success in judgment.   
 
We can now start to link up Anscombe’s characterisation of  intentional action as action 
to which ‘Why?RA’ has application, with her characterisation of  it as an object of  practical 
knowledge. We have already seen that in granting application to ‘Why?RA’ one represents 
one’s behaviour as having a point. And if  practical knowledge displays Theophrastus’ 
feature, then it can take in only action which has a point. Let’s see why this is.  
 
Some of  the things creatures do constitute successful or mistaken performances. But not 
all the things creatures do can constitute successes or failures. Whilst typing I am making 
tapping noises with the keys. If  one of  the keys fails to tap when I hit it because a bit of  
fluff  has got underneath, or because I haven’t hit it quite hard enough, I don’t thereby act 
in error. But writing ‘casual’ rather than ‘causal’ was acting in error. What’s the difference?  
 
The difference is that it doesn’t matter to me whether the key makes a tapping noise or 
not, whereas it does matter whether I write ‘causal’ or ‘casual’; making a tapping noise has 
                                                          
20 Anscombe, Intention, 5. 
21 Ibid., 4; my italics. 
22 It is much more natural here to say that I fail to know what I am writing because I am not writing what I 
mean or intend to be writing. And indeed this will be the paraphrase I will suggest in §2(c). (See again n. 
19.) 
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no point whereas writing ‘causal’ does (ex hypothesi, of  course – another example could be 
built in which making the tapping noise mattered, whereas what I wrote did not). Proof  
can be found in how I might act when I notice I have not done each of  these things. 
Noticing I have not typed ‘causal’ (but ‘casual’), I go back and correct what I have written. 
But noticing that a particular key did not tap, I do not go back and correct this. There is 
nothing here to correct because whether I made a tapping noise or not didn’t matter; it 
didn’t have a point. 
  
The thought holds equally for actions with an atomic, as with an articulate point. Let’s 
say the point of  writing ‘causal’ is explained by saying that I am writing about a certain 
causal relationship, in order to defend a premise in an argument I am making. The point 
of  writing ‘causal’ is here articulated – there are various things we can say about why it 
matters that I write ‘causal’ and not ‘casual’. There was nothing to say about why doing 
my Bob Dylan impression mattered – I simply felt like doing it; its point was atomic. But 
doing the impression nevertheless did matter to me in a way that making a tapping noise with 
the keys as I type does not. We can see this by noting that if  my impression sounds more 
like Tom Waits than Bob Dylan it will be a mistake which I could try to correct (although 
I needn’t in fact go on to do so). 
 
So far we are able to link the characterisation of  intentional action in terms of  the 
applicability of  ‘Why?RA’ with the characterisation as the object of  practical knowledge 
via the notion of  the relevant actions having a point as follows: intentional actions have a 
point, and behaviours are represented as having a point when ‘Why?RA’ is granted 
application. And because practical knowledge displays Theophrastus’ Feature, it can take 
in only actions which have a point, since only actions which have a point can constitute a 
successful performance.  
 
It is tempting at this stage to identify behaviours which have a point with intentional actions. 
But we cannot do this, because not all actions which have a point are intentional. In order 
to understand intentional actions properly, we need to understand the special way in 
which they get their points. To this I now turn. 
 
d. Intentional Action and Egocentricity 
 
Not all actions which have a point are intentional actions. But we can distinguish cases in 
which an action has a point independently of  its agent’s recognising it as having this 
point, from cases in which an action’s having the point it has is dependent on the agent’s 
recognising it as having this point. When an action gets its point in the second way, I will 
call its point egocentric, and I will say that we ought to identify intentional actions with 
actions whose point is egocentric. Egocentricity is also a feature of  the reasons particular 
to intentional action, and to the type of  explanation one gives when one explains one’s 
action in terms of  such reasons, as I shall explain. 
 
Daisy the cow blinks. Her blinking has a point - to keep an advancing speck of  dust out 
of  her eye. Her blinking is not intentional. I wink. My winking has a point – to greet the 
approaching Jones. My winking is intentional. The difference is that Daisy’s blinking has 
the point it has independently of  Daisy’s thinking of  its having this point, whilst my 
winking has its point only because I think of  it as having this point. My winking is 
informed by my recognition of  the point it would serve, whereas Daisy’s blinking is not.  
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Daisy, being a cow, lacks the conceptual sophistication to recognise the point of  her 
blinking. But it is not simply that she fails to recognise the point of  her blinking which 
makes it non-egocentric in my sense. Compare a case in which I blink. I might be aware 
of  the point of  doing so, and even endorse my blinking on the basis of  this recognition, 
thinking to myself  what a good job it is I have this reflex, and how I value having clear 
and pain-free eyes. But even though I recognise and endorse the point of  my blinking, it 
is still like Daisy’s blinking and unlike my winking in that its having the point is has is 
independent of  my recognition, and of  my endorsement.23 Positively, the point of  my 
and Daisy’s blinking is dependent on facts about biology and evolution, and not on facts 
about either of  our conceptions of  this point. The point of  blinking is not egocentric, 
meaning that there is no sense in which the point of  our blinking is dependent on our 
recognition of  its having this point. The point of  my winking is egocentric: my winking 
would not have the point it has unless I recognised it as a way of  greeting Jones, 
something which I also recognise as worth my while to do. (Blinking can have an 
egocentric point, although this is not the usual case. For someone who has lost their 
blink reflex and has to blink intentionally or not at all, blinking will have an egocentric 
point; Hugh Grant might blink intentionally, whilst acting in a film.24) 
 
We could not identify intentional actions as actions which have a point. But we can 
identify them as actions whose point is egocentric. That is not to say that intentional 
actions only have an egocentric point. It is even possible for the point of  an action to be 
both egocentric and non-egocentric. Say I take a drink of  water, the point of  which is to 
quench my thirst. There is an explanation of  the point of  drinking water which is, like 
the explanation of  the point of  blinking (in the normal case) non-egocentric; which will 
advert to facts about evolution and about my biology. The point of  my drinking 
understood in this way is independent of  my recognition of  these facts. But unless I am 
sleep-drinking, we can also explain the point of  my drinking in a way that is egocentric, 
which does advert to my recognition that drinking would quench my thirst. So the point is 
not that intentional actions have only an egocentric point; it is this: it is insofar as an 
action has an egocentric point that it is done intentionally.  
 
Implicit in the previous paragraph is the thought that not only the point of  a behaviour, 
but also its articulation (when it has one) can be egocentric or otherwise. I have suggested 
that giving a reason articulates a behaviour’s point. And an explanation in terms of  reasons 
can also be egocentric or otherwise. In one sense, Daisy and I both act for reasons, in 
blinking and winking respectively. There is a sense of  ‘reason for acting’ in which Daisy 
blinks for the reason that it will keep dust out of  her eyes. But her blinking’s being done for 
this reason does not entail that Daisy recognises this as a reason for blinking, or that she 
could explain her blinking by citing this reason.  
 
My winking, on the other hand, not only is explicable in terms of  reasons (like Daisy’s 
blinking), but further, its being so explicable is dependent on my being able to explain it in 
terms of  these reasons. Daisy’s reasons for blinking are not egocentric, whilst my reasons 
for winking are, and the explanation of  Daisy’s blinking is not egocentric whereas the 
explanation of  my winking is. My winking at Jones is explicable in terms of  my greeting 
                                                          
23 Similar thoughts can be found in Velleman, “Replies to Discussion on the Possibility of  Practical 
Reason,” 12–13; and in Boyle and Lavin, “Goodness and Desire.” 
24 In Alien Hand syndrome, the problem is that the action’s point – to unbutton one’s shirt, for instance – 
is not egocentric; it will be disavowed by the agent as her aim. For a nice discussion of  various 
perspectives on this issue see Roessler and Eilan, “Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and 
Epistemology.” 
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him only because I think of  it as so explicable. The way in which the point of  Daisy’s 
blinking articulates is not dependent on her thinking of  the point as so articulating, 
whereas the way in which the point of  my winking articulates is dependent on my 
thinking of  its point as so articulating. An action for which this is not true is not 
explicable in terms of  those reasons for action which are proper and peculiar to intentional 
action. The special kinds of  reasons for action which are given in explanations proper 
and peculiar to intentional actions are egocentric.  
 
These ideas enable me to make a clarification about Anscombe’s account. Some have 
thought of  Anscombe’s view as one on which intentional action is essentially subject to 
teleological explanation. But I don’t think this is right. We have already seen that she 
distinguishes reasons which imply an aim or intention from motives, which can be 
interpretative or backwards-looking. Taken at face-value, here Anscombe is denying that 
all explanations in terms of  practical reasons are teleological explanations. The sui generis 
kind of  explanation relevant to intentional action is not essentially teleological (although it 
can be teleological, and is when an intention is cited);25 the sui generis kind of  explanation 
is explanation which articulates the point of  a behaviour, where both the point and its 
articulation are egocentric in the way I have described.  
 
Finally, recognising the importance of  the egocentricity of  intentional action’s point and 
– where these apply – its reasons and explanations in terms of  these, helps us understand 
a feature of  Anscombe’s presentation which we have so far glossed over. Anscombe’s 
special question ‘Why?RA’ is always addressed in the first instance to the agent.26 This is not 
because a bystander cannot know about the agent’s reasons or because she could not 
represent another’s intentional action as having a point, and so as intentional. A 
bystander can do all this. But only the agent’s own recognition of  her action’s point, and 
of  the way (if  any) in which it is articulated, plays a role in determining the fact that her 
action has this point, so articulated. Intentional action is action which has an egocentric 
point, and whose explanation, if  any, is also egocentric. So the agent’s own (sincere) 
responses to ‘Why?RA’ are privileged: her own conception of  the explanation of  her 
action in terms of  its reasons (if  any) determines the fact that her action is so explicable. 




                                                          
25 For discussion see Müller, “Backwards-Looking Rationality and the Unity of  Practical Reason” and 
Hursthouse, “Intention,” 96. Cf. e.g. Newstead, “Interpreting Anscombe’s Intention §§32FF.” 
26 Some (e.g. Velleman, “Preçis of  The Possibility of  Practical Reason,” 228) have thought that her focus 
on what an agent might say about their action is evidence of  a commitment by Anscombe to 
behaviourism. I hope to have made it clear here why she is not best understood in this way. Anscombe’s 
own comments about there being controls on the truthfulness of  an answer to the question ‘Why?RA’ 
(Anscombe, Intention, 43–45) attest to this too. 
27 Does all this mean that animals cannot act intentionally, since they cannot give explanations of  what they 
are doing? Some have accepted that intentional action (as opposed to action that is merely purposive) is 
possible only for language-users (see e.g. Hampshire, Freedom of  the Individual, 413; Kenny, Will, Freedom 
and Power, 20; Hamilton, “Intention and the Authority of  Avowals,” 34). But Anscombe thinks that 
animals can act intentionally (Anscombe, Intention, 5). Is this inconsistent? I can’t answer this fully here, 
but consider the following: A squirrel might try various ways of  getting a nut out of  a bird-feeder if  the 
first attempt doesn’t work, and although she can’t answer a ‘why?’ question about her action, we do find 
it natural to say that she’s aware of  failing, trying to find a better way etc. Maybe there’s a kind of  primitive 
egocentricity here; an egocentricity of  points and reasons which attaches to certain actions of  non-
linguistic creatures and distinguishes them from non-intentional but purposive actions like Daisy’s 
blinking. 
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e. Egocentricity and Aquinas’ Feature 
 
In (b) I explained how because (on Anscombe’s view) it displays Theophrastus’ Feature, 
practical knowledge can only take in action which has a point. Here I want to explain 
why a second formal feature of  practical knowledge (according to Anscombe) means 
that it will take in only action whose point is egocentric.  
 
Following Aquinas, Anscombe distinguishes practical and theoretical knowledge as 
follows: 
  
Practical knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’, unlike speculative knowledge, 
which is ‘derived from the objects known’.28  
 
She carries on: 
 
This means more than that practical knowledge is observed to be a necessary condition 
of  the production of  various results; or that an idea of  doing such-and-such in such-
and-such way is such a condition. It means that without it what happens does not come 
under the description – execution of  intentions – whose characteristics we have been 
investigating.29 
 
Velleman also characterised practical knowledge as ‘the cause of  what it understands’ (see 
again Ch. 3, §1(c)), but it is important to distinguish Anscombe’s and Velleman’s version 
of  the characterisation. For Velleman, the idea was that the attitudes which constitute 
practical knowledge – intention-beliefs – are implicated in the aetiology of  intentional 
action; Velleman’s claim is about intentional action’s efficient causes. For Anscombe, the 
claim is about intentional action’s formal cause;30 about what it is for an action to be 
intentional. The idea is that what it is for an action to be intentional is for it to be an 
object of  practical knowledge.  
 
But why should this be? Is the claim meant to be purely analytic – we just do call 
‘intentional’ only actions which are objects of  practical knowledge? Or is there more to 
the idea than this?31 There is more to the idea. For if  intentional actions are actions with 
an egocentric point, this means that their being the intentional action they are is dependent 
on their agents’ thinking of  them as such. For simplicity’s sake, and for now, let’s consider 
why this is by thinking about actions whose point is atomic; I will consider the situation 
for actions whose points are articulate later on (in §2(b)). 
 
I do my Bob Dylan impression just because I feel like it, or for its own sake, which 
means that the only point of  it is that it is a Bob Dylan impression – a Bob Dylan impression is 
what I feel like doing. Ex hypothesi its point is egocentric since I do it intentionally, and 
this means that its having the point it has is dependent on my thinking of  it as having this 
point. And this means that my intentionally doing a Bob Dylan impression is dependent on 
                                                          
28 Anscombe, Intention, 87. 
29 Ibid., 87–88. 
30 Richard Moran gives us an additional way of  understanding the difference between Anscombe’s and 
Velleman’s claims that practical knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’: for Velleman the ‘what it 
understands’ is understood extensionally, whereas for Anscombe it is understood intensionally (Moran, 
“Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge,’” 54). The extensionalist reading seems to rule out an explanation 
of  why actions are intentional only under a description; I think this may be one of  the points Anscombe 
makes in the hard-to-understand Intention §19. See also Hursthouse, “Intention,” 88–89. 
31 Thanks to Richard Holton for pressing me to be clear about this. 
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my recognising what I am doing as a Bob Dylan impression. My judgment about what I 
am doing is required for what I am doing to count as intentional, not for purely analytic 
reasons, but because my behaviour would not be an intentional action unless its point 
was egocentric, and the fact that its point is egocentric means that I must judge myself  to 
be doing a Bob Dylan impression if  I am to be doing something whose point is just that. If  
I judge that I am doing a Bob Dylan impression, and I am doing so then my judgment and 
my performance match up, the performance is successful and I have practical knowledge. 
My practical knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’.    
 
I will extend these considerations later on (in §2(b)&(c)). In §2(b) we will see that actions 
whose points are articulate are themselves internally rationally and temporally structured. 
And in §2(c) I will try to explain how it is the agent’s practical knowledge which is 
responsible for her action’s having this internal structure. Thus we will see another 
dimension to Aquinas’ Feature.  
 
f. Summing up 
 
The aim of  this section has been to elucidate three key notions in Anscombe’s picture: 
the notion of  intentional action, the sense of  ‘Why?RA’ (and at the same time the special 
kind of  explanation proper to intentional action) and, of  most importance to us, the 
notion of  practical knowledge. I came at this task by trying to explain how Anscombe’s 
characterisations of  one of  these notions – intentional action – in terms of  the other two 
– the question ‘Why?RA’ and practical knowledge – really do converge, despite it being 
unclear prima facie why they should.  
 
The resulting picture is of  intentional action as action which has a point, and of  granting 
application to the special question ‘Why?RA’ as showing that one’s action has a point. The 
applicability of  ‘Why?RA’ is dependent on its being granted application by the agent because 
the point of  intentional action is egocentric. Because practical knowledge displays 
Theophrastus’ Feature it takes in only behaviours which have a point and because it 
displays Aquinas’ Feature, it takes in only actions whose point is egocentric. By bringing out 
the various formal features of  intentional action and of  practical knowledge, I have tried 
to show how they fit together; why intentional action should be the formal object of  
practical knowledge. And I have tried to do so at the same time as spelling out the special 
sense of  the question ‘Why?RA’, and trying to make clear why ‘Why?RA’ should be 
applicable of  all and only intentional actions; actions which are objects of  practical 
knowledge.  
 
I will now turn from setting out the details of  Anscombe’s account as I see it, to 
explaining why I think the account is worth paying attention to.  
 
2. Merits and Clarifications 
 
We will consider here why a view on which practical knowledge is characterised by 
Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features is a good one. In (a) I explain why an account of  
practical knowledge as having these two formal features meets the crucial Apparent 
Features and Special Relationship constraints, and does so in a unified way. In (b) I turn to a 
discussion in Intention which suggests that intentional action is internally rationally and 
temporally structured. One result of  this internal structure is that under a given 
description, an intentional action can be represented as present or future. This leads me 
 97
to set out a new constraint on practical knowledge: the Structure-Sensitivity constraint 
requires an account of  practical knowledge to be sensitive to the temporal and rational 
structure of  its object, intentional action. In (c) I return to the idea of  practical 
knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. I explain that seeing Anscombe’s account as one 
on which practical knowledge is constituted by intention, and not by belief, makes it clear 
how easily it meets the Structure-Sensitivity constraint and importantly, that it provides us 
with a further unification: a unification of  Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features. I sum 
up in (d). 
 
a. The Apparent Features and Special Relationship Constraints 
 
I’ll start by explaining how Anscombe’s account meets the Special Relationship constraint 
and move on to considering the Apparent Features constraint.  
 
The Special Relationship constraint requires an account to explain first, why practical 
knowledge is only ever knowledge of  intentional action, and second, why this relationship 
looks particularly tight. The fact that practical knowledge is only ever knowledge of  
intentional action falls out of  thinking of  practical knowledge as having Theophrastus’ 
Feature - as requiring a success not in judgment but in performance, since intentional 
action just is a kind of  successful performance. But it is not any old kind of  successful 
performance, but one the point of  which, and so the success of  which, is determined by 
the agent’s recognition of  its having that point (its point is egocentric). And thinking of  
practical knowledge as having Aquinas’ Feature – as being ‘the cause of  what it 
understands’ - means thinking of  it as a kind of  knowledge which determines its object 
as an intentional action. Theophrastus’ Feature means that only intentional actions are the 
right shape to be its objects, and Aquinas’ Feature means that if  an action is an object of  
practical knowledge (under a certain description), then it will be intentional (under that 
description). On Anscombe’s view, then, an action will be intentional iff  it is an object of  
practical knowledge, and the relationship is a conceptual one. The relationship 
Anscombe sees existing between intentional action and practical knowledge is certainly a 
special one: intentional action is the formal object of  practical knowledge. So her account 
meets the Special Relationship constraint.  
 
And it meets it by more than simple fiat. To re-cap an idea from §1(e), the claim that 
practical knowledge is the cause of  what it understands is not to be understood purely 
metalinguistically, as the claim that we – as a matter of  brute fact – tend to call 
‘intentional’ only actions which are objects of  our knowledge, and that the knowledge in 
such cases is given the name ‘practical’. The claim that practical knowledge is the cause 
of  what it understands is metaphysically thick – there is something we can say about why 
it is true, which adverts to something weightier than a merely analytic connection 
between ‘intentional action’ and ‘practical knowledge’. It is because of  certain structural 
features of  both intentional action and practical knowledge that the two fit – essentially - 
together. The point of  intentional action is egocentric, which is to say that one’s action 
cannot be intentional unless one recognises its point, and this means that the agent must 
judge the action to be of  a certain kind, where its being of  this kind is necessary for it to 
be intentional. In the example above this meant that I could not be acting intentionally 
under the description doing a Bob Dylan impression unless I recognised what I was doing as 
a Bob Dylan impression. And – returning to Theophrastus’ Feature – I would know this just 
in case I made no mistake in performance (just in case the impression sounds like Bob 
Dylan and not like Tom Waits), which meant that as long as I was doing a Bob Dylan 
impression, I would know that I was.  
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The Apparent Features constraint requires an account to accommodate or explain away 
practical knowledge’s apparent FPA, epistemic ungroundedness and psychological immediacy. 
Aquinas’ Feature explains why practical knowledge displays FPA: it is only because I have 
practical knowledge that I am typing, that I am typing intentionally. Nobody else’s 
knowledge of  what I am doing can play this role in constituting my typing as intentional. 
This underwrites a clear first-/third-person asymmetry in relation to facts about what a 
person is intentionally doing. The asymmetry does not mean that I am infallible about 
what I am doing intentionally. I would fail to know that I am typing ‘causal’ if  I am 
typing ‘casual’ instead. And it needn’t mean that I am necessarily any more confident about 
what I am intentionally doing than someone else might be. You may not be able to 
intelligibly doubt that I am intentionally typing if, say, you are watching me whilst I do it. 
But my authority survives even in such a case. It is, in Anthony Kenny’s phrase “the 
authority of  the judge, not of  the witness”;32 even an expert witness like you who are 
observing me type. My authority is not so much about my being in a better epistemic 
position than you are. It is rather that my epistemic position is – as yours is not - one on 
which my action’s being intentional metaphysically depends.   
 
Anscombe is famous for thinking that practical knowledge is not based on observation 
or evidence, but I did not consider this when setting out her view in §1 at all. I had a 
reason for that – it would have distracted from my task in §1, which was to set out the 
main formal features of  practical knowledge, as (I think) Anscombe sees it. And I think it 
is misleading to think of  epistemic ungroundedness as one of  its fundamental formal 
features.33 This feature of  practical knowledge is, for Anscombe, a clue to what it must be 
like, i.e. knowledge which displays Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features.  
 
But with the formal properties of  practical knowledge explained, we can now explain why 
it should be epistemically ungrounded. Consider why theoretical knowledge would be 
epistemically grounded in observation or evidence (or testimony or whatever else). For 
knowledge which involves a successful judgment, the standard for which is set by the facts, 
observation and the appreciation of  evidence can act as means for judgmental success – 
for getting our judgments in line with the facts. But for knowledge which involves a 
successful performance, the standard for which is set by the agent’s judgment, there is no 
need to rely on observation or evidence, because one’s judgment doesn’t need to do any 
lining-up; that is the responsibility of  one’s performance. Although (as we remarked in 
Chapter One (§2(b)) observation and evidence might guide one’s performance itself, they 
do not – in so doing – act as reasons for believing that one is doing what one is doing. So 
they do not epistemically ground one’s practical knowledge that one is doing what one is 
doing. If  what I am aiming to do is to cycle into town, feeling that there is a strong 
crosswind, and having my eyes open the whole way will both be very helpful – perhaps 
necessary for success – but these bits of  perceptual knowledge do not act as epistemic 
grounds.  
 
Aquinas’ Feature is relevant here too. For if  practical knowledge is the cause of  what it 
understands, then the object of  practical knowledge is simply not available to be known 
on any epistemic basis unless the agent already has practical knowledge of  it. I could only 
know that I was typing ‘causal’ on the basis of  observation if  I was not typing ‘causal’ 
intentionally. If  I am, any observations I make must be secondary to my practical – non-
                                                          
32 Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, 6. Moran makes a similar point about practical knowledge’s FPA in  
“Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge,’” 68. 
33 Starting from here would lead us to look “hopelessly for the different mode of  contemplative knowledge in 
acting, as if  there were a very queer sort of  seeing eye in the middle of  acting.” (Anscombe, Intention, 57.) 
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observational – knowledge. The same goes for any evidence I might have to think I’m 
typing ‘causal’.34 Thinking of  practical knowledge as having both Theophrastus’ and 
Aquinas’ Features happily explains why it would – indeed must – be (and so appear) 
epistemically ungrounded.  
 
Aquinas’ Feature also explains why practical knowledge should be (and so appear) 
psychologically immediate: Aquinas’ Feature means that if  I am intentionally typing, it is 
because I know that I am. So there is no room for considering whether I am, consistently 
with my doing so intentionally and there is no room to notice, find out, discover (etc.) that I 
am intentionally typing. I can find out that I am doing something, but not that I am doing 
something intentionally. Aquinas’ Feature easily explains practical knowledge’s psychological 
immediacy.  
 
So Anscombe accommodates all three of  practical knowledge’s apparent features, and 
she needs to explain none away. Given our commonsense-human methodology, this is a 
further benefit of  her account. And because both the Apparent Features and the Special 
Relationship constraint are met in virtue of  thinking of  practical knowledge as having the 
two fundamental formal features it has – Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features - 
Anscombe’s account meets these two constraints in a unified way. This is a further benefit 
of  her account; it means that no further explanation needs to be given as to why the 
apparent features of  practical knowledge cluster together in knowledge of  intentional 
action; why knowledge with a certain content should have the combination of  unusual 
features it has. 
 
b. The Structure-Sensitivity Constraint 
 
Here I will explain, with reference to a discussion within Intention which we have not yet 
come across, why it appears that when an intentional action is done for reasons, it is 
internally structured by those reasons. This is important to our account of  practical 
knowledge, I will suggest, because it ought to make us expect practical knowledge to take in 
the agent’s future intentional actions as well as her ongoing ones, and to be sensitive to 
her practical reasons. These demands will feature in a new constraint on an account of  
practical knowledge, the Structure-Sensitivity constraint. We will see how Anscombe meets 
this constraint in (c). 
 
Anscombe’s ideas about the internal structure of  intentional action can be gleaned from 
her discussion of  the following ‘concrete situation’:  
 
A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drinking water of  a house. 
Someone has found a way of  systematically contaminating the source with a deadly 
cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until they can no longer be cured. The 
house is regularly inhabited by a small group of  party chiefs, with their immediate 
families, who are in control of  a great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews 
and perhaps plan a world war. – The man who contaminated the source has calculated 
that if  these people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will govern 
well, or even institute the Kingdom of  Heaven on earth and secure a good life for all the 
people; and he has revealed the calculation, together with the fact about the poison, to 
the man who is pumping. 35 
                                                          
34 For similar thoughts see Moran, “Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge,’” esp. §4 and Hursthouse, 
“Intention,” 103. I will briefly consider the relationship between practical and theoretical knowledge later 
on (Ch. 6, §4(e)). 
35 Anscombe, Intention, 37. 
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Anscombe asks whether we should think of  the various descriptions of  Pumping Man’s 
activity as each picking out a separate intentional action, or as distinct descriptions under 
which some one action is intentional. She answers in favour of  the latter view: he is 
performing one action which is internally structured (or, in the language of  §1, whose 
point is articulated) according to the man’s intentions. I will try to explain here why the 
latter view seems more appropriate.  
  
Imagine we ask Pumping Man whyRA he is behaving as he is, and he responds by giving 
the various intentions with which he is acting (we ignore what backwards-looking 
motives or interpretative motives he might give for simplicity). We ask whyRA he is (A) 
moving his arm up and down and he says that he is (B) pumping water up to the house. Successive 
‘Why?RA’ questions give the results that he is B-ing in order to (C) replenish the water supply; 
C-ing in order to (D) poison the household and D-ing in order to (E) get good men into power. In 
giving us his intentions he has given us a collection of  action-descriptions. The 
descriptions form a chain, in which each description is linked to later ones by ‘in order 
to’.  
 
An important observation is that not all of  the descriptions in this chain relate to one 
another in the same way:  
 
… there is a break in the series of  answers that one may get to [the question ‘WhyRA are 
you X-ing?’]. Let the answer contain a further description Y, then sometimes it is correct 
to say not merely: the man is X-ing, but also: ‘the man is Y-ing’ – if, that is, nothing 
falsifying the statement ‘He is Y-ing’ can be observed. E.g. ‘Why are you pumping?’ – ‘To 
replenish the water supply’. If  this was the answer, then we can say ‘He is replenishing 
the water supply’; unless indeed, he is not.36 
 
The descriptions before the break characterise what he is doing whereas after it the chain 
is made up of  descriptions of  what he is going to do (for simplicity we assume that his 
intentions will get executed), and at which his current action is aimed. For example, his 
claim that he is (B) pumping water up to the house in order to (C) replenish the water supply 
might entail that he is replenishing the water supply, whilst his claim that he is (C) replenishing the 
water supply in order to (E) get good men into power might not entail that he is getting good men 
into power. The break would here occur somewhere between (C) and (E).  
 
There are two important things to note about the break. First, it is not sharp: 
 
… is there much to choose between ‘She is making tea’ and ‘She is putting the kettle on 
in order to make tea’? Obviously not.37 
 
In relation to Pumping Man’s action, he might say equally coherently whilst moving his 
arm up and down that he is replenishing the water supply or that he is going to replenish the 
water supply, and that he is moving his arm up and down in order to do so. Importantly 
this means that replenishing the water supply can be represented equally as present or as 
future - within a certain boundary, what someone is currently doing and what they are going 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 38–9. Anscombe explains that the qualification ‘unless he is not’ does not render her claim 
tautologous. The reason is that what we infer is not simply that replenishing the water supply is something he 
is doing, but further, that he is doing it intentionally. What we infer thus has more content that what we 
inferred it from. 
37 Ibid., 40. 
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to do in the future can be one and the same. The ‘break’ is vague, and descriptions within its 
penumbra apply to action conceived as present and as future.38 
 
Second, the break is not static (Anscombe does not say this explicitly but it is suggested 
by her commentary): its position moves over time along the chain of  descriptions. At a 
certain point in time – when he’s just started doing so – we might not be happy to infer 
from the fact that he is moving his arm up and down in order to replenish the water supply 
to the conclusion that he is replenishing it. But at a later time, we might be happy to make 
this inference. At the earlier time the break comes between (A) and (C), and at the later 
time it comes after (C). In a slightly different example, I am (A*) putting on the kettle in 
order to (B*) make a cup of  tea in order to (C*) give Bev a cuppa in order to (D*) cheer her up. 
Here you might not now be happy to infer from the fact that I am (A*) putting on the 
kettle in order to (D*) cheer up Bev that I am (now) cheering up Bev, but you might a bit 
later be happy to infer from the fact that I am (C*) giving Bev a cuppa in order to cheer 
her up that I am (D*) cheering her up. Here the break moves from somewhere before (D*) 
at the earlier time, to somewhere after (D*) at the later time. (The examples are slightly 
different because in the second example I no longer count as (A*)-ing at the later time, 
whereas in the first I still count as (A)-ing at the later time. I won’t consider further 
implications of  these different kinds of  case.) That an agent was not doing something at 
an earlier stage which they are doing at a later stage is not an interesting point – although 
it is of  course true. What is interesting is that ‘the break’ Anscombe speaks of  has a 
different position in the same string of  action-descriptions (or: intentions), depending on how 
far things have progressed. 
 
These considerations help us see why Anscombe wants to say that Pumping Man is 
performing just one action which is intentional under various descriptions, rather than 
many different intentional actions. Because the break is not sharp, there are cases in which 
the answer to the question what he is doing and the question what he is going to do converge 
on the same description. And because the break is not static, there are some temporal 
perspectives from which these questions don’t converge on the same description, and 
other temporal perspectives from which they do. With this in mind, the point of  saying 
that each description picks out a distinct intentional action breaks down. If  each action were 
distinct we would have to think of  them as merging into and out of  one another over 
time, and commonsense doesn’t think of  things in this way. Instead it sees intentional 
actions as unfolding over time, and from a given temporal perspective, having parts which 
are past, present and future. This is much more consistent with the idea that there is just 
one action here, which is not only intentional under various descriptions, but which is 
conceived as present or future depending on the description under which it is considered.  
 
Intentional action is best seen as internally temporally structured by the various 
descriptions which apply to it. Within the penumbra of  the break, Pumping Man is not 
performing several accidentally related intentional actions at the same time, but his 
moving his arm up and down is (in the circumstances) his pumping, and so on. And the 
movability of  the break suggests that his present and future actions are not merely 
accidentally related either. The fact that he is now pumping with the intention of  (e.g.) 
getting good men into power means that if  he succeeds in getting good men into power 
by pumping, he will do so intentionally. 
 
It is by responding to ‘WhyRA’ in the way he does that Pumping Man makes clear the 
internal structure of  his action. This shows that it is his reasons (in this case his intentions) 
                                                          
38 For more discussion see Falvey, “Knowledge in Intention,” and Thompson, “Naive Action Theory.”  
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which are responsible for his action’s internal structure: his action is structured by his 
practical reasons. By expressing the reasons, he articulates the point of  his (e.g.) pumping, 
thus telling us both what else he is doing in pumping (here his intention is present-
directed), and telling us what he will be doing (here his intention is future-directed). So in 
saying whyRA he is acting, he is also telling us what he is, and will be doing.  
 
I can now keep my promise to explain a further dimension of  Aquinas’ Feature. In §1(e) 
I explained how in relation to an action whose point is atomic, knowing what one is doing 
under a certain description (‘doing a Bob Dylan impression’ in that case) renders that 
action intentional. But here we can add that many actions are intentional under more 
than one description, the descriptions and the way in which they link together being 
determined by the agent’s practical reasons. An action’s point is articulated by the agent’s 
practical reasons, and the internal structure of  this articulation is the very internal 
structure of  intentional action itself  (again, recall we are assuming no mistake in 
performance is made). This internal structure gives the identity of  an action, and so the 
action’s identity is determined by what the agent thinks of  themselves as doing, which in 
turn is determined by the agent’s reasons for action.  
 
Again, then, practical knowledge is ‘the cause of  what it understands’, but here – unlike in 
the Bob Dylan impression example – the ‘what it understands’ is not given by a single 
action-description, but by a chain of  action-descriptions, tied together as descriptions of  
the same action by the agent’s recognition of  the means-end relations between them or, by 
the explanation the agent would give of  what they are doing in terms of  their practical 
reasons. In complex intentional actions like Pumping Man’s, the present and the future 
are bound together, and they are bound together by the agent’s self-conception. It is internal to 
intentional actions that they can be so structured, because their points can be articulated. 
The question ‘Why?RA’ is the tool we have for uncovering this structure. 
 
If  intentional action can have present and future aspects which are inextricably linked, we 
ought to expect practical knowledge to take in its object – intentional action – under 
both present and future aspects. And given that this structure is determined by the 
agent’s practical reasons, we should expect practical knowledge to be sensitive to these 
too. This is why Anscombe says that “the notion of  ‘practical knowledge’ can only be 
understood if  we first understand ‘practical reasoning’.”39 We can now set out a further 
constraint on a good account of  practical knowledge:40 
 
 
The Structure-Sensitivity Constraint  
 
A good account of  practical knowledge ought to see it as sensitive to the internal 
rational and temporal structure of  intentional action.  
 
                                                          
39 Anscombe, Intention, 57. This comment introduces Anscombe’s discussion of  Aristotle’s account of  
practical reasoning in Intention §§33-44, but at the end of  that discussion, Anscombe says: “… the 
interest of  [Aristotle’s] account is that it describes an order which is there whenever actions are done 
with intentions; the same order as I arrived at in discussing what ‘the intentional action’ was, when the man 
was pumping water.” (Ibid., 80.) This is a reiteration of  the point that when someone acts for reasons, 
her action is itself  structured by those reasons. For discussion see esp. Anscombe, “Thought and Action 
in Aristotle: What Is Practical Truth?” and “Practical Inference,” Mothersill, “Anscombe’s Account of  
the Practical Syllogism” and Vogler, “Anscombe on Practical Inference.” 
40 Some remarks of  Rosalind Hursthouse’s suggest that being able to meet the Structure-Sensitivity Constraint 
may require rejecting CTA. (Hursthouse, “Intention,” 95.) This is intriguing but I cannot pursue it here. 
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If  intentional action has a certain shape, we should expect this to be picked up by the 
faculty of  practical knowledge, given that the faculty of  practical knowledge takes in 
action qua intentional. We will see exactly how Anscombe’s account does this in the next 
section, after I have filled in a final, and very important, piece of  Anscombe’s account. 
 
c. Knowledge “in Intention” 
 
It is tempting to read ‘judgment’, wherever it occurs, as ‘belief ’, or as some mental act 
which precipitates a belief. But here I want to suggest that we are better off  reading 
‘judgment’ as it appears in Intention neutrally between ‘belief ’ and ‘intention’. The 
successful judgments which constitute theoretical knowledge are indeed to be understood 
as beliefs, but the judgments which set standards on successful performance – the 
judgments relevant to practical knowledge – are not beliefs but intentions. This is how I 
understand Anscombe’s claim that practical knowledge is knowledge “in intention”:41 an 
agent’s practical knowledge is constituted by her intention, on the condition of  successful 
performance. Practical and theoretical knowledge differ at bottom in being constituted by 
distinct psychological attitudes. Anscombe is presenting a Non-Cognitivist version of  
Intentionalism - NCI. 
 
Accepting NCI gives us a unified account of  why practical knowledge displays 
Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features. We have already seen how these features explain 
practical knowledge’s apparent features and its special relationship to intentional action. 
Below we will see that NCI very easily meets our new Structure-Sensitivity constraint.   
  
On Anscombe’s understanding of  things, intentions are distinct from beliefs in terms of  
the normative relation each attitude bears to what it represents.42 Beliefs are attitudes 
whose correctness depends on how things are in the world, whereas intentions are 
attitudes which are themselves standards of  correctness for how things (performances) 
are to turn out. It is easy to see how practical knowledge might involve a successful 
performance and not a successful judgment if  the judgment involved is intention, 
because intention is precisely a kind of  judgment to which performances are answerable, 
and in relation to which performances can be successful or otherwise depending on 
whether they match it. 
 
Thinking of  the judgment involved in practical knowledge as intention also explains why 
practical knowledge would display Aquinas’ Feature. The object of  practical knowledge 
is, as we know, an intentional action. This is a quick way of  saying that the object of  
practical knowledge is action which is intentional under some description. The descriptions 
under which someone has practical knowledge of  what they are doing are exactly the 
descriptions under which their actions are intentional. And it is the agent’s intention 
which determines the descriptions under which her action is intentional. This means that 
it is the agent’s intentions which formally characterise the object of  practical knowledge. If  
the agent’s intentions are also the judgments involved in practical knowledge, then it is 
easy to see how her knowledge will be the (formal) cause of  what it understands: the 
agent’s intention determines the description under which an action must fall if  it is to be 
intentional. And if  an action does fall under this description, because there is no mistake 
in performance, the agent has knowledge (Theophrastus again).  
                                                          
41 Anscombe, Intention, 57. 
42 The point is usually made by saying that belief  and intention have different ‘directions of  fit’, and I have 
used this language in previous Chapters. But Anscombe doesn’t use this terminology. There are reasons 
to worry about the ‘direction of  fit’ terminology; see Ch. 6, n. 1. 
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It is for related reasons that NCI happily meets our new Structure-Sensitivity constraint. 
Our discussion of  Pumping Man showed that his action was internally temporally and 
rationally structured by his intentions, which he gave in his answers to our successive 
‘Why?RA’ questions. We can ask a similar question about his intentions to the question we 
asked about his intentional actions: are there as many intentions as there are descriptions 
given in his responses to ‘Why?RA’? Or is there just one intention, with a complex 
content; an intention to do A in order to B, in order to C, in order to D (or: to E by D-ing, by C-
ing, by B-ing, by A-ing)? Here is what Anscombe says: 
  
… when we speak of  [n] intentions, we are speaking of  the character of  being 
intentional that belongs to the act in each of  the [n] descriptions; but when we speak of  
one intention, we are speaking of  […] the intention with which the act in each of  its 
other descriptions was done, and this intention so to speak swallows up all the preceding 
intentions with which earlier members of  the series were done. The mark of  this 
‘swallowing up’ is that it is not wrong to give D as the answer to the question [‘Why?RA’] 
about A; A’s being done with B as intention does not mean that D is only indirectly the 
intention of  A…43 
 
Just as we can talk of  one action which is internally structured, we can talk equally of  one 
internally complex intention: the last intention in the chain ‘swallows up’ – and so contains 
– the preceding ones in the chain. So we can think of  his action as being the intentional 
internally complex action it is in virtue of  being the execution of  his intention which is 
itself  internally complex; the internally complex intention is manifested in an 
isomorphically internally complex intentional action. 
 
The Structure-Sensitivity constraint demanded an account of  practical knowledge to be 
sensitive to the internal rational and temporal structure of  intentional action. And if  
practical knowledge is constituted by intention (if  intentions are the judgments involved in 
practical knowledge), and if  intentions are themselves internally structured 
isomorphically to the action which is their execution, no further questions remain about 
how practical knowledge manages to be sensitive to intentional action’s internal structure. 
Indeed if  practical knowledge is constituted by intention, understood in this way, it could 
not but be sensitive to intentional action’s internal structure because it determines this 
structure (again: it is the cause of  what it understands – only action which comes under 
the descriptions internal to the intention will be an intentional action; will be a successful 
performance and so will be an object of  practical knowledge).  
 
I will not argue that a conception of  practical knowledge as belief-constituted (either CI 
or a non-Intentionalist account like O’Brien’s or Paul’s) could not meet the explanatory 
challenge set by the Structure-Sensitivity constraint. But a view of  practical knowledge as 
belief-constituted would have to explain why someone’s beliefs about what they are doing 
would tend to go along with beliefs about what they were going to do, and to explain the 
interconnectedness of  these beliefs with agent’s practical reasons (if  any). It’s not that 
such an explanation must be hard to come by, it’s just that on NCI no such explanation 
even needs to be given – on the contrary, practical knowledge could not but take in these 
various kinds of  object, if  it is constituted by intention, understood non-Cognitively and 
as itself  internally structured.  
 
Before summing up this section it is worth making a clarification. Some have interpreted 
Anscombe as thinking of  practical knowledge as knowledge that one has of  what one is 
                                                          
43 Anscombe, Intention, 46. 
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doing in virtue of  knowing why one is doing it. But if  NCI is Anscombe’s view, this is not 
quite right. NCI is a view on which it is in virtue of having intentions (which may or may 
not be further articulated by one’s practical reasons) that one has practical knowledge of  
one’s action (assuming no mistake in performance).  
 
The view of  practical knowledge as knowledge of one’s reasons would make it impossible 
to have practical knowledge of  those intentional actions we do for no reason; whose 
point I called ‘atomic’. But on the view I am attributing to Anscombe, we can and do have 
practical knowledge of  these intentional actions. I have practical knowledge that I am 
doing my Bob Dylan impression just in case I am doing it in execution of  my intention. 
It is because I intend to do it that this action has a point. And it is because it has a point 
that it can constitute a successful performance. It is successful just insofar as it is the 
execution of  my intention, and if  it is, I have practical knowledge.  
 
We are encouraged to reject – as an interpretation of  Anscombe - the view on which 
practical knowledge is (inter alia) knowledge of  reasons (including intentions) by 
Anscombe’s commitment to the view that knowledge presupposes the possibility of  
brute intelligible error. I fail in theoretical knowledge if  my belief  is mistaken; I fail in 
practical knowledge if  my performance is mistaken, and intelligible examples of  both kinds 
of  case abound. But being wrong about why I am acting tends to suggest self-deception, 
confusion or some other assault to my intelligibility. So we ought not interpret Anscombe 
as thinking that we know what we are doing (will do) by knowing why we are doing (will 
do) it. Rather, we know what we are doing and will do in virtue of  intending to do it. 
When these intentions are executed (whether internally structured or atomic) – when 
there is no mistake in performance – they constitute practical knowledge. This is NCI’s 
conception of  practical knowledge. 
 
d. Summing up 
 
Anscombe’s conception of  practical knowledge met the Apparent Features and Special 
Relationship constraints in a unified way, in virtue of  displaying two fundamental formal 
features which distinguished it from theoretical knowledge: Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ 
Features. Thinking of  practical knowledge as constituted by intention, understood non-
cognitively, explains why it should display both features, and leaves no explanatory work 
to be done in order to meet our new Structure-Sensitivity constraint. And it does all this in a 
unified way. So NCI has significant explanatory power. Additionally, on NCI, all three of  
practical knowledge’s apparent features are accommodated as actual features. And given 
that our guiding principle throughout is to do justice, where possible, to our 
commonsense-human understanding of  things, this is a further significant benefit of  
NCI. 
 
Let’s zoom out a bit and think about NCI in comparison to the other accounts we have 
been considering. These all conceived practical knowledge as constituted by belief, and in 
so doing they put themselves under a certain explanatory demand: for a belief  to 
constitute knowledge it must not only be true, but must be held in favourable epistemic 
circumstances, as demanded by the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge. What are these 
circumstances? O’Brien, Paul, Velleman and Setiya all accepted the need to respond to 
this question, and responded to it in different ways. But none of  their answers were 
entirely adequate.  
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Anscombe side-steps this explanatory demand. According to NCI, practical knowledge is 
not epistemically grounded in any way. Recall Velleman’s worry about such a suggestion, 
that it makes “epistemological exceptions” in practical knowledge’s favour by denying 
that it is subject to the usual epistemological requirements on knowing.44 Velleman 
interprets Anscombe as simply not being able to see what evidence practical knowledge 
might be based on.45 But this is a mistake. Anscombe thinks of  practical knowledge as a 
kind of  knowledge formally such as to rule out an evidential – or any other epistemic – 
basis. Knowledge which displays Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features not only need not 
but could not be grounded in any kind of  epistemic justification.  
 
Anscombe gives us a way of  thinking about practical knowledge on which its epistemic 
ungroundedness (as well as its FPA and psychological immediacy) are not puzzles to be 
solved, but on which they are necessary concomitants of  the fact that practical 
knowledge is fundamentally formally distinct from theoretical knowledge. Underwriting 
these differences – I have suggested - is a difference in the attitude constituting practical 
and theoretical knowledge. Whereas theoretical knowledge is constituted by belief, 
practical knowledge is constituted by intention.  
 
But NCI is not without its challenges. I will consider three in the next section. 
 
3. Three Prima Facie Problems 
The first challenge takes up some worries we have already come across when discussing 
Lucy O’Brien’s view of  practical knowledge, and I mention them here mostly to put 
them to one side. The second two worries are more serious. I will not seek to solve them 
here – that will be the work of  Chapter Six, where I will defend a view of  practical 
knowledge very closely related to NCI, which I think can meet all of  our constraints.  
 
a. Too Special a Relationship? 
I said that Anscombe did well on the Special Relationship constraint because of  her view 
that practical knowledge displays Aquinas’ Feature. Thinking of  practical knowledge as 
‘the cause of  what it understands’ seems to entail a commitment to the idea that an 
action will be an object of  practical knowledge under all descriptions under which it is 
intentional. But many have thought – as we have already seen (Ch.1, §3(b); Ch. 2, §1(c)), 
that this claim is too strong; it seems to admit of  counterexamples.  
As we saw in Chapter One, the quintessential version of  this kind of  example is 
Davidson’s example of  the man making ten carbon copies, but I am going to concentrate 
on O’Brien’s example of  Bev playing snooker instead. First, because we have already 
discussed O’Brien’s example in some detail, but second because I think that O’Brien’s 
case is actually harder for a view like NCI to cope with than Davidson’s, for there is a 
kind of  response to Davidson’s case which is not available in relation to O’Brien’s. The 
relevant difference is that making ten carbon copies is something you can still be doing even 
if  your first attempt doesn’t work out. You’d simply take the successful sheets off  the top 
and carry on. The response is that if  this counterfactual is true of  the carbon copier then 
he does know that he is making ten carbon copies – even if  he’s surprised that his first 
                                                          
44 Velleman, Practical Reflection, 25. 
45 “… the evidence [on which practical knowledge is based] has escaped Anscombe’s attention because the 
agent’s conception of  his action isn’t and could not have been derived from it.” (Ibid., 105.)  
 107
attempt worked (perhaps he is not intentionally making ten carbon copies in one go but this 
needn’t mean he is not intentionally making ten carbon copies). And if  the counterfactual is 
false, he’s not making the ten copies intentionally. Michael Thompson makes roughly this 
argument.46 But potting the (this) pink is an action one only ever gets one go at, which 
means that this kind of  counterfactual is not relevant in O’Brien’s example, so this kind 
of  response cannot be given.  
O’Brien thought Bev could intentionally pot the pink but fail to be authoritative about 
the fact she was doing so and so lack practical knowledge that she was. I complained 
there that O’Brien wrongly generalises from this example in at least two ways (§1(d)). But 
Anscombe’s critics do not need an example which will generalise; they just need one case 
in which an agent acts intentionally under some description, but lacks practical 
knowledge under that description.  
My thought is that when we consider the case in detail, it becomes less obvious that Bev 
really does both intentionally pot the pink, and lack practical knowledge of  what she is 
doing. And indeed for any case, the extent to which we are suspicious about whether the 
agent has practical knowledge that they are doing something under some description, 
roughly equals the extent to which we are suspicious about whether they are acting 
intentionally under that description, at least when we think it through. 
 
Compare again Bev’s pink-potting with Ronnie’s. Imagine again that on point of  the 
physics of  the table, things are just the same in Bev’s and in Ronnie’s shots. And recall 
that Bev doesn’t know, as she strikes the cue-ball, whether she is potting the pink, 
whereas (ex hypothesi) Ronnie does. Bev doesn’t know this because she doesn’t know the 
pink will go in, whereas Ronnie knows the pink will go in because he knows he’s potting it. 
This was what I suggested in Chapter Two (§1(d)). 
 
These differences are underwritten by the fact that for Bev, luck plays a rather large role, 
and expertise and skill a very minor one, whereas for Ronnie it is the other way round. 
Given that Ronnie is skilled and Bev is not, this is not a contingent feature of  the case. 
Being skilled in some domain just is narrowing down the role which luck is likely to play 
in one’s successes in that domain, and being unskilled just is having one’s successes in that 
domain owe a large debt to luck. For these reasons I think we might be differentially 
happy to say of  Bev and of  Ronnie, that they pot the pink intentionally, for the concept of  
intentional action is one which to a certain extent squeezes out that of  luckily achieving 
one’s aims. 
 
I can aim to win the lottery – I do so when I buy a ticket. So why can’t I win the lottery 
intentionally? Because there is no way of  achieving this aim which is does not owe a very 
large debt to luck. What about winning at Chess? I can aim at this too, but can I do this 
intentionally? Well it depends on the case. If  I am playing an averagely intelligent eight-
year old child, I can win intentionally because winning here is something I can do without 
relying very much on luck. But if  I am playing Deep Blue, winning is almost impossible 
for me to do, but it is completely impossible for me to do without relying much on luck. 
And it is completely impossible for me to do intentionally. Can I cycle into town, make a 
cup of  tea, write a thank-you letter or finish a chapter of  my Thesis intentionally? 
Typically, yes. It needn’t be easy to do all these things (which is why I include the final 
example), but being able to do them without relying on luck doesn’t require being able to do 
                                                          
46 Thompson, “Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge,” 209–210. 
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them at the drop of  a hat. Again, doing something intentionally seems to require meeting 
one’s aims without relying very much on luck. 
 
Bev’s potting the pink is not like my beating Deep Blue at chess. But nor is it like my 
beating the eight-year-old. There is a scale running from those aims we achieve purely by 
luck to those aims we achieve independently of  luck playing any role at all (Given that we 
are necessarily hostage to worldly impingements, we might expect the terminal points of  
this scale to be unoccupied by any actual action.) And the closer to the ‘pure luck’ end of  
this scale the achievement of  an aim sits, the less happy we would be to say that it 
represents the execution of  an intention; that the aim was achieved intentionally.  
 
Further, I think that the degree to which we are happy to say that someone’s knowledge of  
what they are doing explains their knowledge that they will achieve their aim in acting, 
maps on to the position of  the achievement of  that aim on our scale. More concretely, 
because we are happy to say that Ronnie knows that the pink is going in because he knows 
that he is potting it, we think of  his potting the pink as rather close to the ‘no-luck’ end 
of  the scale. Whereas because Bev needed to wait and see whether the pink was going in, 
in order to know that she was potting it, we are happier to say that luck played a relatively 
central role in her potting it, and so – I claim - less happy to say that she intentionally 
potted it.  
 
I don’t want to say that there are no reasons to say that Bev potted the pink intentionally. 
If  I said that it would leave it mysterious why examples like O’Brien’s and Davidson’s 
have seemed so compelling. Instead the thought is that there are some reasons to deny 
that Bev’s pink-potting is intentional which do not exist in Ronnie’s case, viz. that luck 
plays a relatively large role in Bev’s pink-potting but not in Ronnie’s. And for this reason, 
Bev’s pink-potting is not straightforwardly an example in which someone does something 
which is intentional under some description but is not an object of  practical knowledge 
under that description. I will leave the case to one side for now, but will have more to say 
about it in Chapter Six (§2(b)), for my discussion there will make available a slightly more 
nuanced understanding of  the special relationship between practical knowledge and 
intentional action. 
 
b. Two big (prima facie) problems: Our three remaining Constraints 
 
The second and third problems cannot be put aside so easily. I have not considered in 
the foregoing how NCI fares on two of  our constraints - the Why Knowledge? constraint 
and the Intention-Content constraint. And the worries are that it will not meet the former, 
and that meeting the latter leaves it mysterious why practical knowledge should be – as it 
is - a kind of  propositional knowledge. The second problem will lead me to add a final 
constraint to our set.  
 
It is important to NCI that practical and theoretical knowledge are formally distinct, 
since it is their formal differences which explain practical knowledge’s philosophically 
interesting features. The features turn out, on Anscombe’s view, to be puzzling only given 
what she calls our “incorrigibly contemplative conception of  knowledge”.47 Practical 
knowledge is not puzzling as long as we free ourselves from the idea that all knowledge is 
constituted by belief, requires a successful judgment, and is ‘derived from the objects 
known’. In the language I have been using throughout this Thesis, what Anscombe 
                                                          
47 Anscombe, Intention, 57. 
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thinks we need to do is to free ourselves from the assumption that all knowledge is 
structured by the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge.  
 
But the “contemplative conception of  knowledge” - the view that all knowledge fits the 
Standard Metaphysics - needn’t be held on the basis of  prejudice. It is likely to simply 
seem hard to understand how a kind of  knowledge could possibly be as Anscombe 
describes it. First, how could knowledge fail to be constituted by a true belief  held in 
epistemically favourable circumstances – how could something which fails to fit the 
Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge be a kind of  knowledge in anything but name? And 
second, how could knowledge be constituted by intention just on the condition that that 
there is no failure of  performance? Isn’t Anscombe, in holding this, equating knowing that 
one is doing something with intentionally doing it? But intentionally doing something is not an 
epistemic phenomenon – it is an action-theoretic one. So don’t we need to hold on to the 
idea that whatever practical knowledge looks like, it must display the Standard 
Metaphysics? Isn’t that the only way to understand any phenomenon as a knowledge-
phenomenon?  
 
If  we can’t explain how executing an intention could possibly be a kind of  knowledge then 
we will have to reject NCI as failing to meet the Why Knowledge? constraint. And note that 
its failure will be much more serious than the failures we have seen so far in relation to 
this constraint. For our other protagonists (Paul, Velleman and maybe Setiya) failed to 
meet it because they failed – in their own ways – to give a complete description of  the 
favourable epistemic conditions under which a true belief  about what one is doing gets 
elevated to knowledge-status. But they were nonetheless all working within a paradigm - 
that of  the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge - in which it is clear how, pending a filling-
in of  the favourable epistemic condition, the structure they are describing would be the 
structure of  a kind of  knowledge. But Anscombe’s ‘Why Knowledge?’ problem is of  a 
different order. The problem for NCI is not in the details, but in the whole idea that 
knowledge might be constituted in a belief-free way, simply by the execution of  intention.  
 
The second problem also relates to the idea that practical knowledge is intention-
constituted, and concerns how to understand intentions. I have not explicitly attributed 
to Anscombe the view that intentions are not propositional attitudes, and nothing in her 
account commits her to Propositionalism. But if  NCI is to meet the Intention-Content 
constraint, it must conceive of  intentions as at least in their fundamental form, non-
propositional.48 The worry is that meeting the Intention-Content constraints seems prima 
facie inconsistent with meeting a final constraint, which we can now state: 
  
 The Knowledge-Content Constraint 
 
An adequate account of  practical knowledge ought not to leave it mysterious why 
practical knowledge is a kind of  propositional knowledge. 
 
How could a non-propositional attitude possibly constitute a kind of  propositional knowledge?49 
This is a worry for Anscombe’s view if  we build into it a rejection of  Propositionalism. 
But it is also a worry for any version of  Intentionalism. For an Intentionalism which accepts 
                                                          
48 Anscombe certainly thinks that intentions can be expressed using indicative statements, but as I pointed 
out at the end of  Chapter Four (§3(b)), the content of  an attitude does not in general match the content 
of  its linguistic expression.  
49 McDowell thought that it couldn’t, recall Ch. 4, n. 3. 
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Propositionalism will flout the Intention-Content constraint, whereas an Intentionalism which 
rejects Propositionalism looks set to flout the Knowledge-Content constraint. 
 
An account which flouts any of  these three constraints; the Why Knowledge? constraint, 
the Intention-Content constraint or the Knowledge-Content constraint must be rejected. In the 
next Chapter I will introduce and defend a stronger version of  NCI than the one here 
described, one which explicitly rejects Propositionalism about intention. And I will 









This Chapter clarifies and defends Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism – NPI. NPI agrees 
with Anscombe’s NCI in thinking of  practical knowledge as constituted by intention, as 
long as there is no mistake in performance or, as I shall put it here, on the condition that 
the intention is executed (understood in the way described in Ch. 4, §1(b)). According to 
both views, I have present-directed practical knowledge that I am typing because my 
intention to do so is getting executed, and if  I have future-directed practical knowledge 
that (e.g.) I will go to the cinema tomorrow, it is because I now having an intention to go, 
which will get executed when the time comes. 
 
The difference between NPI and NCI is just in the way in which the views understand 
intentions. Anscombe was explicit only that intentions are unlike beliefs in relation to the 
normative relationship they bear to ‘the facts’: intentions set standards on ‘the facts’ 
(strictly, on performances) whereas beliefs have standards set for them by how things are 
with the facts.1 The idea of  intention internal to NPI is of  a kind of  attitude which 
differs from belief  along this normative dimension, but also along a semantic dimension: 
intentions are, at least in their most fundamental form, non-propositional attitudes; they 
are attitudes towards acting in a certain way, and their contents make no reference to their 
subjects.2  
                                                          
1 It is worth explaining briefly why I avoid the language of  ‘directions of  fit’ here. There are two reasons 
why this terminology is unhelpful in this context. First, the idea of  two attitudes having different 
‘directions of  fit’ suggests that both attitudes might have the same content, differing only in their direction 
of  fit. But belief  and intention could sit in such a relation only if  intentions were propositional attitudes, 
and I have rejected this view. Second, the ‘direction of  fit’ terminology seems to suggest that the 
normative structures of  intention and belief  mirror one another, but they do not, not perfectly at any 
rate. With belief, there is a sharp distinction between whether blame for falsity is on the side of  the 
world or the mind; it is on the side of  the mind. With intention, there is no such sharp distinction – if  an 
intention is not executed, then the fault is with the performance; something at once mental and worldly. 
The ‘direction of  fit’ language papers over important structural differences between the ways in which 
success and failure relate to intention and to belief. Similar worries are brought up in Alvarez, Kinds of  
Reasons, 66–72 and in Boyle and Lavin, “Goodness and Desire,” 170–174. Both Alvarez and Boyle & 
Lavin link the notion of  direction of  fit with Propositionalism about desire; Alvarez discusses additional 
worries. 
2 I made the assumption there that some intentions were propositional in order to start my argument from 
a position the Propositionalist would accept. But it is consistent with my conclusion in Ch. 4 that no 
intentions are propositional attitudes; that all intentions are intentions to do something (to send Bev to 
prison, for instance, rather than for Bev to go to prison). These issues have implications for the scope of  
the discussion of  this Chapter: if  intentions are never propositional then the account I give here is an 
account of  all practical – i.e. intention-constituted – knowledge. If  some intentions are propositional, 
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Denying Propositionalism about Intention entails denying Cognitivism about Intention, 
which means that NPI includes or entails NCI. And this means that any benefit of  NCI 
is eo ipso a benefit of  NPI. The benefits of  NCI were argued in Chapter Five to be that it 
meets the Apparent Features and Special Relationship constraints in a unified way, and that it 
met the new Structure-Sensitivity constraint with minimal effort. The first two constraints 
were met by thinking of  practical knowledge as displaying Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ 
Features (Ch.5; §2(a)). These features in turn were explained as stemming from thinking 
of  practical knowledge as constituted by intention, understood non-Cognitively. And 
thinking of  practical knowledge as intention-constituted was also responsible for NCI 
meeting the Structure-Sensitivity constraint particularly easily (see again Ch. 5, §2(c)). 
Because NPI entails NCI we can treat the question of  whether NPI meets these three 
constraints as having already been answered.  
 
There were two major problems with NCI (Ch.5; §3(b)). First, it was unclear whether it 
could meet the Intention-Content constraint consistently with a new – and final – 
constraint, the Knowledge-Content constraint; it was unclear how if  we think of  intentions 
as non-propositional, then we can think of  the knowledge they constitute as a kind of  
propositional knowledge. Because NPI contains a rejection of  Propositionalism about 
Intention, NPI will meet the Intention-Content constraint. NPI meets this constraint 
trivially, but not in an ad hoc way, since a rejection of  Propositionalism was motivated by 
my argument in Chapter Four. With this in mind, the problem for NPI is whether it can 
meet the Knowledge-Content constraint. I will refer to this as the Knowledge-Content problem.  
 
The second problem for NCI was to explain how it meets the Why Knowledge? constraint. 
Anscombe seemed to think it dogmatic to deny that someone executing their intention 
thereby knows that she is acting as intended,3 but her opponent is bound to find it equally 
dogmatic simply to insist that they do. Acting as one intends is acting intentionally. Why 
think that this would be a knowledge-phenomenon as well as an action-theoretic one? 
According to NCI, practical knowledge is not structured according to the Standard 
Metaphysics of  Knowledge. Why should its metaphysical structure – that of  executed 
intention – be thought of  as a form which knowledge can take? I will refer to this as the 
Why Knowledge? problem, and this problem is inherited by NPI.  
 
The primary aim of  this Chapter is to respond to the Knowledge-Content and the Why 
Knowledge? problems, on behalf  of  NPI. My strategy for doing so will involve developing 
two ideas in addition to the core claim of  NPI. The first idea is about how to think of  
knowledge per se. NPI requires thinking of  knowledge in a way that is neutral between its 
practical and theoretical manifestations, because on NPI – as on NCI – practical and 
theoretical knowledge are formally distinct. I will characterise knowing that something is 
the case in terms of  being mentally engaged with a fact, in such a way that one has certain 
specifically epistemic capacities relative to this fact. Knowing that something is the case 
fundamentally involves the capacity to express, and to make (practical and theoretical) 
inferences from what one knows. My response to the Why Knowledge? problem will 
involve explaining how intending – just as much as believing – can put a person in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
then the account is of  an importantly privileged subset of  practical knowledge, given the fundamentality 
of  non-propositional intentions explained at the end of  Chapter Four. In the latter case, I would of  
course need to say more about what practical knowledge looks like when constituted by propositional 
intentions, and how this knowledge relates to knowledge constituted by non-propositional intentions. 
But this task goes beyond the scope of  what I attempt here.  
3 Anscombe, Intention, 57. 
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possession of  these capacities: it will do so just in case the execution condition on 
practical knowledge is met.  
 
The second idea is that practical knowledge, intentional action and the execution of  intention are 
to be understood as non-reductively related to one another. I will describe these phenomena 
as three different facets of  a single underlying phenomenon. These three facets are 
conceptually related, and the underlying phenomenon of  which they are facets has them 
as facets essentially. The concepts which pick out these three facets must be conceptually 
elucidated in terms of  one another. This idea will help me respond to the Knowledge-
Content problem.  
 
I have said that NPI entails NCI but I would like to make a couple more comments 
about the relationship between the two views before continuing. First, it might be that 
Anscombe is best thought of  in Intention as putting forward NPI and not the weaker NCI 
which I have attributed to her. I won’t take a stand on this here. I attributed NCI to 
Anscombe because she is not explicit that intentions are non-propositional attitudes, not 
because she is explicit that they are propositional attitudes. I suspect that Anscombe 
would accept the stronger NPI, if  my interpretation of  her is half-right, but I don’t seek 
to argue for this here, and to some extent NPI was developed independently of  
interpreting Anscombe in that way that I did in the previous Chapter.4 Second, although 
NPI takes over NCI, my discussion of  NPI will abstract away from certain of  the issues 
which we concentrated our attention on in Chapter Five. I will not, for example, consider 
the details of  the internal rational and temporal structure of  intentional action and of  
practical knowledge. 
 
The plan for this Chapter is as follows. In §1 I develop NPI by explaining the ways in 
which, on the view, practical and theoretical knowledge are analogous and disanalogous. 
This section contains the beginnings of  a response to the Knowledge-Content problem (in 
(d) & (e)), and it does the ground-work for my response to the Why Knowledge? problem, 
which I begin to give in §2. §2 clarifies what is at issue in the Why Knowledge? Problem; I 
reject two versions of  the problem by being clear about the relationship NPI sees as 
holding between intentional action, intention-execution and practical knowledge. This is 
where the ‘three-facets’ idea described above comes in. In §3 I respond to the clarified 
Why Knowledge? problem. I list four capacities which commonsense epistemology links 
with knowing, and explain why someone who is executing (or will execute) an intention 
displays each of  these capacities. We will then have pro tanto reason for accepting that 
NPI describes a kind of  knowledge. 
 
In §4 I consider some reasons to think that knowing entails believing, and consider how 
harmful this conclusion would be to NPI. I argue that knowing requires being mentally 
engaged with a fact in such a way as to underwrite the epistemic capacities considered in 
§3, and I argue that although believing can embody the relevant kind of  mental 
engagement, intention can too. I will then have removed a final obstacle to accepting that 
NPI describes a kind of  knowledge. I will also come back to a new version of  the 
Knowledge-Content problem, defending NPI against this as well. I will conclude that NPI is 
a view of  practical knowledge which meets all six of  our constraints, and is worth taking 
seriously. 
 
                                                          
4 That is not to say that the ideas in this Chapter are independent of  my understanding of  Intention; it’s 
rather that the particular way in which I have interpreted Anscombe in the previous Chapter also owes a 
debt to the development of  the view I describe and defend in this one.  
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1. Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism 
 
NPI can be clarified by describing the analogies and disanalogies which, on the view, exist 
between practical and theoretical knowledge. So here I will state and explain these 
analogies and disanalogies, without aiming to argue for NPI. During the course of  this 
section we will make a start on responding to the Knowledge-Content problem (in (d) & (e)), 
but I will have nothing to say about the Why Knowledge? problem. For this reason the 
problem is likely to seem acute throughout this section. But I ask the reader not to worry 
too much about this here; I will address these concerns directly in later sections.  
 
a. ‘Knowledge-Elevation’ in Practical and Theoretical Knowledge 
 
According to NPI, intention and belief  are different kinds of  psychological state, but are 
both equally potentially knowledge-constituting. Only potentially knowledge-constituting, 
because both belief  and intention constitute knowledge only if  further conditions are 
met; if  they are not met a given intention or belief  falls short of  knowledge. I will refer 
to whatever meets these further conditions as ‘knowledge-elevators’. Knowledge-
elevators are factors which elevate a potentially knowledge-constituting attitude to actual 
knowledge-status. Different factors elevate a belief  to theoretical knowledge, and an intention 
to practical knowledge: theoretical and practical knowledge have different knowledge-
elevators.  
 
Theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-elevators are familiar from traditional epistemology 
as truth and favourable epistemic circumstances. A belief  will be elevated to knowledge-status 
when it is characterised by these factors. People argue about the exact nature of  the 
epistemically favourable circumstances which elevate a (true) belief  to knowledge-status - I will 
come back to this idea in (c). 
 
Practical knowledge’s knowledge-elevator is – for us – familiar from the previous chapter. 
Anscombe held that intentions constituted knowledge as long as there was no mistake in 
performance, (Theophrastus’ Feature) which means that intentions are elevated to 
knowledge-status by their execution: execution is intention’s knowledge-elevator. 
 
Isn’t there a problem for NPI here? If  an intention is elevated to knowledge-status by its 
execution, then how can we ever have intention-constituted knowledge of  future actions? 
How can I know that I will go to the cinema tomorrow if  my knowledge requires execution 
and there is no execution yet on the scene?  
 
But NPI does not say that intentions constitute knowledge only during their execution. It 
says that intentions constitute knowledge given their execution. So I can know that I will 
go to the cinema tomorrow, in virtue of  now intending to go, as long as I execute my 
intention tomorrow – when the time comes. If  we don’t think it is problematic for me to 
now know that the film I want to see will be on tomorrow, virtue of  (inter alia) a now 
future condition (the film’s being on tomorrow) then we shouldn’t find a problem with 
my knowing that I will go in virtue of  a now future condition (my executing my intention 
tomorrow). NPI involves the assumption that someone can now have knowledge of  the 
future in virtue of  relating to some future condition, but this assumption seems no more 
problematic in relation to practical than in relation to theoretical knowledge.  
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But what if  I now intend to go to the cinema tomorrow afternoon, but change my mind 
this evening, only to change it back again tomorrow morning, ending up going to the 
cinema as originally planned tomorrow afternoon? It doesn’t seem that in such a case I 
know now that I will go to the cinema tomorrow afternoon. Is this a problem for NPI? 
 
No. NPI does not deliver the verdict that in this case I know (now) I will go to the 
cinema tomorrow afternoon. For although we can say that I have one intention which I 
drop this evening and take up again tomorrow morning, intentions ought to be identified 
not only by reference to their subjects and their contents, but also in a way which 
respects the fact that they exist for the period of  time between being formed and being 
either executed or dropped (because of  a change of  mind, laziness or forgetfulness). 
With this in mind, it turns out that the intention I execute tomorrow afternoon is distinct 
from the one I have now. The one I have now does not get executed, so it is not elevated 
to knowledge-status. So NPI agrees with common-sense that I don’t now know that I will 
go to the cinema tomorrow afternoon.  
 
I will consider some more complexities which attach to future-directed practical 
knowledge later on (§3(c)), but now let’s consider some analogies and disanalogies 
between practical and theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-elevators. 
 
b. Knowledge-Elevation and two kinds of mistake 
 
I have just suggested that theoretical knowledge has two knowledge-elevators (truth and 
favourable epistemic circumstances), whereas practical knowledge has one (execution). So 
here we find a disanalogy between practical and theoretical knowledge on NPI. But there 
is nevertheless an analogy between practical and theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-
elevators. For both kinds of  knowledge can be undermined in two different ways. In 
theoretical knowledge one of  the two knowledge-elevators might fail to obtain, whereas 
in practical knowledge the knowledge-elevator can fail to obtain in two different ways.  
 
Consider first how theoretical knowledge might be undermined. Bev believes that Pam’s 
new handbag is a knock-off. Her belief  might fail to constitute knowledge by being false – 
if  Pam’s new handbag is not a knock-off  but is legit. But even if  it’s true, it might fail to 
constitute knowledge if  the epistemic circumstances are not right; if  Bev’s belief  is, e.g. 
based on the false assumption that Pam bought it down the market and not from a 
reputable stockist.  
 
Practical knowledge will be undermined if  a person’s intention is not executed, and 
intentions can fail to be executed in two ways. My intention to water the tomatoes might 
not be executed because I don’t do what I intend – I forget to water them, or change my 
mind, or water the aubergines by mistake. But I also might fail to execute my intention 
even though I do, in a sense, do what I intend. Recall from Chapter Four (§1(b)) that in 
the case where I trip over the step, sloshing water over the grow-bags, my intention is 
satisfied but not executed. I fail to have practical knowledge in both cases. (I may or may not 
have theoretical knowledge in the second case – if  I do I will have a true belief  that I am 
watering the tomatoes which will most likely be perceptually justified. Here perception 
constitutes the epistemically favourable circumstances required for theoretical 
knowledge.)  
 
The two ways in which the execution condition might fail to be met map on to two strands 
of  the way in which intentions set the standard for successful performance. One strand is 
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determined by the content of  the intention: if  the content is not satisfied then I don’t 
execute my intention. The other strand is determined by the fact of  its being an intention 
that I have, and the fact that intentions are attitudes whose execution requires more than 
a mere match between content and outcome. Execution is a special kind of  success, and it 
is success of  this kind which we aim at in intending. We don’t merely aim to get our 
intentions’ contents satisfied. We aim to execute them; only in meeting this aim do we act 
intentionally.  
 
The two kinds of  potential mistake can be described neutrally between the practical and 
the theoretical cases. One kind of  mistake occurs when a person lacks knowledge 
because she has a potentially knowledge-constituting attitude whose content fails to 
relate her to the facts (false belief; unexecuted intention). The other kind occurs despite 
the fact that the content of  a person’s potentially knowledge-constituting attitude does 
relate her to the facts, and because it relates her in the wrong way for knowledge (true but 
unjustified belief; satisfied but unexecuted intention).  
 
So despite an initial disanalogy between practical and theoretical knowledge – practical 
knowledge has one knowledge-elevator (execution), whereas theoretical knowledge has two 
(truth and favourable epistemic circumstances) – the cases are nonetheless analogous in terms 
of  the complexity of  the kind of  success knowledge involves in each case. This 
complexity is shown up in the fact that there are two ways in which both practical and 
theoretical knowledge can be undermined.  
 
c. Arguing about Knowledge-Elevation  
 
I mentioned above that people argue about one of  theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-
elevators, viz. how to understand the favourable epistemic circumstances in which a true 
belief  constitutes knowledge. I will explain what these argument look like, and describe 
some analogous arguments surrounding execution on the practical side. Traditionally, these 
latter arguments have been conceived as arguments about the conditions on intentional 
action, and they are. But NPI conceives them as also being arguments about the 
conditions on practical knowledge.  
 
First, there is an argument about reduction. Some think that the epistemically favourable 
circumstances in which a true belief  constitutes knowledge can be given a universal 
reductive description, and some deny this. A universal reductive description is a 
description of  what makes for favourable epistemic circumstances which a) applies to all and 
only cases in which a true belief  constitutes knowledge and which b) does not include 
(implicitly or explicitly) the concept of  knowledge itself. This is one way of  
understanding the dispute between what has come to be known as the ‘knowledge-first’ 
approach to understanding knowledge and the more traditional ‘JTB’-style accounts. 
  
Second, there are arguments which come up most naturally within the reductive 
paradigm. These are arguments about exactly what constitute the epistemically favourable 
circumstances which elevate a true belief  to knowledge-status. Must such beliefs be 
internalistically justified, and if  so what does this require? Or do true beliefs constitute 
knowledge when they track the truth, or when they are caused by the facts they concern, 
or when they are produced by reliable mechanisms? Ought we be trying to give a 
reductive account of  justification? Or does the justification condition need replacing with 
other kinds of  condition which stand a better chance of  being universally and reductively 
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described? The arguments between these positions are familiar in the post-Gettier 
literature, and I won’t detail them here.  
 
Both arguments – the one about reduction and the one internal to the reductionist 
position - have analogies in the practical sphere. Familiar from the action-theoretic 
literature is a debate between those who think that a universal reductive description of  
the requirements on intention-execution can be given, and those who don’t. The most 
familiar version of  the reductive account of  intention-execution is a reductive version of  
CTA, which says that an intention is executed iff it suitably causes some bodily 
movement which matches the content of  the intention, where suitability is assumed to be 
describable without falling back on the concepts of  intention-execution or intentional 
action.  
 
Within this reductionist position, arguments abound about the exact terms in which the 
reduction is to be effected; about what features must be displayed by a causal chain 
between intention and bodily movement matching the intention’s content, if  the 
intention is to confer ‘intentionalness’ on to the bodily movement; for it to count as 
executed and not merely satisfied. Again, these debates are familiar, this time from the 
literature on the problem of  causal deviance in the context of  action-theory, and again 
they needn’t be detailed here.  
 
Both debates in the practical sphere are about how to understand execution (as distinct 
from satisfaction). Because intentional action is the upshot of  executing our intentions, the 
debates are at the same time about how to understand intentional action. But according to 
NPI both debates are also about how to understand practical knowledge, because it is 
execution which elevates an intention to knowledge-status. Thought of  in this way the 
debates are about whether practical knowledge can be given a universal non-reductive 
description and if  it can, in what terms. And so thought of  in this way, both practical and 
theoretical knowledge admit of  the same kind of  arguments. Later on (see §2(b); §4(d)) I 
will come down on the non-reductive side of  the debate as it attaches to practical 
knowledge; this will be important to my response to the ‘Why Knowledge?’ problem.  
 
d. Factivity and propositional structure in Practical and Theoretical Knowledge 
 
The reader might be worrying about the idea that practical knowledge has only one 
knowledge-elevator – execution. The worry I have in mind is that because knowledge is 
factive, truth must be a condition on any attitude’s constituting knowledge. But I have said 
that according to NPI, truth is not amongst practical knowledge’s knowledge-elevators.  
 
This worry relates to the Knowledge-Content problem, which was the problem of  explaining 
how a non-propositional attitude (intention) could possible constitute a kind of  propositional 
knowledge (practical knowledge). The problems are related because it is propositional 
knowledge which is factive, yet NPI holds that practical knowledge is both constituted by 
a non-propositional attitude, and does not include truth amongst the conditions this 
attitude must meet in order to constitute knowledge. Indeed, because according to NPI, 
practical knowledge is constituted by a non-propositional attitude (intention), truth could 
not be a condition on which this attitude constitutes knowledge. Truth can’t be a 
condition on an attitude which is incapable of  being true.  
 
It is true that according to NPI, truth is not a condition on practical knowledge. But 
although this may seem incoherent, it is not, because it doesn’t undermine the factivity of  
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practical knowledge. For the factivity of  practical knowledge comes not from a property 
of  its constituting attitude, but a property of  its knowledge-elevator. Let me explain.  
 
Theoretical knowledge is factive in virtue of  the fact that its constituting attitudes – 
beliefs – are true. Truth is one of  theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-elevators for the 
reason that only by being true will a belief  relate a person to a fact, and since knowledge 
is factive we can demand that the beliefs involved in theoretical knowledge are true. My 
belief  that the pangolin is endangered can be knowledge only if  it is a fact that the 
pangolin is endangered. If  it is, my belief  might relate me to this fact in the right way for 
knowledge (it will do so just in case the epistemic circumstances in which I hold the 
belief  are favourable).  
 
Practical knowledge is factive not in virtue of  being constituted by an attitude (belief) 
with a true content, but in virtue of  involving the execution of  the intention, where 
executing an intention precipitates a fact. I intend to be typing, and I am executing this 
intention; the upshot is the obtaining of  the fact that I am typing. In practical knowledge, 
just as in theoretical knowledge, a person is related to a fact. But the way in which they 
are related to this fact is different in practical and theoretical knowledge, according to 
NPI. In the latter, we are related to the facts we know in virtue of  (inter alia) having 
beliefs about them; in the former we are related to the facts we know in virtue of  
precipitating them. This precipitation of  a fact is what happens when someone executes 
their intention.  
 
The content of  theoretical knowledge is carried over directly from the content of  the 
constituting attitude (belief), whereas the content of  practical knowledge is determined 
by the constituting attitude, and the fact that the execution condition is met. The 
relationship between the content of  my intention and the content of  my knowledge is 
not one of  identity, but it is nonetheless a tight and non-arbitrary relationship. We can 
understand this relationship better by recalling some thoughts from Chapter Four. There 
I argued that intentions (at least in their fundamental forms) do not contain reference to 
their subjects in their contents. The content of  my intention is not that I am typing or for 
me to type, but is simply to type or typing. When I execute my intention, I in some sense join 
myself  with typing, and through doing this I create the fact that I am typing; this fact is the 
content of  my knowledge. I will have more to say about the idea of  ‘joining myself ’ with 
typing in (e). 
 
We can relate these ideas to Anscombe’s thought that practical knowledge displays 
Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ Features. Theophrastus’ Feature means that it is by being 
executed (no mistake in performance) that an intention constitutes knowledge. And I have 
just explained how execution secures an object for practical knowledge; the fact that one is 
acting. And Aquinas’ Feature means that practical knowledge is the cause of  what it 
understands. NPI holds that execution is internal to practical knowledge; it is practical 
knowledge’s knowledge-elevator. And since execution is responsible for the precipitation 
of  the fact which is practical knowledge’s object, this means that the phenomenon which 
gets an agent practical knowledge of  the fact that they are acting (viz. the execution of  
intention) is the very same phenomenon which precipitates the object of  this very 
knowledge (the ‘what it understands’). 
 
Denying that practical knowledge requires having a true attitude towards the fact known 
might seem an overly procrustean way of  dealing with the Knowledge-Content problem. 
Why should we make these contortions to save the idea that practical knowledge is 
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constituted by a non-propositional attitude? Well, I have already argued (Ch. 4) that a 
Propositionalist conception of  intention is untenable, which means that if any form of  
Intentionalism is correct, then it must be a non-Propositionalist Intentionalism. And by rejecting 
O’Brien’s and Paul’s accounts (Ch. 2), I made the case that the two main alternatives to 
Intentionalism don’t look particularly likely to meet our constraints on a good account of  
practical knowledge. I hope that by the time I have responded in detail to the Why 
Knowledge? problem, the comments I have made in this section will come to seem less 
procrustean than they might at present, and that NPI will seem worth taking seriously.  
 
e. Practical and Theoretical Predication 
 
In (c) I said that in executing my intention to type, I in some sense ‘join myself ’ with 
typing, thus precipitating the fact that I am typing, securing at the same time, knowledge and 
the object of  knowledge. I will call this ‘joining’ ‘practical predication’ and will compare it 
to a kind of  predicating which is involved in theoretical – belief-constituted – knowledge.  
 
We sometimes talk about predication as something which formally characterises the 
relationship between constituents of  a proposition. In the proposition that the pangolin is 
endangered, being endangered can be said to be predicated of  the pangolin. That the predicate is 
predicated of  the subject marks the difference between a proposition and a mere collection 
of  senses. But there is another sense of  ‘predication’, where it is thought of  as something 
a thinker can (in a thin sense) do. One way in which we predicate is in judgment. In 
judging that the pangolin is endangered, I myself  can be said to predicate being endangered of  the 
pangolin. In so doing I unify distinct representations into a propositionally shaped whole, 
viz. the content of  the belief  which is precipitated by my judgment. I will refer to 
predication in this sense – the predication a thinker does in unifying sub-propositional 
representations into a propositional representation – as ‘theoretical predication’. Where 
knowledge is constituted by belief, it involves theoretical predication, since belief  
involves theoretical predication.  
 
But just as – according to NPI – theoretical knowledge is not the only kind of  
knowledge, equally theoretical predication is not the only predicating a person can do. In 
what I will call practical predication, a person unifies sub-propositionally-shaped 
constituents not into a propositionally-shaped representation or mental content, but into 
a propositionally-shaped worldly item; into a fact. I practically predicate typing (an act-type) 
not with a representation of myself, but with myself. In so doing I unify typing with me, thus 
instantiating typing and precipitating the fact that I am typing. Practical knowledge involves 
practical predication, and executing an intention can be thought of  as – practically - 
predicating the intended action of  oneself.  
 
The upshots of  practical and theoretical predication – facts and mental (e.g. belief-) 
contents respectively - share the possibilities of  logical shape, but they have different 
ontological statuses, and for this reason different (although at one level analogous) 
relationships to the knowledge they are involved in. Whereas theoretical predication is 
essential to theoretical knowledge’s constituting attitude, practical predication is essential to 
practical knowledge’s object. And where theoretical predication is independent of  
theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-elevators, practical predication is dependent on 
practical knowledge’s knowledge-elevator. Indeed, ‘practical predication’ is really only a 
description of  what goes on in executing an intention. I will have more to say about the 
idea of  practical predication in §4(c), where I will use the idea to defend NPI against the 
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Why Knowledge? problem, and against a new incarnation of  the Knowledge-Content problem 
too.  
 
f. Summing up 
 
I have not tried to defend NPI in this section, just to describe it in some detail. But I 
have along the way explained my strategy for responding to the Knowledge-Content worry, 
which involves prying apart issues about the content of  the attitude which constitutes a 
bit of  knowledge from issues about the content of  the knowledge itself. In theoretical 
knowledge, these contents match, but they don’t – according to NPI - in practical 
knowledge. I explained that the content of  practical knowledge was a function of  both 
the constituting attitude and the knowledge-elevator, and linked this idea back to 
Anscombe’s idea that practical knowledge displayed Theophrastus’ and Aquinas’ 
Features; an idea NPI takes over from NCI.  
 
I approached the task of  explicating NPI by considering how the view compares and 
contrasts practical (intention-constituted) and theoretical (belief-constituted) knowledge.  
We saw in our discussion of  Anscombe that thinking of  practical and theoretical 
knowledge as formally distinct offered a unified way of  meeting two of  our key 
constraints (Apparent Features and Special Relationship) and sat happily with a third 
(Structure-Sensitivity). But it was exactly this idea of  a formal difference between the two 
kinds of  knowledge that gave rise to the Why Knowledge? problem: if  practical knowledge 
isn’t structured by the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge, what makes it a kind of  
knowledge?  
 
I haven’t tried to respond to this here, but I have done some groundwork. For one thing 
we observed throughout this section was that although they look formally different at a 
certain level of  description, zoom out a bit and we can find descriptions which are 
neutral between the two phenomena. The possibility thus opens up that these neutral 
descriptions are descriptions of  the structure of  knowledge per se, and that the formally 
different, lower-level descriptions are descriptions of  the different ways in which 
knowledge can manifest itself. Indeed, this is just what NPI holds.  
 
2. The Why Knowledge? Problem: Clarifications 
 
It is not controversial to suggest that there is a level of  description at which analogies of  
the kind I described in §1 exist between the practical and the theoretical sphere. Consider 
for example, this description of  the way in which ‘knowledge’ mirrors ‘action’ from 
Timothy Williamson:  
 
Knowledge and action are the central relations between mind and world. In action, world 
is adapted to mind. In knowledge, mind is adapted to world. When world is maladapted 
to mind, there is a residue of  desire. When mind is maladapted to world, there is a 
residue of  belief. Desire aspires to action; belief  aspires to knowledge. The point of  
desire is action; the point of  belief  is knowledge.5 
 
                                                          
5 Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 1. (Williamson is a Knowledge-Firster, but this kind of  comparison 
between knowledge and action can be accepted by JTB-ers too.) Similar sentiments can be found in 
Danto, Analytical Philosophy of  Action (Ch. 1); Armstrong, “Non-Inferential Knowledge,” 181; Peacocke, 
Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation.  
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What is likely to be controversial is my characterisation of  the analogies as analogies 
between two kinds of  knowledge. My opponent is likely to insist that knowledge must be 
constituted by belief; that intention cannot even aspire to knowledge, let alone constitute 
it.  
 
If  left undefended, the supposition that only belief  could aspire to knowledge is 
dogmatic. But it would also be dogmatic for me to claim, without defence, that belief  is 
not the only attitude which might aspire to knowledge; that we were supposed to simply 
buy this from Anscombe was one of  the main problems I raised for her view, or at least 
for her presentation of  it as I understood things. At least, if  Anscombe does provide an 
argument in favour of  the epistemic credentials of  NCI’s conception of  practical 
knowledge, it is not as clear as one might like. 
 
So I intend to consider directly why the phenomenon I have been calling ‘practical 
knowledge’ does indeed deserve to be thought of  as a kind of  knowledge – as an epistemic 
phenomenon; as (in Velleman’s words) ‘worthy of  the name’ “knowledge”. My strategy 
has three stages. First, (this section) I try to get clearer on where the problem is supposed 
to lie. Doing so leads me to clarify the details of  the relationship between intentional 
action, intention-execution and practical knowledge, according to NPI. Second (§3), I 
draw up a list of  capacities which commonsense-epistemology links with knowing, and I 
argue that an intender who is executing or will execute her intention displays all of  these 
capacities, concluding that this gives us pro tanto reason to take seriously the idea that 
intention constitutes practical knowledge, on the condition that it is executed.  
 
In §4 I remove a final obstacle to accepting this conclusion by considering the claim that 
believing must be essential to knowing, because knowing requires being mentally engaged 
with the fact known, in a way only believing that fact could account for. I accept the 
picture of  knowing as mental engagement with a fact, but deny that only belief  could 
provide the right kind of  engagement: I argue that intention can too. A new version of  
the Knowledge-Content problem comes up here and I respond to it by returning to the idea 
of  practical predication. By the end of  §4 I will have completed my response to both the 
Why-Knowledge? and the Knowledge-Content problems.  
 
a. What is the Why Knowledge? Problem? 
 
What exactly is the worry about NPI’s epistemic credentials? Perhaps it is represented in 
the following argument: 
 
 Why Knowledge? (ident.) 
  
Pi1) NPI  identifies practical knowledge with the execution of  intention, which is 
itself  identical with intentional action. 
 
Pi2) Intentional action and intention-execution aren’t knowledge phenomena 
(concepts) but action-theoretic ones. 
 
Ci) What NPI calls ‘practical knowledge’ is not a knowledge-phenomenon 
(concept) but an action-theoretic one. 
 
I can easily rebut this version of  the Why Knowledge? problem by being clear that I do not 
want to identify intentional action, the execution of  intention and practical knowledge. Instead, I 
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imagine the three phenomena as sitting in constitution-relations to one another, and as 
importantly conceptually related.  
 
In a bit more detail, NPI sees practical knowledge as constituted by intention, on the 
condition that it is executed, and the execution of  intention and intentional action are also 
constituted by intention, on the condition that it is executed (the former trivially so). 
Given these constitution-relations, which I will describe more fully in (b), the three 
phenomena are essentially related, and the expressions which pick them out are 
essentially co-referential. But the three phenomena are not identical, and the expressions 
which refer to them are not synonymous. So (Pi1) is false and Why Knowledge? (ident.) does 
not go through.  
 
But there is another way of  thinking about the Why Knowledge? problem; something like 
the following: 
 
 Why Knowledge? (explan.) 
 
Pe1) NPI explains practical knowledge in terms of the execution of  intention and 
intentional action. 
 
Pe2) Intentional action and intention-execution aren’t knowledge-phenomena 
(concepts) but action-theoretic ones.  
 
Ce) What NPI calls ‘practical knowledge’ isn’t a knowledge-phenomenon 
(concept) but an action-theoretic one. 
 
This argument makes a weaker assumption about the relationship NPI asserts between 
practical knowledge, intentional action and intention-execution. And it is true that NPI sees 
practical knowledge as explicable in terms of  the other two phenomena (concepts). But this 
version of  the argument also misses the mark. How it does so depends on how we read 
“explains … in terms of  …” in (Pe1). 
 
The argument might go through if  my plan were to effect a conceptual reduction from 
practical knowledge to one or the other or both of  the other two concepts, since then I 
would be trying to reduce the concept of  practical knowledge to a set of  non-epistemic 
concepts, and it would indeed be unclear how what I called ‘practical knowledge’ really 
was a kind of  knowledge. But as I am developing it, NPI does not offer this kind of  
conceptual reduction. So on this reading (Pe1) is false and the argument does not go 
through.  
 
So what is the explanatory relationship between intentional action, the intention-execution and 
practical knowledge, according to NPI? An elucidatory one. Elucidation (as I am using the 
term here) is a kind of  non-reductive conceptual explanation. It is a kind of  conceptual 
explanation because it involves explaining a concept by tracing its conceptual 
relationships to others; by thus locating it in a web of  concepts. And it is a kind of  non-
reductive explanation in the sense that the norms which govern elucidatory explanation do 
not impugn elucidations in which the explanantia themselves require explanations in terms 
of  the explananda.  
 
In general, elucidating a concept of  one commonsense conceptual type may well require 
tracing its relations across commonsense-type boundaries, to concepts of  other 
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commonsense-types. NPI elucidates a concept of  commonsense epistemology in terms of  
concepts of  commonsense psychology and commonsense action-theory. This in itself  ought not to 
be a controversial procedure. Indeed, it seems to be a feature of  the way our 
commonsense-human understanding is structured that although there are various 
commonsense conceptual types, these do not have sharp boundaries. And this is likely to 
be accepted by NPI’s opponent, who will likely accept that belief, for example (a 
commonsense-psychological concept) ought to be understood in terms of  not only other 
commonsense-psychological concepts (desire, intention) but also commonsense action-
theoretic ones (of  intentional action), commonsense-epistemological ones (knowledge, 
justification), commonsense-semantic ones (truth) and so on. 
 
Elucidation is a kind of  conceptual, non-reductive explanation, and elucidating 
commonsense-human concepts in general involves tracing conceptual relations over 
commonsense-type boundaries, without threatening the explanans’ claim to be of  its 
initial commonsense-type. Because I am suggesting that we elucidate the concept of 
practical knowledge in terms of  intention-execution and intentional action and not that we effect a 
reduction between these concepts, on this reading of  Why Knowledge? (explan.), (Pe1) and 
(Pe2) are true, but (Ce) doesn’t follow. 
 
b. The ‘Base Phenomenon’ and its three Facets  
 
I have just said something about how NPI conceives of  the explanatory relationships 
between the concepts of  intention-execution, intentional action and practical knowledge. I turn here 
to considering NPI’s account of  the relationships between the phenomena which these 
concepts pick out.  
 
It might be misleading to suggest, as I did above, that all three of  these phenomena are 
constituted by intention on the condition that it is executed (the first trivially so), because 
this suggests that intention-execution is the fundamental category, with the other two 
somehow supervening on it. But I don’t want to suggest a picture like this. We should 
understand intention-execution, intentional action and practical knowledge as phenomena on the 
same explanatory and ontological level; as each equally a facet of  some one essentially 
three-faceted phenomenon.6  
 
For example, currently, a phenomenon is instantiated which can be referred to equally as 
my intentionally typing, or as my executing my intention to type or as my knowingly typing - where 
the knowledge in question is practical (i.e. knowledge which has the special features 
attaching to practical knowledge we described in Chapter One).  
 
It will be useful to be able to refer to this three-faceted phenomenon neutrally between 
its three facets; I will call it ‘the base phenomenon’. Sometimes ‘base phenomenon’ will 
be used to refer to a type and sometimes to a token. I will say that a person instantiates the 
base phenomenon (type-sense) when they are the person whose practical knowledge, execution 
of  intention and intentional action make up the base phenomenon’s (token-sense) three facets. 
From now on I will let context disambiguate between the type- and token-senses.  
 
The base phenomenon is essentially three-faceted, which means that it is not properly 
instantiated unless all three of  its facets are instantiated. And the facets are conceptually 
                                                          
6 Adrian Haddock also suggests that practical knowledge is in some sense an aspect of  intentional action 
itself  (Haddock, “The Knowledge That a Man Has of  His Intentional Actions,” 162). One way of  
thinking about the Why Knowledge? problem is as the problem of  explaining how this can be so.  
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related, which means that someone is capable of  recognising one facet only if  they are 
capable of  recognising its two others. It would not be possible, for example – for me or 
anyone else - to think of  me as intentionally feeding Egbert unless it were also possible to 
think of  me as having knowledge of  doing so which displayed practical knowledge’s 
three apparent features, or to think of  me as executing rather than merely satisfying my 
intention - although of  course it is not a requirement that one must attach the 
expressions ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘execution’ to these concepts, or indeed any 
particular expressions at all.  
 
In saying that the base phenomenon is essentially three-faceted, I am saying both that 
intentional action, intention-execution and practical knowledge cannot be pulled apart – whether 
metaphysically or explanatorily - and that they are nonetheless distinct – again, 
metaphysically and explanatorily. How is this supposed to work? I will try to explain why 
we should think of  these phenomena as distinct, and then why we should think of  them 
as nonetheless essentially bound up with one another.  
 
We can see that the three phenomena are distinct facets of  the base phenomenon by 
considering their contrast-classes. To return to an earlier example, I might be thought of  
as typing ‘causal relationship’ intentionally rather than accidentally, or I might be thought of  
as executing an intention rather failing to do so in either of  the two ways we considered 
above (no satisfaction or mere satisfaction). Finally, I might be thought of  as typing ‘causal 
relationship’ knowingly rather than unawares, or (e.g.) of  knowing ‘all along’ rather than 
knowing because it is something I have noticed. 
 
Under which of  these aspects an instance of  the base phenomenon is thought of  will 
depend on our interests in thinking about it. For instance, the notion of  intention-execution 
is well-suited to highlight an agent’s steadfastness, particularly in a context where such 
steadfastness is surprising or noteworthy: “She said she intended to run the marathon 
and I didn’t believe that she would – but credit where credit’s due: she went through with it.” 
It is obviously true that she didn’t run the marathon by accident, or unawares, but pointing to 
these facets of  the base phenomenon would not help our speaker make his point. 
 
We might think of  the base phenomenon under its intentional action aspect when the kind 
of  issues which played such a central role in our discussion of  Anscombe are to the fore; 
when we want to highlight its purposive or goal-directed character and its means-end 
structure. Thinking of  the action as an object of  practical knowledge, or as done in 
execution of  an intention doesn’t seem to pick up on these features of  the base 
phenomenon. In thinking of  the base phenomenon under its intention-execution aspect, 
one seems to characterise it in a backwards-looking way, whereas in thinking of  it under its 
intentional action aspect, one seems to characterise it in a forwards-looking way.  
 
I’d like to suggest that we think of  the base phenomenon under its epistemic aspect; as 
practical knowledge; when we are interested in highlighting the agent’s cognitive involvement 
with what she is doing, when we want to highlight the special kind of  ownership which we 
have over what we do intentionally. In thinking of  someone as knowingly engaged in (say) 
kicking the cat, we see her kicking the cat as a product of  her rational mind and as 
something she identifies herself  with; something which she thinks of  as expressing her 
motivations and perhaps her personality in a broader sense too. Thinking of  people as 
cognitively involved in what they are doing in this way also seems important to 
understanding the degree and kind of  personal, moral and legal responsibility they bear in 
relation to their actions.  
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Thinking of  the base phenomenon’s three facets as distinct also helps us to see more 
clearly what’s going on in the ‘potting the pink’ example. Because the three facets of  the 
base phenomenon are different, there will be cases in which we are happier to apply some 
of  the concepts than others. How happy we are to apply one of  the concepts will 
depend on how happy we are to apply related concepts. For example, because acting 
intentionally is closely related to intending, aiming and trying, and to being responsible for an 
outcome, and because we are happy to think of  Bev as trying, aiming and intending to 
pot the pink, and as to some degree responsible for it’s going in, we have some reason for 
saying that she potted it intentionally (even if  not as much reason as we have in Ronnie’s 
case, because – as I said at the end of  Chapter Five – she owes a large debt to luck). 
Because practical knowledge is closely related to e.g. knowing all along, and being confident about 
the fact that something is taking, or will take, place, and because these concepts do not 
apply to Bev, (she had to wait and see how the balls dispersed until she knew it would go in 
the pocket; she wasn’t sure it was going to go in whilst taking her shot), we have no 
reason at all to say that she potted it with practical knowledge.  
 
The fact that the three essential facets of  the base phenomenon can be differentially 
instantiated does not undermine thinking of  practical knowledge as an aspect of  
intentional action (and of  the execution of  intention). All it means is that the base 
phenomenon can be instantiated imperfectly. In Bev’s case, the base phenomenon is like 
a car which cannot get one from A to B (see again Ch. 1, §2(b)). Such a car still counts as 
a car because it has many features which are essential to the concept of  being a car. But it 
is a dud car in that it lacks this one. Bev instantiates the base phenomenon in virtue of  
the fact that certain concepts relating to her intentionally potting the pink are in place - she 
intended to, she tried to, and she pulled it off; her doing so was not entirely down to luck. 
But the base phenomenon she instantiates is a dud, in virtue of  the fact that certain other 
concepts do not apply to it – she did it more out of  luck than out of  skill, she wouldn’t 
be able to repeat it, she didn’t know she was doing it. And even though we might think of  her 
as potting the pink intentionally, hers is not a central or straightforward case of  
intentional action. 
 
So the three facets really are different. Why, then, think of  them as facets of  the same 
phenomenon, as conceptually related? I will consider just one reason here, viz. that thinking 
of  them as conceptually related seems to explain certain kinds of  exchange which would 
otherwise be puzzling. Consider the following two snippets of  conversation: 
 
“Did you mean to upset Dan?”  
- - - “Goodness, no! I didn’t realise I had until he’d left.”  
 
“Do you know where Superman is?”  
- - - “Clark Kent is at the Daily Planet offices.” 
 
The cases feel quite different: the first feels quite natural whereas the second seems odd. 
But why don’t both feel odd? Both look like cases in which a question is asked about one 
subject-matter but answered in relation to another. It feels as if  some conversational 
maxim is flouted in the second exchange but not in the first. Why not?  
 
According to NPI, both are cases in which a question is asked about an object under one 
of  its aspects, and answered in relation to the same object, under another of  its aspects. 
According to NPI, the difference is that only in the first case is a conceptual relationship 
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recognised between the two aspects: possessing the concepts of  practical knowledge, 
intentional action and intention-execution involves recognising their interconnections, 
and this is why I can answer a question about whether I intended to upset Dan by saying 
something about my knowledge of  what I was doing, or lack of  it. In suggesting that one 
aspect of  the base phenomenon (practical knowledge) was uninstantiated I thereby suggest 
that its other aspects (intentional action and execution of  intention) were uninstantiated too.  
 
Even stipulating that in the second case, Clark Kent’s identity with Superman is common 
knowledge, the respondent still does not appear to be properly answering the question 
asked. This is because although both aspects of  the object are known by both parties, the 
aspects are not conceptually related (so a fortiori not recognised as such). This means that 
responding to the question by giving Clark Kent’s whereabouts requires an implicit “… 
and (as we know) Superman is Clark Kent”, which lends an unnecessarily complicated air 
to the response. But no further implicit qualification is needed for the response “I didn’t 
know I was upsetting Dan” to count as a response to the question, because the relations 
between the concepts of  executing an intention and having practical knowledge are built 
in to the interlocutors’ grasp of  the concepts themselves. They recognise that practical 
knowledge and intention-execution are essentially aspects of  a single underlying 
phenomenon; what I have been calling the ‘base phenomenon’.  
 
c. The Revised ‘Why Knowledge?’ Problem  
 
I have been trying to say more about the exact relation I take there to be between the 
concepts and phenomena of  intentional action, the execution of  intention and practical knowledge 
as a way of  showing why my development of  NPI is not susceptible to the two versions 
of  the Why Knowledge? problem we considered in (a).  
 
In so doing I have come down on the ‘non-reductive’ side of  the debate about intention-
execution which I discussed in §1(c). This means, by the way, that NPI is likely to appeal 
more to someone who is already attracted to the non-reductive side of  the debate about 
theoretical knowledge; a Knowledge-First-er rather than a JTB-er. I don’t think there are 
any logical barriers on accepting a reductive theoretical epistemology and a non-reductive 
practical epistemology, but it would be a strange choice. At any rate here is not the place 
to pursue such questions; I mention the importance of  my non-reductive development 
of  NPI only for the sake of  transparency. 
 
But even building non-reductionism into NPI, a version of  the Why Knowledge? problem 
remains. For although I have stated a view of  the relationship between the three 
phenomena/concepts, on which there is no conflict between thinking of  one of  the three 
as epistemic and the other two as not so, I still need to convince the reader that the base 
phenomenon has an epistemic aspect; that there is a phenomenon which has not only 
intentional action and the execution of  intention as facets, but practical knowledge too. I am in a 







3. Why Practical Knowledge is Knowledge 
 
My argument that the base phenomenon - the phenomenon which is identifiable as both 
acting intentionally and as executing one’s intention – also has an epistemic aspect will 
involve showing that the capacities and feature associated by commonsense with knowing 
are all possessed by someone instantiating the base phenomenon. I will thereby have 
traced the conceptual relationships between instantiating the base phenomenon, and 
instantiating the phenomena associated with knowing, and this will give us a pro tanto 
reason for accepting that intentions really can constitute knowledge, when the execution 
condition is met.  
 
So what does knowing involve? Our methodology demands that this question be 
answered by commonsense, not philosophical, epistemology. To answer this question is to 
elucidate the commonsense concept of  knowledge. The following list represents a 
plausible collection of  the central epistemic capacities possessed by a person qua p-
knower.  
  
a) Knowing that p puts one in a position to “provide a correct answer to a potential 
question”,7 and to proffer this information in providing accurate testimony. 
 
b) Knowing that p puts one in a position to use the fact that p as a reason for 
“[m]aking a decision or an inference, believing, doubting, performing a 
calculation in one’s head, doubting or believing or hoping something, conceiving 
a desire or forming an intention”.8  
 
c) Knowing that p allows one to stop thinking, worrying or considering whether p.9  
 
d) If  someone knows that p, then she can explain how she knows it, and can 
thereby give an interlocutor reasons for themselves believing that p. 
 
Obviously I need to be careful at this stage not to beg any questions, either in favour or 
against NPI. So I have derived this list from a consideration of  what NPI (along with 
Anscombe’s NCI) call theoretical knowledge; what NPI’s opponent thinks of  as knowledge 
per se. I will argue that someone instantiating the base phenomenon straightforwardly 
displays the capacities described in (a)-(c), and displays one element of  that in (d). But I 
will also explain that the other element of  (d) is not in all cases to be expected of  
someone who has theoretical knowledge (again, for my opponent: who has knowledge 
per se), so NPI will remained unharmed. 
 
My opponent is bound to complain that I have left an item off  my list which is both 
central to a commonsense conception of  knowing and damaging to NPI: doesn’t 
commonsense epistemology link knowing with believing? I will leave this question to one 
side until §4. (This is why I said above that at the end of  this section we will have a pro 
                                                          
7 Hyman, “How Knowledge Works,” 436. Hyman is here quoting White, The Nature of  Knowledge, 119. 
White seems to think of  knowledge as defined in the way described. I am not using the idea in this way 
here. Instead, I am characterizing being able to provide a correct answer to a potential question as a plausible 
commonsense concomitant of  knowing that p.  
8 Hyman, “How Knowledge Works,” 439. For Hyman this condition characterises knowledge, but as with 
the capacity in (a) I am treating this capacity only as a concomitant of  knowing.  
9 Thanks to Alison Fernandes for this suggestion. 
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tanto reason for thinking that NPI can overcome the Why Knowledge? problem.) Let’s 
consider the items on our list in turn.  
 
a. Correct answers and accurate testimony 
 
Does instantiating the base phenomenon put one in a position to ‘provide a correct 
answer to a potential question’, and to proffer this information in providing accurate 
testimony? 
 
Yes. Intentions can be expressed by making statements about what one will do, or is 
doing, and there is no barrier to thinking that someone can, in so doing, provide an 
interlocutor with accurate testimony. Her testimony will be accurate on the condition that 
the intention she expresses is being, or will be, executed. 
 
An example: “What are you doing tomorrow at 3pm, Bev?” asks Henry. “I’m going to 
the hairdresser’s”, says Bev. If  this is a case in which Bev’s intention (to go to the 
hairdresser’s) will be executed, then Bev has provided a correct answer to Henry’s 
question; she does so by expressing her intention. Fast-forward to that evening: “What 
are you up to at the moment Bev?” asks Henry on the phone. “Getting ready for a night 
out with the girls”, says Bev. If  this is a case in which Bev’s intention is getting executed, 
then again Bev provides a correct answer to Henry’s question; and again by expressing 
her intention.  
 
It is her having and executing her intention which, in both the present- and the future-
directed case, explains how Bev is able to provide a correct answer to Henry’s questions, 
and these correct answers constitute accurate testimony. And although in our example 
Bev is prompted by Henry’s questions, there is no need for her to be. She could tell Henry 
about her intentional actions, present and future, quite spontaneously – again, by 
expressing her intentions, and again thereby providing testimony which will be accurate 
just in case her intentions are being, or will be, executed.  
 
So instantiating the base phenomenon puts Bev in a position to provide a correct answer 
to a question, and to provide (spontaneous) accurate testimony. 
 
b. Using what one knows as a reason 
 
The idea in (b) comes from John Hyman, who wants to identify knowledge (per se) as: 
 
... the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt 
things, for reasons that are facts. […] [T]he list – doing, refraining from doing, believing, 
wanting, doubting - is not exhaustive. Any verb can be added which can occur in a 
sentence of  the form ‘A’s reason for [Ψ]-ing was that p’.10 
 
Whether or not Hyman is right to identify knowledge in this way, it seems very plausible 
that someone who knows that something is the case will have the capacity Hyman 
describes. Indeed, it is hard to see what the point of  knowing that p could be if  it did not 
furnish one with a capacity like this. So does instantiating the base phenomenon give one 
this capacity? 
  
                                                          
10 Hyman, “How Knowledge Works,” 441. I have changed Hyman’s ‘φ’ to ‘Ψ’ because ‘φ’ has been used 
throughout my discussion differently to how Hyman uses it in his. 
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Yes. We have already seen that Bev can accurately testify about what she is doing just on 
the basis of  instantiating the base phenomenon, and being able to express her intention. 
The examples in (a) are in fact already examples in which she uses a fact as a reason for 
Ψ-ing in some way. For one of  her reasons for telling Henry that she is getting ready for a night 
out with the girls is the fact that she is doing so. This is not her only reason for telling Henry 
this, of  course, but it needn’t be to meet Hyman’s condition. 
 
By instantiating the base phenomenon, Bev is able to use the fact that she is getting ready 
for a night out as a reason for Ψ-ing in various other ways too: she can use it as a reason 
to put her lucky dress on; to call Pam and decide how to get to the club, and to intend to drink a 
litre of  water before bed. And the same goes for the future-directed case. Bev could use 
the fact that she will go to the hairdresser’s later as a reason for getting money from the 
cash-point, for worrying about her bank-balance, for believing that by 4pm she’ll look a 
million dollars, and so on.  
 
So it seems that instantiating the base phenomenon puts Bev in a position to use the fact 
that she is acting or will act as intended, as a reason for Ψ-ing in the various ways in 
which Hyman has in mind.  
 
c. Closing down enquiry 
 
The thought behind (c) is that if  someone knows that p, then the question of  whether or 
not p is the case can be closed for them; enquiry into whether p is no longer necessary for 
someone who knows that p. Does instantiating the base phenomenon allow one to stop 
thinking worrying or considering whether p?  
 
In many cases, it clearly does. It is hard to make sense of  someone currently doing 
something intentionally, but continuing to enquire about whether they are doing it. They 
may wonder whether they are doing it well, or whether they will complete it, but for reasons 
we have already come across (see Ch. 2, §1(d) & §2(c)), enquiring into these things is 
different from enquiring whether one is doing what one is doing.  
 
What about people who instantiate the base phenomenon in virtue of  now having an 
intention which will be executed? In many cases here too such a person will not make 
further inquiries into whether they will act. Bev seemed to regard it as settled that she 
would go to the hairdresser’s later when she expressed her intention to Henry. She didn’t 
hedge her claim with saving clauses, and we didn’t get the feeling that she ought to have 
done.  
 
Indeed it seems as if  it must be the case that forming an intention puts a stop to further 
enquiry about whether or not one will act, at least typically. It’s hard to see what the point 
would be of  forming intentions to do things if  we then always, or even usually, still took 
it as up in the air as to whether we would act as intended. And it’s hard to see how 
expressing our intentions could play the role it does play in our lives if  expressing an 
intention for the future were only ever expressing a tentative guess about what one was 
likely to do. You and I would not be able to make plans together, for example, if  we both 
understood the truth-value of  my statement “I will be at the cinema at six” as requiring 
further investigation up until I executed the intention. So I think we can safely assume 




But if  instantiating the base phenomenon is a way of  knowing, which is what I am 
arguing on NPI’s behalf, then it needs to be the case that in instantiating the base 
phenomenon, one thereby possesses the capacities commonsense links with knowing. If  
(c) is indeed one of  these capacities, then instantiating the base phenomenon must in all 
cases underwrite this capacity. So all instantiations of  the base phenomenon must give an 
agent the capacity to cease enquiring into whether she is acting or will act. And the worry 
is that certain cases of  what NPI classes as future-directed practical knowledge don’t look 
like cases in which the agent ceases enquiring into whether she will act as intended.  
 
An example: I intend to call Henry this evening, and (we will assume) my intention will 
get executed when the time comes. Thus I now instantiate the base phenomenon and 
according to NPI I have practical knowledge. So I ought to cease enquiry about whether 
I will call Henry. However, calling Henry is something I often ‘forget’ to do, especially 
when Julia is around and the sun is out and the pubs are open. I rack my brains trying to 
remember Julia’s schedule for this week – did she say she was free tonight? Or was she 
working late? Given the relationship between Julia’s being free and the likelihood of  my 
‘remembering’ to call Henry, this can count as a kind of  ‘further enquiry’ into whether or 
not I will call him. So, the thought goes, the base phenomenon obtains because I have an 
intention to call Henry, which will (ex hypothesi) get executed (Julia is, it turns out, working 
late), but (c) is not met, since I have not ceased enquiring into whether I will call him.  
 
The first thing to say in response to this worry is that the same kind of  case arises in 
agreed cases of  knowledge as standardly understood – what NPI classes as ‘theoretical’ 
knowledge. Consider a version of  the familiar ‘unconfident schoolboy’ example.11 Our 
boy is very insecure, but pretty competent, and is in the midst of  revising for his history 
exam. He is doing an online test which consists of  ten questions. He fills in his answers, 
getting (say) 8/10 correct (he doesn’t know this yet). At this stage he can click a button to 
get his results, but his lack of  confidence about his own ability leads him to hesitate, 
return to his books and check his answers - he doesn’t want his online score to be poor 
because it’ll be bad for his confidence and lessen his chances of  doing well in the exam. 
Looking up the answers, he realises – with surprise – that he has got 8/10. This lad – it is 
plausible to say – knew the answer to (say) question 6, “In what year was the Battle of  
Hastings?”, but carried on his enquiry (by checking his books) nevertheless.  
 
The description of  the case as one in which he knew the answer to question 6, yet 
continued his enquiry, is allowed for by our commonsense-human concepts, which 
means that (c) appears too strong as a commonsense condition on, or concomitant of  
knowing even as standardly understood. Having theoretical knowledge that p is consistent 
with a kind of  epistemic low self-esteem which might well lead the p-knower to carry on 
their enquiry as to whether p. This won’t be the typical case, but it’s perfectly intelligible.  
 
What should we conclude? I think it would be an overreaction to reject (c) altogether as a 
capacity linked by commonsense with knowing, because (c) does seem to capture 
something important. For although our boy did keep enquiring into when the Battle of  
Hastings was fought, there is a sense in which he could have ceased doing so. The example 
is precisely of  someone who is over-cautious, and it seems very plausible that we think of  
him as over-cautious in checking his answer to question 6 precisely because we think of  
him as knowing it. Observing him we might want to tell him to calm down, stop worrying 
and trust his first instincts: “Come on Chris, you know this stuff!” And we would be right 
                                                          
11 An argument to the effect that confidence is not necessary for knowing is given in Woozley, “Knowing 
and Not Knowing.” 
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to do so – his score attests to that. The happier we are to think that he knows the answer 
to question 6, the more otiose and neurotic his double-checking appears and the more 
reasonable further enquiry appears, the less happy we would be to think of  him as having 
knowledge.12   
 
So I think that there is an important relationship between knowing and ceasing enquiry, but 
it is not an entailment relationship but a permissive-normative one. Someone who knows 
that p is in a position to cease enquiring into whether p – any such enquiry is in a certain 
sense otiose. But in certain cases a p-knower may well de facto continue enquiring. 
Knowledge is consistent with occasional lapses of  epistemic self-esteem.13 
 
Chris still enquires into when the Battle of  Hastings was fought, and I still enquire into 
whether I will call Henry this evening. And this is consistent with enquiry being, in both 
our cases, otiose. In further enquiring into the facts that we know, we engage in some kind 
of  irrationality; in epistemic overkill. Sure it might seem perfectly reasonable from my 
perspective to consider whether I will call Henry, but it seemed perfectly reasonable from 
Chris’s perspective to check his answers in his text-books. Further enquiry can be otiose 
without seeming so.   
 
But there is a disanalogy between Chris’s case and mine, for there seems to be a special 
kind of  difficulty for the suggestion that having an intention which will be executed, 
renders further enquiry otiose. The worry is that it just doesn’t seem as plausible that 
because I now intend to call Henry, and because this intention will be executed (ex 
hypothesi), further enquiry is otiose. Intuitively, I do need to keep enquiring because I don’t 
know that my intention will get executed, and because I have fairly good reason to think 
it may not.  
 
Is it otiose for me to keep enquiring into whether I will call Henry this evening, on the 
assumption that I intend to and that I will in fact do so? That depends on the case. One 
question is whether I am best described as straightforwardly intending to call him. I have 
described myself  as ‘forgetful’ when it comes to calling him – especially when I’d rather 
be in the pub. The quote-marks indicate that this not a forgetfulness I try very hard to 
combat. If  the case is like this, then pressure is put on my claim to - really – intend to call 
Henry. Alexander knows what I’m like; “Do you really intend to call Henry?” he might 
ask. And the most honest answer might be “-ish”, or “Sort of ”.14 This would mean that I 
don’t straightforwardly instantiate the base phenomenon (I might instantiate it -ish or sort 
of), which would allow that practical knowledge is not straightforwardly instantiated 
either.  
 
Let’s say I do straightforwardly intend to call Henry – I answer Alexander’s question by 
saying “Yes, I really do intend to call him – it’s just that I know I often forget.” In this 
                                                          
12 David Lewis describes this kind of  case as one in which Chris knows but does not believe that p (Lewis, 
“Elusive Knowledge,” 556; see also Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 42). If  he is right then this would 
be a hindrance to my view, in that it conflicts with my understanding of  theoretical knowledge as belief-
constituted. But I am not sure of  Lewis’ intuition about this case. Perhaps he has in mind that we can’t be 
confused about what we believe, but this claim doesn’t seem convincing. It might not be rational for 
Chris to fail to recognize his own belief, but it doesn’t seem impossible. 
13 Woozley again: “… to say of  a man that he knows that p, although he is not sure of  it is to criticize him 
for […] not being sure of  something of  which he ought to be sure.” (Woozley, “Knowing and Not 
Knowing,” 159.) 
14 I do not have, in Hampshire’s phrase, a “serious practical intention” (Hampshire, Freedom of  the Individual, 
77). 
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kind of  case, however, conducting further enquiry into whether or not I will in fact call 
him doesn’t seem the appropriate thing to do. The appropriate thing to do if  I really do 
intend to call him would be to find a way to mitigate my known forgetfulness; for 
instance to set an alarm on my phone saying “Ring Henry!” Having done this, though, 
further enquiry does start to seem otiose and (c) is met.  
 
So I think that instantiating the base phenomenon – at least straightforwardly doing so – 
does render further enquiry otiose. This is the case both for someone who is executing 
their intention, and for someone who will execute their intention, although the latter case 
brings up a complexity not present in the former. The complexity has highlighted that 
the base phenomenon may fail to be straightforwardly instantiated. But in such a case, I 
have suggested, all three of  its constituting phenomena will be instantiated in a suspect 
way. So this doesn’t cause a problem for my claim that the base phenomenon has an 
epistemic aspect, and that its having this aspect follows from the fact that instantiating it 
gives one the capacities which commonsense attaches to knowing. The happier we are to 
say that the base phenomenon is straightforwardly instantiated, the happier we are to say 
that further enquiry is otiose. So someone instantiating the base phenomenon displays 
capacity (c). 
 
d. Knowledge and reasons 
 
The final member of  our list links knowledge with reasons. The idea has two parts. First, 
someone who knows that p can give the grounds on which their knowledge is based, and 
second, they can give someone else a reason to believe that which they know. Call these 
two parts of  (d), (d’) and (d’’) respectively. So, does someone instantiating the base 
phenomenon possess these capacities? 
  
Someone instantiating the base phenomenon clearly seems to possess (d’’), for a reason 
we have already seen. Bev could testify to Henry about what she was doing, and about 
what she was going to do. And testifying to what one knows is a way of  giving someone 
a reason to believe what one knows. 
 
But someone instantiating the base phenomenon will not possess (d’). According to NPI 
Bev knows that she is getting ready to go out simply in virtue of  instantiating the base 
phenomenon. Her knowledge is not constituted by belief, and it has no epistemic 
grounds. Bev can’t give the epistemic basis of  her knowledge, because it has none. 
Although Bev can testify that she will go to the hairdresser’s later, and this testimony can 
be a reason for Henry to believe that Bev will, it is not Bev’s reason.  
 
This would be a problem for NPI if  (d’) appeared – from the commonsense-human 
perspective - to be a necessary concomitant of  knowing. (Indeed, it would be a problem 
for any conception of  practical knowledge which seeks to accommodate rather than to 
explain away its epistemic ungroundedness.) But (d’) is not a capacity possessed even by all 
bearers of  agreed pieces of  theoretical knowledge. A first kind of  case is when someone 
might seem to have some grounds, but perhaps because there are so many minor grounds 
it is not obvious what to say when asked for them. My knowledge of  what my name is, 
when I was born, where I live, that I have a brother, that cats typically have tails, looks 
like this. I wouldn’t know what to say if  asked how I know each of  these things, since 




A second kind of  case is one’s knowledge of  one’s own psychological goings-on. How 
do I know that I believe Egbert needs feeding, that I feel slightly hungry, that I hope it’s not 
raining when I have to walk into town later? There might in some circumstances be 
things to say in response to these questions (“I noticed myself  looking at her chips!”), 
but there needn’t be anything to say. And most will agree that for all that, these are cases in 
which I have knowledge.  
 
These cases might seem unhelpful to some for reasons stressed by Wittgenstein, who 
worried about the idea that in ordinary kinds of  case, we can be straightforwardly said to 
know propositions like those in the examples above. I won’t get embroiled in those 
considerations here. For anyone finding the examples in the previous paragraph dubious, 
I can point to examples in which we know that someone must have some grounds, but in 
which these grounds are not apparent to the knower:15  
 
“How do you know she’s upset? She doesn’t look sad.” 
- - - “I can just tell – don’t ask me how”.  
 
“How do you know so much about the Kodiak bear?” 
- - - “I really can’t remember.” 
 
In light of  these considerations, we cannot require that if  the base phenomenon has an 
epistemic aspect, then anyone instantiating it would possess the capacity to give the 
grounds on the basis of  which they know that they are acting or will act. If  this was 
required for some phenomenon to count as a kind of  knowing, then even agreed cases 
of  theoretical knowledge would not pass the test.  
 
The capacities which come under (d’) and (d’’) come apart in these theoretical cases too. 
For even someone whose theoretical knowledge has grounds, which they cannot give, 
can give someone else grounds for believing what they know: “I know it’s true, you’ll just 
have to take my word for it.” Circumstances will dictate whether this purely testimonial 
basis is a good reason to believe the thing in question, but the requirement we are 
considering is only that a knower is able to give a reason. 
 
So we should drop (d’) from our list, and maintain (d’’). And instantiating the base 
phenomenon seems to put someone in possession of  (d’’). 
 
e. Summing up 
 
I think, then, that instantiating the base phenomenon underwrites the possession of  all 
the capacities on our list which seem essential to knowing as commonsense epistemology 
understands it. Only (d’) did not seem to come along with instantiating the base 
phenomenon, but (d’) did not seem to essentially attach to knowing as standardly 
understood (to what NPI calls ‘theoretical’ knowledge). Possession of  the four capacities 
(excepting (d’)) appears to accrue to someone who is executing (or who will execute) 
their intention no less than to someone who has a true belief  held in favourable 
epistemic circumstances. 
 
We thus have pro tanto reason for accepting that the base phenomenon has an epistemic 
aspect; that intentionally φ-ing and executing one’s intention to φ are two facets of  a 
                                                          
15 See also Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” 551. 
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phenomenon of  which knowing that one is φ-ing is a third. The idea is that simply in virtue 
of  instantiating the base phenomenon, an agent is in the position of  a knower, since 
simply instantiating the base phenomenon puts someone in possession of  a set of  
capacities which seem to be linked by commonsense, essentially, to knowing. If  this is 
right then knowing per se can be manifested in two ways – by belief  or by intention; by 
instantiating the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge or by instantiating what I have 
been calling the base phenomenon. 
 
The reason is only pro tanto because NPI’s opponent can object by finding some other 
feature of  a person who is classified by commonsense as a p-knower, which is not a 
feature of  someone instantiating the base phenomenon; I haven’t claimed that my list of  
capacities is exhaustive, just that the item on it are central. In the next section we will 
consider whether p-knowers must be such in virtue of  being p-believers. If  they are, then 
NPI will have been undermined.  
 
4. Knowledge and Mental Engagement 
 
In this section I will consider whether commonsense links knowing to believing in a way 
that is damaging to NPI. NPI will not be damaged by the conclusion that knowing entails 
believing unless we have further reason to think that this entailment tracks a constitution-
relation between knowing and believing. So I will explicitly consider whether we have any 
reason to think that the commonsense conception of  knowing that p is one which sees 
knowing as constitutively involving belief  rather than intention.  
 
I will start in (a) by thinking about how we might get to the idea that all knowledge has to 
constitutively involve belief. The idea will be that knowing that p requires being mentally 
engaged with the fact that p, where this mental engagement is what explains how a knower 
possesses the epistemic capacities considered in the previous section. I then go on to 
consider in (b) and (c) whether a person can be mentally engaged with the fact that she is 
φ-ing in virtue of  intending to φ, and executing this intention. A prima facie problem for 
the idea that she can comes in the form of  a new incarnation of  the Knowledge-Content 
problem. As it arises here the worry is that we can’t make sense of  an agent being able to 
express her knowledge that she is φ-ing by expressing an intention, because her intention 
does not represent the fact that she is φ-ing, it represents at most φ-ing. I explain why I 
think that this worry stems from a suspect conception knowledge-expression. I suggest a 
different way of  understanding knowledge-expression which is both not suspect and which 
leaves the idea of  being able to express propositional practical knowledge in virtue of  
having a non-propositional attitude (intention) intact. In (d) I respond to a final objection. I 
sum up in (e).  
 
By the end of  this section I will have completed my case in favour of  NPI and answered 
both the Why Knowledge? problem and the revised Knowledge-Content problem. I will 
conclude in §5 that NPI ought to be taken seriously, at least as a basis for further 
investigation.  
 
a. Why think knowing entails believing? (Mental engagement with a fact) 
 
I am not aiming here to rule out that someone instantiating the base phenomenon also 
believes that she is acting as she is. Perhaps we even always have beliefs about our present 
and future intentional actions. What I want to argue against is the idea that when 
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someone’s knowledge is practical knowledge, the fact that they know that they are acting 
as they are is to be explained inter alia in terms of  the fact that they believe that they are 
acting as they are.  
 
I have already set out my case in §3 for thinking that someone will possess all the 
epistemic capacities which commonsense links to knowing simply in virtue of  
instantiating the base phenomenon. But it is consistent with everything I said in §3 that 
someone instantiating the base phenomenon only has these capacities because she also 
believes that she is acting as intended.  
 
It is hard to avoid begging questions here. We need to find a way to arbitrate the dispute 
between NPI and its opponent without assuming either that all of  the epistemic capacities 
in §3 attach to the base phenomenon independently of  any beliefs an agent might have 
about what she is doing or that they attach to the base phenomenon only because the 
agent has such beliefs in addition to instantiating the base phenomenon.  
 
Here’s the tactic: I will consider an agreed case of  belief-constituted knowledge, and think 
about what contribution to the person’s possession of  the epistemic capacities in §3 is 
made by the fact that she believes that the fact known obtains. We can then ask whether 
the same kind of  contribution can be made independently of  belief, in virtue of  
instantiating the base phenomenon. That sounds a complicated task but it is made much 
simpler once we recognise that in fact the four capacities I listed in §3 actually all seem to 
be grounded in two more fundamental capacities; the capacity to express what one knows 
and the capacity to draw inferences – both practical and theoretical - from what one knows. 
So we really only need to ask, for an agreed case of  theoretical knowledge, what it is 
about believing that p that explains the person’s capacity to express what she knows, and to 
draw inferences from it.  
 
I know that the pangolin is endangered, inter alia in virtue of  believing that the pangolin 
is endangered. This is our starting-point. What is it about my belief  which underwrites 
my capacity to express this knowledge, and to draw inferences from it? 
 
I think the answer must be that in believing that the pangolin is endangered, I am mentally 
engaged with the fact that the pangolin is endangered. What do I mean by mental 
engagement? Two things about my belief  seem important: first, my belief  represents the fact 
that the pangolin is endangered, and second, my belief  commits me to the obtaining of this fact.  
 
Having a representation of  the fact that the pangolin is endangered seems important to my 
capacity to express my knowledge. Why is this? Well, to put the thought rather 
metaphorically, I can’t express the fact that the pangolin is endangered; I can only express 
my own ‘internal’ features. We might think that it is possible for me to express my 
knowledge that the pangolin is endangered only by expressing some internal condition 
which relates in the right way to the fact that I know. My belief  is just such a condition: it 
relates to the fact I know by representing it, and it is an internal condition of  me, and so 
something I can express. Having a belief  which represents the fact that I know thus 
seems central to my capacity to express my knowledge.  
 
Being committed to the obtaining of  the fact that the pangolin is endangered seems 
important to my capacity to make inferences from my knowledge. Why is this? Well, 
compare a state which represents the fact that the pangolin is endangered but which does 
not commit one to the fact’s obtaining. Say that Ellisif  imagines (but does not believe) that 
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the pangolin is endangered, and because the pangolin is endangered, Ellisif  thereby 
represents a fact. It seems that I can draw practical and theoretical inferences from the 
proposition that the pangolin is endangered which Ellisif  cannot. Consider the case for 
theoretical inference-drawing. Ellisif  might recognise the same logical relations between 
the proposition that the pangolin is endangered, the proposition that the pangolin is the 
only scaled mammal and the proposition that the only scaled mammal is endangered. But 
recognising these relations alone does not render Ellisif  able to conclude that the only scaly 
mammal is endangered. I can draw this conclusion. The difference seems to be exactly 
that in believing that the pangolin is endangered I am committed to the obtaining of  the 
fact that it is, whereas in imagining that the pangolin is endangered, Ellisif  is not so 
committed.  
 
So my belief  that the pangolin is endangered seems to explain my capacity to express and 
infer from what I know in virtue of  its being a kind of  mental engagement with the fact that 
the pangolin is endangered. And my belief  seems to deliver the requisite mental 
engagement in virtue of  representing the fact that I know and committing me to its obtaining.  
 
b. Intentions as commitments 
 
Now we can try to arbitrate the dispute between NPI and its opponent. The opponent’s 
idea is that only a belief  could provide the relevant kind of  mental engagement with a fact 
to underwrite the capacity to express and to infer from what one knows. NPI must deny 
this. I suggest here that it is relatively uncontroversial that intentions commit a person to 
the obtaining of  the fact that they are acting, or that they will act. In (c) I move on to a 
discussion of  representation and knowledge-expression, where things will be a bit more 
complicated. 
  
I don’t see any reason to deny that intentions are themselves a kind of  commitment to 
the obtaining of  a fact. First, we already know that one can express intentions by making 
a claim about what one is doing or about what one will do. “I am going to the cinema 
tomorrow” looks like it expresses a commitment to the obtaining of  the fact that I will 
go to the cinema. My reader might worry that I am here assuming something my 
opponent will not accept. Perhaps – they might suggest – I can only make assertions like 
this one in virtue of  believing that I will go to the cinema. I think that in disagreeing on 
this fact about intentions my opponent may be taking things a step too far away from our 
commonsense-human methodology. (For a related argument recall my objection to 
Castañeda’s thoughts on the relation between an attitude’s linguistic expression and its 
content in Ch. 4, §3(b).)  
 
At any rate, I don’t think NPI’s opponent can make the consideration stick. For quite 
apart from how we express intentions, consideration of  the kind of  attitudes they are 
seems to entail that they commit their subjects to the fact that they are acting, or will act. 
Intentions aim at execution.16 And the execution of  an intention (on anyone’s view) 
precipitates a fact. We would not bother forming intentions unless we implicitly accepted 
this about them. So I think we can happily accept that intentions commit their subjects 
to the obtaining of  facts. My intention to go to the cinema tomorrow commits me to the 
fact that I will go to the cinema tomorrow, and my intention to be typing commits me to 
the obtaining of  the fact that I am now typing.  
 
                                                          
16 According to NPI this means that they also aim at intentional action, and at practical knowledge; but I 
can’t pursue this here. 
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I want to be clear why I am not contradicting myself  in saying this. I have argued against 
a view (Cognitivism about Intention) according to which intentions are commitments to 
the obtaining of  facts in the same way that beliefs are. Beliefs commit a person to the 
obtaining of  a fact by committing her to the truth of  the propositional content of  the belief. 
And according to NPI beliefs don’t have propositional contents, so they cannot be 
commitments to the obtaining of  facts in quite this way. But thinking of  intentions and 
beliefs as both committing their subjects to the obtaining of  facts does not require 
thinking of  them as doing so in just the same way. I have outlined the idiosyncratic way 
in which intentions commit their subjects to facts in the previous couple of  paragraphs.  
 
c. Knowledge-Expression (The Knowledge Content problem again) 
 
Being committed to the obtaining of  a fact seemed important for being able to draw 
inferences, and I have suggested that both intention and belief  commit their subjects to 
the obtaining of  facts. What about the capacity to express what one knows? In (a) we 
followed a train of  thought which seemed to threaten NPI’s claim that instantiating the 
base phenomenon is enough on its own to count as knowing: knowing requires being 
able to express what one knows, but expressing what one knows requires expressing an 
internal condition which represents the fact known. And intentions do not represent facts.  
 
This is a new version of  the Knowledge Content problem. The earlier worry was the sense 
of  a conflict between the idea that practical knowledge is propositional and the idea that it 
is constituted by intention, a non-propositional attitude. I responded to the earlier worry by 
trying to drive a wedge between the issue of  the knowledge’s content and the issue of  the 
content of  its constituting attitude. But now we have seen a reason to worry that this there 
is no space into which this wedge can be driven: if  I am to know that the pangolin is 
endangered I must be able to express this, but now expressing knowledge seems to 
require expressing a representation of  that fact – something which is isomorphic to the fact 
I know but unlike this fact, ‘inside’ me. I needed a belief  that the pangolin is endangered 
in order to express my knowledge of  the fact. But my intention to type does not represent 
the fact that I am typing. So don’t I, after all, need a belief  that I am typing to express my 
knowledge of  this fact?  
 
The first thing to say is that the idea of  expressing one’s knowledge as requiring some inner 
facsimile of  the fact which one knows, which is – in being expressed – somehow ejected 
into the world, is a metaphor, and it is unclear what it is a metaphor for. We should be 
suspicious of  this metaphor at least for the reason that expressing an attitude, or a bit of  
knowledge, does not leave the subject without the feature expressed. Whatever 
‘expressing’ an attitude or a bit of  knowledge involves, it can’t be like – say - expressing 
the pip from a lemon by squeezing it. For the lemon pip goes from being inside the lemon 
to outside it, and so not inside it; whereas when we express our attitudes and bits of  
knowledge, they remain with us.  
 
If  the idea that expressing knowledge requires expressing an isomorphically-shaped 
attitude is encouraged by a model of  expression like the lemon-pip model, then we 
needn’t take it very seriously, for the lemon-pip model is problematic for the reason just 
given. The question for NPI is whether a better model for understanding knowledge-
expression will also require us to think of  the knowledge as expressed by expressing an 
attitude whose content is isomorphic to the fact known.  
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A better model of  knowledge-expression is made available by our language of  
predication introduced in §1(e). I spoke there of  theoretical predication – which is 
internal to theoretical knowledge by being internal to its constituting attitude (belief) – 
and of  practical predication which is internal to practical knowledge, without being 
internal to its constituting attitude (intention). But another kind of  predicating a person 
can do is linguistic. I linguistically predicate being endangered of  the pangolin when I assert: 
“The pangolin is endangered”.  
 
With this in mind, an alternative model of  knowledge-expression becomes available. The 
idea is that one expresses one’s knowledge when one’s linguistic predication captures the 
predication internal to one’s knowledge. In the theoretical case this would mean 
linguistically predicating F of  a and thereby capturing what one knows in virtue of  
theoretically predicating F of  a in one’s judgment. My knowing that the pangolin is 
endangered involves – we said above – my theoretically predicating being endangered of  the 
pangolin and thus securing a belief-content which is a unification of  representations of  
the pangolin and of  being endangered into a propositionally-shaped representation. This 
theoretical predication constitutes knowledge iff theoretical knowledge’s knowledge-
elevators are in place. My knowledge is expressed when I linguistically predicate isomorphic 
linguistic constituents into an assertion: “The pangolin is endangered”. Call this the 
predication-mirroring model of  knowledge-expression. 
 
We can tell an analogous story for practical knowledge. I can express my practical 
knowledge by linguistically predicating φ-ing of  myself, where I thereby capture what in this 
case is known in virtue of  my practically predicating φ-ing of  myself. My knowing that I am 
typing involves my practically predicating typing of  myself. This is just what I do in 
executing my intention to type and so precipitating the fact that I am typing, which is the 
object of  my knowledge. On the predication-mirroring model, I can express my practical 
knowledge by linguistically predicating typing of  myself  and thus capturing the practical 
predication internal to my knowledge that I am typing.  
 
Both theoretical and practical knowledge can be expressed by linguistically predicating in 
a way that captures the predication internal to one’s knowledge. In theoretical knowledge, 
this predication will also be internal to the knowledge’s constituting attitude – belief  – 
because theoretical predication is the unification of  thought-contents into a belief-
content. But in practical knowledge, this predication will not also be internal to the 
knowledge’s constituting attitude – intention – because practical predication, as explained 
in §1(e), occurs in the execution of  intention, not in its formation.  
 
My opponent here might demand that I explain how I could be capable of  linguistically 
predicating typing of  myself  without having theoretically (‘internally’) predicated typing of  
myself. But part of  what I want to suggest is that the feeling of  a demand here stems from 
a suspect metaphor like the lemon-pip model of  knowledge-expression. Once we have 
rejected this metaphor, there is no reason left to think that one can express a piece of  
knowledge only by expressing an attitude isomorphic to it, and we are freed up to adopt 
the predication-mirroring model of  knowledge-expression. At the very least, the burden 
is on NPI’s opponent to explain why expressing a piece of  knowledge is possible only by 






d. A Red Herring? 
 
I will consider a final complaint before concluding this chapter. The complaint is that all 
this detail about practical predication is a red herring. For can’t someone practically 
predicate something – snoring, for example – of  oneself  without having the expressive 
and inferential capacities which we have been treating as essentially linked with knowing? 
Can’t one even practically predicate the content of  one’s intention of  oneself  without 
possessing these capacities – as when I water the tomatoes by tripping and sloshing, and 
don’t realise what I am doing?  
 
The answers to both questions are yes. And in light of  this my opponent is likely to 
suggest that we still need to think of  my knowledge that I am typing as belief-constituted: 
only by thinking of  me as believing that I am practically predicating typing of  myself  (or 
just: that I am typing) can we understand how I am mentally engaged with the fact that I 
am typing in such a way as to underwrite the relevant expressive and inferential capacities 
(and so the higher-level epistemic capacities familiar from §3). 
 
I have already given a sense of  how I want to respond to this kind of  objection, for it is a 
new slant on the one I considered at the end of  (c); the objection that I have not 
explained how I manage to be capable of  linguistically predicating typing of  myself  without 
having theoretically (‘internally’) predicated typing of  myself. Here I will only add some 
comments to the earlier discussion, and be clear about the relevance of  the non-reductive 
aspect of  NPI to my approach to this kind of  objection. 
 
We need to be clear that practical predication is – because execution is – to be 
understood itself in relation to practical knowledge. This is because practical predication is 
another name for intention-execution, and we have already said that intention-execution 
is one facet of  the base phenomenon, of  which practical knowledge is another facet. So 
far we have been using the idea of  intention-execution to explain practical knowledge, 
but that was solely for dialectical reasons – it was practical knowledge that we have been 
trying to understand. Here, though, we want to understand intention-execution or – as 
we are now also calling it – practical predication. And to do this we need to bear in mind 
its relationship to practical knowledge.  
 
Attention to the non-reductive character of  NPI (at least as I am developing it here), 
shows that I do not practically predicate watering the tomatoes of  myself  in the bad case. At 
least, I do not do so in the sense that is required for – and internal to – practical 
knowledge. The sense in which I practically predicate watering the tomatoes of  myself  in the 
bad case is analogous to the sense in which Ellisif  theoretically predicates being endangered 
of  the pangolin when she imagines that the pangolin is endangered. In so doing she does 
not predicate being endangered of  the pangolin in a way apt to constitute knowledge that the 
pangolin is endangered; we can see this by observing that even if  theoretical knowledge’s 
knowledge-elevators are in place, Ellisif  – who merely imagines that the pangolin is 
endangered – does not know that it is. 
  
There is more to say, of  course, about what is involved in the theoretical predicating I do 
when I judge that the pangolin is endangered, how this kind of  theoretical predication 
differs from that which Ellisif  does in merely imagining that the pangolin is endangered. 
Whatever more there is to say about this is analogous to what more needs to be said 
about the practical predication of  watering the tomatoes which I do of  myself  in executing my 
intention, as opposed to the practical predication of  watering the tomatoes which I do of  
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myself  in merely satisfying it (when I trip and slosh). I don’t have room to pursue either 
case here. 
 
The take-away point is that whatever more needs to be said will not be sayable without 
making mention of  practical knowledge itself. This is the upshot of  my non-reductive 
conception of  the relations between the base phenomenon’s three facets, and the 
concepts which pick them each out. Given the centrality of  the non-reductive 
characterisation of  the relationship between practical knowledge, intentional action and 
intention-execution to NPI, my opponent cannot expect me to describe the kind of  practical 
predication which is sufficient for practical knowledge, independently of  talking about 
practical knowledge itself. This commitment to non-reductionism is likely to put 
someone with a certain philosophical mind-set off  NPI. But it is a central and whole-
hearted part of  the picture I have been defending: a feature of  the view which I am 
happy to lean on, and not a consequence to shy away from.  
 
e. Summing up 
 
I have tried to explain in this section why I think that someone can possess the capacities 
associated with knowing ((a)-(d’’)) I virtue of  instantiating the base phenomenon, rather 
than in virtue of  instantiating the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge, and I have done 
so by trying to first uncover, and then undermine, the motivations for thinking that 
knowledge (per se) must be constituted by belief. What I have not done is deny that 
someone who instantiates the base phenomenon – and so has practical knowledge – will 
have a belief  about what they are doing. Perhaps we typically have beliefs about what we 
are intentionally doing. Perhaps we always do. Both possibilities are consistent with what I 
have argued here – that practical knowledge is not constituted by belief. It is worth making 
some very quick comments about how if  we do have beliefs about what we do 
intentionally as well as having intention-constituted practical knowledge, the two 
phenomena relate.17  
 
First, according to NPI, any beliefs we have about our intentional actions will be 
dependent on practical knowledge for their truth. My belief  that I am intentionally typing 
will be true only if  I am intentionally typing, but I will be intentionally typing only if  I 
have practical knowledge that I am. And second, any beliefs we have about our 
intentional actions will – plausibly – be dependent on our practical knowledge for their 
justification. Here I borrow a thought from Johannes Roessler, who, in a discussion of  
Hampshire’s account of  practical knowledge, remarks that “it can hardly be suspect to 
believe that p when one knows that p and has good reason to think one knows that p”.18  
 
What are my good reasons to think I know that I am typing? Perhaps they are that I 
know that I have the relevant epistemic capacities in relation to the fact that I am typing. 
Sure, my knowing that I possess them is dependent on my knowing that I am typing, but 
this needn’t rule out that I do know that I possess them. Compare: my knowing that the 
sun is out is dependent on knowing that I am not dreaming, but this does not rule out 
that I do know that the sun is out; at least if  we think that global scepticism must be false, 
and this is an assumption of  our commonsense-human methodology. 
 
                                                          
17 See also Anscombe’s comments on “two knowledges [in any operation, of  which] one is practical, the 
other speculative.” (Anscombe, Intention, 88–89.) 
18 Roessler, “The Epistemic Role of  Intentions,” 53. 
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Another option would be to reject the requirement in Roessler’s second conjunct, and say 
simply that ‘it can hardly be suspect to believe that p when one knows that p’. This seems 
hard to deny. In either case, having practical knowledge that I am typing, which is 
constituted by intention and not by belief, can act as a ground for theoretical knowledge 
that p. Because I instantiate the base phenomenon, any belief  to the effect that I am 
typing will be elevated to (theoretical) knowledge-status: it will be true, and it will be held 
in favourable epistemic circumstances, these being just the circumstances in which I 




In this chapter I have elucidated and defended NPI. NPI took over from NCI the 
capacity to meet the Apparent Features, Special Relationship and Structure-Sensitivity 
constraints, doing all this in virtue of  thinking of  practical knowledge as constituted by 
intention, understood non-cognitively. NPI adds in that intentions are to be understood non-
propositionally, and so trivially meets the Intention-Content constraint. I have tried to explain 
why NPI also meets the Knowledge-Content constraint and the Why Knowledge? constraint, 
despite first appearances. We can allow that it meets the former if  we are happy to allow 
that someone can have knowledge of  a fact without representing that fact to themselves, 
and I explained how I see this working. And we can allow that it meets the latter if  we 
think of  knowing that p as involving being mentally engaged with the fact that p in such a 
way as to underwrite certain epistemic capacities; those detailed in §3.  
 
NPI’s capacity to meet both constraints relies on a conception of  knowing per se as being 
mentally engaged with a fact in such a way that one possesses the capacities (a)-(c) & (d’’) 
from §3, which I said in turn relies on the possession of  the capacities to express and to 
make inferences from one’s knowledge. Perhaps knowing that p explains a person’s having this 
collection of  capacities in relation to a fact, or perhaps it just is their having this collection 
of  capacities in relation to a fact. I have remained neutral on this question throughout 
this section. Whichever way we develop the idea, my thought in this Chapter has been 
that although having a true belief  in favourable epistemic circumstances is one way in 
which someone might possess the capacities which go along with knowing, it is not the 
only way, and so that instantiating the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge is not the only 
way of  knowing. When what is known is the fact that one is acting or will act, and the 
actions in question are intentional, a person will possesses these capacities in virtue of  
having an intention, on the condition that it is executed; in virtue of  instantiating what I 








By way of  concluding, I want to re-cap the considerations which led me to develop and 
defend NPI, to flag up just a few of  the loose ends I have left, highlighting issues which 
would particularly benefit from further investigation.  
 
a. The lay of the land 
 
Chapter Six aimed to remove the most obvious obstacles to accepting the key claim of  
NPI, that practical knowledge is constituted by intention, understood non-propositionally 
(and so non-cognitively), given that it is executed. It was of  central importance to NPI’s 
capacity to meet all six of  our constraints that it did not fit the Standard Metaphysics of  
Knowledge (true belief  held in epistemically favourable circumstances). So along with 
NPI as an account of  practical knowledge, came a view about knowledge per se, as a 
structure which can be manifested in two different ways: theoretically by believing or 
practically by intending. Both intention and belief  are equally potentially knowledge-
constituting states, because both can put one in the possession of  a set of  capacities 
which commonsense links with knowing. There is simply no reason to deny that 
someone with all these capacities is a knower, or so I have suggested.  
 
But for the reader unconvinced by NPI, it is worth recalling how we came to it, for if  she 
wants to reject it, she will have to reject one or more of  my premises. The first (Chapter 
One) was that a good account of  practical knowledge must meet the Apparent Features 
and Special Relationship constraints. The second (Chapter Two) was that two main 
alternatives to Intentionalism (the consciousness-based and inferentialist accounts) fail to 
meet these constraints, and do so in a way which motivates considering Intentionalism. The 
third premise (Chapters Three and Four) was that a certain kind of  Intentionalism – CI - 
wouldn’t fit the bill. The fourth (Chapter Five) was that a different kind of  Intentionalism – 
NCI, which I attributed to Anscombe - met the Apparent Features and Special Relationship 
constraints very well, and the new Structure-Sensitivity constraint; and it did this because of  
rejecting Cognitivism about Intention. The fifth (Chapter Five) was that if this version of  
Intentionalism could not also meet the Why Knowledge? constraint and meet the Intention-
Content constraint consistently with the new Knowledge-Content constraint, then it would 
have to be rejected. The Sixth (Chapter Six) was that a development of  NCI – NPI – 
could both meet the Intention-Content constraint (trivially), and the Why Knowledge? and 
Knowledge-Content constraints. I concluded that NPI is worth taking seriously.  
 
Two extra assumptions helped the argument along. One was that we ought to adopt what 
I have been referring to as a commonsense-human methodology in our investigations 
into the notion of  practical knowledge, because it is a commonsense-human concept. 
And the other was that no account of  practical knowledge which sees it as grounded 
somehow in perception, including proprioception, was likely to accommodate its 
seeming features. I did not consider any such accounts, a strategy which has since been 
vindicated by the considerations in Chapter Five (§2(b)) which led to the Structure-
Sensitivity constraint: if  practical knowledge must take in future as well as present intentional 
action, then it cannot be grounded in perception, since perception cannot be of  what is 
future. If  there are any good perception-based accounts of  a special kind of  awareness 
we have of  what we are up to, it is not an account of  exactly the phenomenon we have 
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been calling ‘practical knowledge’ (I attached a similar thought, recall, to ‘consciousness-
based’ accounts in Chapter Two). 
 
I hope the above will serve as an aid to the reader who is not convinced by NPI; as a way 
of  pinpointing where the argument of  the Thesis seems to have gone astray. I will close 
by considering some loose ends, suggesting some avenues for further investigation. 
 
b. Loose ends 
 
One of  the main ideas of  NPI is that in practical knowledge one knows that one is φ-ing 
without representing oneself  as φ-ing (Ch. 6, §1(d); §4). This claim has some resonance with 
ideas which can be found in Anscombe and in Lewis. In ‘The First Person’, Anscombe 
denies that ‘I’ is a referential expression, suggesting instead that we use ‘I’ to express 
“unmediated agent-or-patient conceptions of  actions, happenings or states”.1 And in 
‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Lewis argues that de se attitudes are not attitudes to 
propositions about oneself, but are instead self-ascriptions of  properties. But things are 
complicated by the fact that Anscombe’s and Lewis’ remarks concern self-ascription 
rather generally, whereas my remarks about NPI are specific to practical knowledge, in 
virtue of  its being constituted by intention; a non-propositional attitude. So it would be 
good to think more about how the non-representational element of  NPI might relate to 
these ideas of  Anscombe’s and Lewis’, and additionally about how their ideas relate to 
one another.  
 
NPI is wholeheartedly non-reductive and for that reason sits much better with a non-
reductive conception of  theoretical knowledge. But there are various ways in which one 
might be a non-reductionist about theoretical knowledge. Consider just two ways of  
developing the ‘Knowledge-First’ idea. On one, all knowledge is belief-constituted, albeit 
not reducible to belief: knowing is believing par excellence. On another, knowing is being in a 
primitive relation to a fact.2 If  we assume that both of  these are supposed to be accounts 
of  knowledge per se, then only the second is consistent with NPI. Whether or not, in the 
end, NPI should be accepted will depend inter alia on whether it is consistent with an 
acceptable account of  knowledge per se. I started to make the case, in Chapter Six 
(§§3&4) that it is, but a full defence of  NPI would require a more thorough investigation 
of  how to think about knowledge per se. 
 
If  my response to the Why Knowledge? problem on NPI’s behalf  works, then an interesting 
possibility is opened up for thinking about psychological self-knowledge. The strategy in 
Chapter Six (§§3&4) was to show that instantiating the base phenomenon put one in 
possession of  a collection of  distinctively epistemic capacities, independently of  one’s 
instantiating the Standard Metaphysics of  Knowledge. But notice that a parallel argument 
might be available in relation to psychological self-knowledge. My belief  that the 
pangolin is endangered seems to go hand-in-hand with my being able to provide accurate 
testimony about whether I believe it, to use the fact that I believe it as a reason, to stop 
enquiring about whether I believe it, and to give someone else a reason for believing that 
I believe it. In light of  this, why not say that I know that I believe that the pangolin is 
endangered? This would be a kind of  expressivism about self-knowledge, but not an 
expressivism to worry about. For it is not one which contrasts my ability to express my 
belief  with my capacity to know that I have it; on the contrary, the suggestion is that my 
                                                          
1 Anscombe, “The First Person,” 159. 
2 A discussion of  these options can be found in Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, Ch. 1, §5.  
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capacity to express my first-order belief  that the pangolin is endangered is central to my 
possession of  the epistemic capacities which go along with knowing that I believe that 
the pangolin is endangered. This would be an expressivism with epistemic credentials, so 
is worth exploring.  
 
What goes for belief  seems also to go for sensations, emotions and other attitudes such 
as desire, hope, fear and intention. The latter is worth commenting on explicitly. 
Anscombe, I suggested (Ch. 5, §2(c)), denied that knowing what one is doing is in any way 
grounded in knowing why one is doing it: we don’t have practical knowledge by knowing 
our reasons or intentions, but by having them. NPI agrees with this: practical knowledge is 
constituted by intention. But if  the idea just floated is right, then typically someone who has 
practical knowledge will have knowledge of  her intention too. For having practical 
knowledge entails having an intention, and having an intention (like having a belief) puts 
one in possession of  the capacities relevant to knowing. I don’t know that I am typing 
because I know that I intend to be typing; my intention itself  constitutes – in different 
ways – my knowledge that I am typing and my knowledge that I intend to be doing so.  
 
The concept of  practical knowledge plays a complex and important role in our lives and 
in our understanding of  the kinds of  creatures we are. I have alluded to this role in 
places, saying rather simplistically that the objects of  practical knowledge form a legally 
and morally relevant class. But there is more to practical knowledge’s role than this. 
Plausibly, for example, it also helps to constitute the psychological make-up of  
individuals, binding together experiences into the experience of  a life; helping to link one’s 
future self  with one’s present and past selves; making the idea of  logically distinguishable 
time-slices hard to maintain, grounding a person’s temporal unity. These issues deserve 
further attention. It is plausible that it is in virtue of  its apparent features that practical 
knowledge can play roles like these. If  this is right, then rejecting any or all of  these as 
merely apparent will have implications for the reality of  the notion of  a human being, and 
of  a distinctively human kind of  life. To repeat a thought from my Introduction, it does not 
seem clear that there is a coherent viewpoint from which to doubt the reality of  concepts 
as fundamental as these to who we take ourselves to be.  
 
Johannes Roessler ends his paper ‘The Epistemic Role of  Intentions’ by advocating a 
project in which we do not try to “offer a philosophical defence of  the commonsense 
view of  practical self-knowledge, but question whether it can coherently be challenged.”3 
I have just been suggesting that it cannot coherently be challenged. But in this Thesis I 
have offered a ‘philosophical defence’ of  it nonetheless.  
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